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INTRODUCTION
The entire Critical philosophy

is

an attempt

to

understand the

principles of thought in their relation
to man’s experience of knowing,

acting and judging.
of.

Practical Reason

And as Kant declares
,

the concept of freedom "is the
keystone of the

whole architecture of the system
reason.

"

in the Preface to the Critique

of pure reason and

even of speculative

Therefore the relation between reason and
freedom must be

seen as one of the chief concerns

of the Kantian program.

In fact,

rather than finding freedom in opposition
to the necessary laws of rea-

son, Kant maintains that

it is

the necessary presupposition as well as

the essential product of such laws.

Copernican Revolution

This,

I

shall argue, is the real

of the Critical philosophy,

interpretation and focus that

I

one that points

to

an

have found to be underdeveloped and

unappreciated in Kantian scholarship.
Kant

however.

treatment of the concept of freedom is not unproblematic

s

Kant goes on to say in the Preface to the second Critique that

the concept of freedom is such a keystone only "in so far
as its reality
is

proved by an apodictic law of practical reason,

concept of freedom really applies to something.
critics feel that this creates a disparity

Critiques

.

Is

But

between the

that is, that the

many
first

of Kant's

and second

not the negative conclusion of the first Critique

.

2

concerning the limitation of the
categories
the second

gories

C ritiqu e when

to

appearances, nullified

Kant begins to speak positively
of the cate-

relation to noumenal being in
his attempt to

freedom

in

show

the reality of

?

Kant himself recognizes this
to be the riddle of his
program.

Now

is explained the enigma
of the critical philosophy,
which
les in the fact that we must
renounce the objective reality of
the supersensible use of the
categories in speculation and yet
can attribute this reality to them in
respect to the objects of
pure practical reason.'^

The solution to this riddle, which
goes

between reason and freedom,

is offered

to the very heart of the relation

by Kant in the same paragraph:

The inconsistency vanishes because the
use which
concepts

is different

is

now made

of these

from that required by speculative reason.

understand this answer, which

is

To

an essential part of the program of this

dissertation, is to understand the unity of the
three Critiques as they

provide different principles necessary for the
theoretical, moral and
teleological aspects of our experience.

understand the unity of reason itself as

To put
it

it

differently,

seeks to satisfy

poses--a unity which would be impossible independent

it is

to

ail of its

pur-

of its reciprosity

with freedom
Intimately bound up with this solution

is

the seemingly paradoxi-

cal explanation of the compatibility of freedom and determinism
presented
Critiq ue of Pure

same event as being

in

Reason

.

How

is it

possible to regard one and the

one aspect a determined effect

of nature and in

3

another aspect an effect due
to freedom?
point with relation to

of

Furthermore,

freedom and determinism

i

s

if

we make

the

same

regard one's self as

view of nature, as phenom-

To my mind, Kant' s answer

been fully understood.
bility of

if

man himself, how can one

noumenally free and yet from the
point
enally determined?

Or,

to this question has
not

his attempt to

show

the compati-

not sound, then, as he
himself

realizes, his entire efforts in
the second Critique to prove
the reality
of freedom

must be seen as

in vain.

Therefore, a critical examination

and vindication of his solution to
the Third Antinomy constitutes
another
essential part of

my

dissertation.

The legitimacy of Kant's solution to
the Third Antinomy depends

upon Kant's theory

of transcendental idealism,

which provides

a

frame-

work within which the correct limitation
and employment of the fundamental categories of mind can be described.
causality through freedom

is

The practical concept

of

only applicable within the realm of
noumena

making morality possible, while the theoretical
concept

of natural

causality is only applicable within the realm
of phenomena, making

science possible.
In his reflections

on metaphysics Kant reaffirms the importance of

freedom as well as his transcendental idealism:

"There are two cardinal

principles of all metaphysics; the ideality of space
and time and the
reality of the concept of freedom.

But

it is

exactly in joining these

two cardinal principles that the above mentioned riddle appears.

Given

4

the first cardinal principle
and what Kant says about the
categories of

mind in the

first

Critiqu e, namely that their objective
reality

fied only with the ideality
of

is justi-

space and time, how can he account

for

the second cardinal principle?
Ironic as

it

may seem, however,

it

is Kant's

transcendental

Idealism that allows him to solve
this riddle as well as the antinomy
of

freedom and natural necessity.

To understand Kant's transcendental

Idealism as a mere limitation of reason

dom
It

that

it

gives to reason in

is to

its efforts

miss the power and free-

toward a proper metaphysics.

provides a theory of meaning and a framework
for setting up different

models

of interpretation

and justification.

This is central to under-

standing what Kant means by referring to one
and the same event from
different standpoints, by speaking of an
extension of the category of

causality into the practical sphere® and, in the
Critique of Tudgment

.

by

extending the use of this same category even further
to cover teleological causality, another important aspect of our
experience which

demands

interpretation and justification.

There
of
its

is

no way to understand this Critical program independently

how Kant unfolds
problems and

his transcendental idea of freedom.

In reconciling

in substantiating its reality Kant is at the

unpacking the freedom

or spontaneity of

reason itself.

same time

The critique of

pure reason is essentially the revelation of reason's proper freedom and

powers.

Rather than cutting off the serpent's head of metaphysics,

5

Kant gives

it its

proper

freedom-a freedom

shall attempt to

come

terms with in this dissertation
by dealing with Kanfs
answer

to the

problem of freedom and determinism
in the
for the objective reality
of

this dissertation,

solution has been

first Critique

to

and his search

freedom in the second Critique
and else-

where which places us face
In tackling the

I

to face with

Kanfs self-admitted

riddle.

problem of freedom and determinism
in Part

I

of

cannot overlook the recent objections
that Kanfs

I

made obsolete due

to

Heisenberg and quantum physics.

This dissertation must answer
the quite serious charge that
modern physics has eliminated the whole
problem of freedom and determinism
sinoe

the problem stems out of a

more, that even

if

now outdated Newtonianism, and

further-

there were still a problem, Kanfs
solution is no

longer interesting since

To answer such

a

it is

wedded

charge

I

to this

must

Newtonianism.

first try to

understand what Heisen-

berg's uncertainty principle means and
what its implications for the

problem are as well as what Kanfs determinism
among phenomena means
and then

to try

and see

if

the two are in any

attempts quite naturally demand that
of Experience out of

events springs.

which

I

way incompatible.

deal with Kanfs Second Analogy

his claim about the natural necessity

One can understand neither Kant's solution

Antinomy nor whether

it

Such

among

to the Third

has been made obsolete by Heisenberg's causal

indeterminancy principle unless what he means by the category
of
causality is properly understood.

6
I

Shall argue that

when Kanfs determinism

is

understood properly,

in its critical or
transcendental sense, Heisenberg's
principle, under

both the interpretations that

have been able to uncover,
does not

I

invalidate the problem of freedom
and determinism that Kant
struggles

With in the Critique of Pure Reason
But to
its solution,

show

the present relevance of the
problem is not to provide

which Kant attempts

to

Some Kantian scholars have argued
and therefore did not solve

gram

is to free Kant

it

do by resolving the Third Antinomy.

that Kant misunderstood the
AnUnoray

within the Critical spirit.

my

Part of

pro-

from such criticism by properly
understanding the

Antinomy which demands that

I

make clear

the importance and function

of reason's regulative nature.

Once

this

groundwork has been laid,

I

hope to be in

a position to

explicate Kant’s explanation of the compatibility
between transcendental

freedom and natural necessity— problem which
a
turns around the question mentioned earlier, namely,

how one and

the

same event can be seen

as both empirically determined and yet as the
free effect of an intelligible cause.

Furthermore,

this question could not

The key
try to

I

think

it

will be clear in this explication

be answered without laying such

to Kant's solution to the Third

a

groundwork.

Antinomy, which

develop and make intelligible, concerns what

it

why

means

I

shall

for

reason

to bo transferred into or to carve out for itself different
explanatory

frameworks or models according

to different

purposes.

And

to

understand

7

this again

son as

It

demands

that

seeks to unify

we recognize
its

the regulative employment
of rea-

own operations. Furthermore,

vinced that when one understands
this not only

am con-

1

is real light

shed upon

the seemingly arbitrary and
paradoxical solution to the freedom-

determinism problem but also what
Kant was doing in the

third Critique

With teleological principles
becomes excitingly consistent with the

determinism of the

However,

first Critique

.

show the logical possibility

to

of freedom,

claims to have done by solving the
Third Antinomy,
real possibility.

The reality of freedom according

demonstrated through
that IS, within the

its relation to

domain

attempts to uncover in his second Critique

to Kant

whose

But

.

Part

II

can only be

it is

this very purpose
it

extends the

example, into the noumenal realm,

namely, causality through freedom, and proceeds
tive reality.

its

principles Kant

that leads to the riddle of the Critical
philosophy because
for

show

is not to

action and moral responsibility,

of practical reason,

use of the category of causality,

which Kant

to

deduce

its

objec-

of this dissertation is an explication of Kant's

demonstration of the objective reality cf freedom which will not
only
elucidate his theory of freedom and his rationality of action but
will also

open the door

to his

answer

to the riddle

— an answer which is

the practi-

cal complement to his solution to the Third Antinomy.
In order to

accomplish this purpose

machinery essential

I

shall outline the Kantian

for the rationality of action, for it is here that

8

freedom shows

its actuelity.

This is to give the metaphysical
deduction

of pure practical principles,
a deduction

counterpart in the first Critiaue.

which has

its theoretical

By following the demands of
pure

practical reason, which requires
the elimination of all empirical
conditions from its principles, 7
Kant leads us to the principle of
autonomy

pointing to a purely formal and
normative dimension of thought.

Such

a deduction must, therefore,
not only distinguish empirical from
pure

practical principles but also provide
an analysis of imperatives which
will distinguish hypothetical from
categorical practical principles.
In order,

however, to establish the possibility of
categorical

imperatives, which are the laws of freedom,
Kant must establish a theory
of

r ational

whose objects

desire

will is determined

by purely formal principles of thought.

this higher faculty of desire,
of thought

which

Is

are a priori determinable such that the

one

at the

In

developing

same time focuses upon

a nature

self-legislating and which grounds the categorical

validity of intentions.

theory of desire which

The rationality of action presupposes
is really the

this rational

normative-prescriptive function of

thought itself.
This determination of the content of a maxim of action by

its form,

that is, by the form of the categorical law of reason, is the
exact

point at which the critics of Kant's formalism attack.

defend Kant from such attacks
of freedom and action.

If

if

I

am

to

Therefore,

make any sense

I

must

of his theory

the categorical imperative is misconceived by

.

9

Kant, then so too is his theory
of freedom since the former

Is the

law of

freedom

To lay the complete groundwork

for the reality of

deal with more than the logic of
practical reasoning.

reason can be practical

I

freedom

I

must

To show how pure

must also deal with the metaphvslc of
practi-

cal reasoning which goes beyond
the categorical validity of practical

laws by exploring their causal efficacy
within the concrete world of
events and actions.
including both

its

This demands a study of Kant's theory
of will,

determinations and

its

freedom.

To understand Kant's full-blown theory of
will

I

shall have to un-

ravel one of the darkest areas of Kantian
scholarship, namely, the distinction and interrelation between Wille and
Willkur as well as the

concept of ^sinnung which serves to unify the will
and establish
ral personality and identity.

Necessary

to the

a

mo-

understanding of Wille

and Wnikiir as two abstracted functions of a unitary
theory of will

is the

unique spontaneity which must be predicated of each; without
the former
there would be no freedom of legislation, without the
latter no freedom of

choosing.

To put

this differently,

Willkur without Wille

bound, Wille without

mands actualized.
humanity with

I

sliall try to

is rationally blind

W illkiir

is

show

that

and, therefore, empirically

causally impotent

to

have any of

The freedom of Wi lle identifies man as

all of the

pany that predication.

whereas

its

com-

a part of

moral responsibilities and dignity that accom-

The freedom of Willkur has the potentiality

of

10

rejecting the anove freedom,
lowering

as

if

man

to a position

where he acts

he were not free, as well
as the potentiality to actualize
this most

basic freedom of rationality,
a freedom which in the final
analysis he

can no more escape than he can
of freedom as applied to

his

own

WlMr must be

self.

These two different senses

made

clear

if

Kanfs theory

of

will is to be understood.

However,

this very important

groundwork does not

prove the objective reality of freedom.
sity of a transcendental deduction

viciously circular.
a

I

in

and of itseJf

For this, Kant sees the neces-

which

critics

have accused

of being

shall argue that such accusations are
based upon

misunderstanding of the deduction,

a

misunderstanding which can be

traced to a failure to realize what Kant
has already established about

transcendental freedom in the

first Critique

the essential unity of the two Critiques

Kant

s

,

Unless one understands

.

one will never grasp the key

to

deduction of the moral law and hence of freedom; and
conversely,

unless one grasps the heart of the deduction, the unity
of the whole
Kantian program will be overlooked.

Little

wonder

that Kant speaks of

freedom as the keystone to his entire Critical system.
In this

transcendental deduction of the moral law the reciprocity

between freedom and reason reaches

a

climax, enabling the apparent

opacity of the riddle of the Critical philosophy to become transparent.

What was thought

to be

an enigma turns out

reason's proper functions as

it

seeks

to

be a failure to understand

to unify its various

purposes.

It

11
is the

same understanding of reason

Antinomy,

m

that is at work in solving
the Third

fact, rather than the
deduction of the reality of
freedom

being recalcitrant to the

CntiaueoLPure^^

dovetail together in mutual
support.

through this dissertation

is that the

What

I

,he two Critiques

shall attempt to

show

concept of freedom in both

its

theo-

retical and practical
contexts is central to understanding
the real unity
Of the Kantian program

which revolves around the necessary
and

related uses of man's rationality
as
bility into the different

it

inter-

freely works order and
intelligl.

dimensions of our humanity.

PART

I

FREEDOM AND DETERMINISM
Introduction

In the

Transcendental Dialectic of the

first Critique

the ancient problem of freedom
and determinism by

Antinomy.

As

I

see

it,

way

Kant sets forth

of the Third

in dealing with this problem and
Kant's attempted

solution, one is in a position to feel the
very heartbeat of the Critical

philosophy as

it

works

life into the

The problem arises out of

realms of nature and morality.

a conflict of

reason with itself as

seeks an unconditioned ground which will provide
tions

.

a unity for all

it

condi-

That reason must be understood as searching for
an uncondi-

tioned ground is a presupposition Kant makes
throughout his Critical

writings.

In fact, the entire Critical

program might be seen as an attempt

to transcendentally justify this presupposition.

Kant is attempting to

understand the activities of reason which, he believes, remain unintelligible unless one sees reason as essentially incomplete
and as search-

ing for completion in an unconditioned ground.

It

is

my hope

that this

dissertation will shed some light on this theory of reason.
In the thesis of the Third

Antinomy reason sees the necessity

of

postulating a free causality "without which, even in the ^ordinaryj^

,

13

course of nature, the series of
appearances on the side of the
causes
can never be complete. '! On the
other hand, in the antithesis,
there
is a denial of

such transcendental freedom on the
ground that

it

would

undercut the unity of the work of the
understanding so that “the appear-

ances which in their natural course
are regular and uniform would be
rGduc6d to disordGr and incohGFGncG
Kant, howGVGr, attGmpts to tgsoIvg
this conflict by showing the

compatibility botwGGn the thesis and the
antithesis, and
to

understand this solution in Chapter

only because
ful, but also

it

II.

it

shall attempt

This solution is important not

shows the logical possibility

because

I

of freedom, if

it

success

is

allows us to see Kant’s theory of being in

its

relation to the spontaneity of mind.

Many contemporary

critics of Kant feel,

however, that quantum

physics has dissolved the problem of freedom and
determinism.

Margenau,

for

Henry

example, says:

Modern physics, through Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy, has loosened Laplacian determinism sufficiently
to allow uncaused atomic events, permitting in
certain
specifiable situations the incidence of genuine chance.^
Kant therefore saw a problem, Margenau argues, only because he
saw no

reason to doubt classical physics, which implies
sity

among natural events.

interpretation of Kant.

In

Chapter

I

I

a

mechanistic neces-

shall argue against this

CHAPTER

I

KANT'S THEORY OF CAUSAL DETERMINISM
AND

THE CHALLENGE OF MODERN PHYSICS

(1)

Before

want

to

I

A Sketch of Modern Physics and

Its

Debate

begin this sketch of the debate within
modern physics,

emphasize the modesty

of

my aims

in offering

such

I

a sketch.

The technicalities of relativity physics and
of the principle of indeter-

minacy are beyond the scope of the purposes of

this dissertation.

I

am

only interested in the philosophical implications
of modern physics and,
then, only as they relate to Kant's theory of
causal determinism.
shall

make use

I

of this sketch in attempting to indicate such
relation-

ships in sections

(3)

and

(4).

According to classical mechanics, within a specified closed
physical system in which there
appropriate law L,

it

is

knowledge

of an event

E^^

and of an

should be possible to predict and calculate the

occurence of an event E

2

with exact certainty.

Upon

this

view Margenau

states that

The course of events in the universe is a single flow; there
is no ambiguity about the happenings at any given time, aside
from our knowledge of them, and if a superhuman intellect
knew everything that happened up to a certain time T, he would

15

but
bura®riai'ri‘"f‘n°H“®
a rigid, filled space-time

What quantum physics has done

<=lear

determinism,

structure of events.
to this rather frozen picture
Is to can-

cel the inferential symmetry
along the time axis and introduce
an asym-

metry into events with respect to
their temporality.
but the future is not.
relating

and

When

The past

is certain

dealing with subatomic events, the
law

may be only

probabilistic so that Ej and law L are
not

sufficient conditions for predicting

Although the inadequacies of Newtonian
physics have been dis-

cussed since 1885 with the Michelson-Morley
experiment, the nature
the probabilistic laws which characterize
contemporary physics is

subject to debate.

As

I

understand

it,

What Heisen-

we can never know whether

state determines a subsequent state since

neously the position and velocity of the
to define the state of a particle.

still

such debate marks the difference

between Einstein's mechanics and quantum mechanics.^
berg discovered in 1927 is that

of

a

we can never know

initial state

given

initial

simulta-

which go together

This is so because our measuring pro-

cess unavoidably interferes with the object measured.

Karl

Popper

characterizes Heisenberg's uncertainty principle in the following way:

A ray of light, for example, might be directed upon the object,
and part of the dispersed light reflected by the object might
be absorbed by the measuring apparatus. Any such exchange
of energy will alter the state of the object which, after being
measured, will be in a state different from before. Thus the
measurement yields, as it were, knowledge of a state which
has just been destroyed by the measuring process itself.^

.

16

Einstein interprets Heisenberg's
principle as essentially an
epistemological principle which leaves
classical determinism
unthreatened.

Indefiniteness lies not in the
nature of things but in the
observer whose
acts of observation are
unavoidably acts of participation
which disturb
the reality being observed.
As the French philosopher Leon
Brunschwicg
puts

it:

remains to understand that this
^Heisenberg's principle 7 bv
breakup of determinism; it merely
means
thare^
th
that
at the
present stage of our experimental
technique we
cannot be satisfied any longer with
a simple-minded and dogatic form of determinism which
is interested in reality
without
being interested in knowledge.^
It

Such an interpretaUon allows Einstein

to maintain his belief that

not "accept the view that events in
nature are analogous to a

chance,

and

Max

we must

game

of

Planck to state:

must definitely declare my own belief that the
assumption
dynamic causality is to be preferred simply because
the idea of a dynamically law-governed
universe is of wider
and deeper application than the merely statistical
I

of a strict

idea.

On

.

the other hand, Heisenberg argues that the
probability of

physical laws cannot simply be explained because
of the inabilities of
the observer but rather reference must be

made

to the contingent

random-

ness of the elementary particles that constitute
physical reality

itself,

thereby rejecting the hidden determinism of Einstein and
Planck.

The

concept of probability

is

introduced into the theoretical definition of the

ontological states of quantum mechanics.
for

I

must admit that the grounds

Heisenberg's position are not completely clear

to

me.

However,

I

,

think Heisenberg is saying
at least in part that the
philosophical impli-

cations of quantum mechanics
demand that

observed objective reality from the
acts
is to refer

back

longer separate

of the observer and to

to the old materialistic
ontology.

says in The Ph^i
tive'

we no

c.al

Principles of th e

As Heisenberg

Quantum Theory

"an 'objec-

physics in this sense, i.e. a sharp
division of the world into

object and subject has indeed ceased
to be possible.
v^ith this is the following

to be

do so

analogy by

Max

Born that

man

Consistent

no longer

is

seen as an isolated spectator of the flow
of events:

We may compare the observer of a physical phenomenon not
with the audience of a theatrical performance,
but with that
of a football game where the act of
watching, accompanied
by applauding or hissing, has a marked
influence on the
speed and concentration of the players, and thus
on what is

watched

^

^

.

This means that the focus of scientific explanation
has shifted from
nature as an independent reality to man's observation
of nature and with
this shift

goes a whole new ontology.

(2)

With
ask

if it is

An Interpretation

of Kant's

Second Analogy

this very brief sketch of contemporary physics

I

now want

to

incompatible with what Kant says about natural causality in

the first Critique

.

In other

words can we free what Kant

is

saying about

causal necessity among phenomena from the outdated Newtonianism

which admittedly he believed

to

be true and adequate?

In order to
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answer

this question

Second Analogy

I

must

first

understand what Kant

is

doing in the

of Experience, that
a priori synthetic
principle

which

states that 'all alterations
take place in conformity
with the law of the

connection of cause and effect.

Most Kant scholars agree as

to the importance of the

Analogy and would affirm
along with H.
crux of his doctrine

is to

Paton that "for Kant the real

be found there,

Even such an avid

as Jonathan Bennett writes
that the Second Analogy

passages
one

of the

of the

modern philosophy.

most unclear parts

At the

is

critic

"one of the great

same time, however,

of the first Critique and,
therefore,

it is

one

most misunderstood.
I

to

in

Second

take the central argument of the
Second Analogy to be an attempt

uncover what must be the case

if

we

are to know, from

among our

representations, of the occurence of an
event, assuming, as Kant does,
that all events are represented to
us successively.
all

our representations are successive
even

In fact, for Kant,

when they

are of permanent

states of affairs such as a house.

For example, in observing the house

beginning from the top,

basement

On

the other hand,

we had observed

we see

the

we would have seen

after

we see

the roof.

the basement before the roof

the house in the reverse order.

Unlike this example,

however, the successiveness of some of our representations
those of events,

downstream.

is irreversible,

As Kant puts

it:

if

,

namely

as in the watching of a ship move

®
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"

cemna'statTnTth

happening

(the pre-

entitle A, and the suc-

ceeZa hf R

^
k ^ apprehended
only as following upon A‘
the perception A cannot
follow upon B but only preceL
it
order in which the perceptions
suceed one another in
pprehension is in this instance
gamely the ship example 7
determined, and to this order
apprehension is bound down
in the perception of an
event there is always a rule
that makes the order in
which the perceptions (in the apprehension of this appearance) follow
upon one another a
necessary order
.

.

.

.

.

Kant

IS

sion of

above,

answer

seeking an explanation as

my representations
is the order of
is that

my

in

to

why

I

cannot arrange the succes-

any other order.

Why,

in

cases like the

representations determined (bestimmt

"we must derive the subjective succession

hension from the objective succession

of

appearances

.

)

?

His

of appre-

Otherwise the

order of apprehension is entirely
undetermined, and does not distin-

guish one appearance from another.
representation
of the

"1 ^

-phe irreversibility of

my

being succeeded by R must be explained in terms
2

successiveness of

and

,

the events represented.

more, the subjective succession of R^ and R

2

Further-

is not a sufficient

tion for establishing the objective succession
of E^ and

subjective succession by itself is altogether arbitrary

.

condi-

"since the
^

Therefore,

the necessity of this objective succession of events will
consist in

the conformity to a rule, namely, that of causality.
In order that this relation be

known as determined, the relabetween the two states must be so thought that it is
thereby determined as necessary which of them must be
placed before, and which of them after, and that they cantion

not be placed in the reverse relation.

But the concept

20

which carries with
be

a pure

it a necessity
of synthetic unity can
only
^
concept of the relation of cause

Kant is saying that our
knowledge of the occurence of
an event
is

essentially bound up with our
consciousness of the Irreversibility

of the order in

which we apprehend the event.

In fact,

Kant says that

this is the "sole empirical
criterion of an effect in its
relation to the

causality of the cause which
precedes

it.

"20

however, with

j

N. K. Smith that "Kant in this
second Analogy does not argue
that
irreversibility Is by itself proof
of causal relation, but only
that con-

sciousness of such irreversibility
demands the employment of the
conception of causality. "21

The Humean dilemma resulted from

try-

ing to discover a proof of causality
based upon empirical criteria

alone.

Kant's problem is to find out

how

to render this subjective

thesis of apprehension objectively
valid, 22 and

must employ the thought
occurence

of

of causality

^,43

answer

such that our knowledge

an event necessarily presupposes that there

other event which is causally related
to
of our observations.

is that

it

syn-

we

of the

some

Is

thereby determining the order

This is a presupposition without which the
very

experience of an event would be impossible, 22
since "in the synthesis
of

appearances the manifold

and

I

of representations is

always successive"

perceive or assume that in this succession there

to the preceding state, from

is a

relation

which the representation follows

in

21

conformity with a rule. "24

saying that when

we experience

something that happens, we cannot
reverse our observations, because
to recognize

something as an event

fr0iTiGwork of

is to

already place

it

within a

c3usg 3nd GffGct.

Kant's answGr to

Humo,

thoroforG, is thG following;

If all

suc-

CGSsion of pGrcGptions worG mGrGly
subjGctivG, thGn GxpGriGncG would
be "a play of roprosontations

,

rolating to no objGct; that is to say,

would not bG possiblG through our pGrcGption

to distinguish

appoarancG from anothor as rGgards rolations of
timG.
that

WG

it

ono

Humo admits

arG conscious of a succession of events
from which the con-

cept of cause

argument

is

abstracted.

is totally

According to Kant, however, such an

misconceived because, as

L.

W.

Beck puts

it:

The distinction between event-sequences and mere
sequences
of representations (which is all Hume has
a right to claim to
know) itself requires the principle that the object of one
representation must precede the object of the other. But this
principle is equivalent to the causal principle itself.
Hence in
supposing that we observe sequences of events and then
come to know by generalization that the earlier event is the

cause of the later, Hume put the cart before the horse. We
do not know that we are cognizing events except when we

know

that events are causally related in a way in which
simultaneous states of affairs /^.g. the roof and basement
of a houseJ7 are not causally related.

Against Hume, the Kantian position

is that

concepts such as causality

can be found in experience "only because we have put them into
experience, and because experience

by their means

.

is

thus itself brought about only

22

The proof of the second Analogy

is

an exemplification of Kant's

transcendental deductive method
which follows this schema:

Any

formal element without which
experience would be impossible
is necessary. In the experience of
an event the order of our
apprehension is

determined such that one cannot
know

of the

occurrence of an event

without regarding the order of
his apprehension as irreversible.
this

were not true, the observation

of events could not be
distinguished

from the observation of permanent
states.
irreversibility

If

The consciousness

would be impossible without the employment

such

of

con-

of the

cept of causality which states that
every event follows some other

event according to a rule.

The employment of the category of causality,

therefore, is necessary.

This proof of the necessity of the
category of causality in no

says that the verification of specific events

is a priori, nor

does

way

it

say that, given any specific event, there
must be necessary and sufficient conditions for its occurring.

Kant is arguing that the form

the causal law is necessary and universal.
the occurrence of an event unless

we employ

Otherwise there would be no way to account

We

are not able to

of

know

the thought of causality.
for the irreversibility of

the order of our apprehension of events.

Kant

is

not saying that

successive events,

would be impossible

and
for

E^^

if it

,

of

would be impossible

to

observe two

without observing E2 after E^

,

that

to exist without E2 existing after it.

it
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Rather Kent Is arguing that, by
actually observing two such
events, we
are not thereby enabled
to know that an event
Is occurring unless

we employ

the thought that

some event such as

There are, of course, instances

where

ing)

seem

E^

to cast

causes E2

Kanfs

.

example thunder and lighten-

(for

we observe

and yet

,

caused E2

E2 before E^

irreversibility thesis into doubt.

.

This might

But Kant himself

notes that many causes are
simultaneous with their effects, for
example, a stove heating and the
room warming or a ball laying on a
cushion

and

a

hollow in the cushion occurring.

h^ a

to explain

place first.

He

person,
is

who knows

arguing that

we must employ

ring, then

or^

its

cause.

we

two events, knows which takes

are to

by reference

And an event "can acquire

an event's occur-

to

some

prior event

which we have

which

it is

the

to reckon.

this determinate position in this relation of

time only in so far as something
it

of

Kant asks us not to "fail to note that

of time, not the lapse of time, with

upon which

know

the thought of causality in order to
assign

a temporal order to the event

serves as

if

of

Kant is not saying or trying

is

presupposed

in the

preceding state

follows invariably, that is, in accordance with a rule.

This applies in the case where the cause is
simultaneous with the
effect just as
"I

it

does when cause and effect are in serial succession.

cannot reverse the series, placing that which happens

upon which

it

follows.

I

prior to that

could not know, according to Kant, of the

occurrence of an event, such as the warming of the room,

if

there were

,

.
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no way

of

temporally determining

such as the heating

it

with relation to some other
event,

of the stove, so that

it

would be impossible

for

the former event to precede
the latter.
It

is

probably worth noting at this point

Kant's development of the Second
Analogy.

ment lends

a

possible confusion in

The language of the argu-

itself to a realistic interpretation
in that

it

refers to a

subjective succession of representations
and an objective succession
of events to

which our representations correspond.

We

must, however,

constantly keep in mind Kant's transcendental
idealism:

may be
they

things

themselves, apart from the representations
through which

in

may

"How

affect us, is entirely outside our sphere
of knowledge

Events for Kant are appearances, and the
point of Kant's argument

is to

distinguish the different relations these appearances
have to each
other.

It,

therefore, would probably be less confusing, although

more awkward,

much

to refer to a "successive-state-perception-series

rather than to talk in terms of perceptions that correspond
to events.
It

must be remembered that Kant

is

seeking to establish the source

of

the objectivity of experience which cannot be established
through mere

observation alone.
A Kantian scholar

who

criticizes the argument of the Second Anal-

ogy by falling into the above confusion

is P.

I'.

Strawson.

He argues

that Kant eguivocates on the notion of necessity by shifting from the

necessity of the order of our perceptions, which

is a

conceptual

25

necessity ..given that which
B,

observed

to a causal necessity
existing

inues by saying

by

is

a

It

is a

is in fact a

between A and

change from A

B themselves.

to

Straw-

very curious contortion
indeed where-

conceptual necessity based
on the fact of

a

change

is

equated

with the causal necessity
of that very change.
But as

1

have tried to point out,
Kant's argument cannot be
inter-

preted in this manner.

What Strawson

is

assuming

is that it is analytic

that our perceptions are
irreversible in this case,
because

observing an event, when this
Kant

is

fact a

work.

saying that

is

to B

are

actually begging Kant's
question.

we cannot know

change from A

we

that

what we are observing

unless the category of causality

is

is in

already at

Kant is not shifting from a
conceptual necessity among our

appearances to a causal necessity among
objects, but rather trying

to

explain the objectivity which
exists among the appearances which
make

up our experience.

He

is trying to

discover what will make our "sub-

jective synthesis of apprehension
objective

take,

I

.

Strawson's main mis-

think, IS to fall into the trap of
interpreting Kant's language

along lines of realism which
thesis of objectivity:

is

evidenced by what he calls Kant's

"that experience

must include awareness

jects which are distinguishable from
experiences of them.

of

ob-

Such

a

confusion unfortunately colors the rest of
Strawson's interpretations of
Kant, including his reading of the causal
proof.

Another interesting criticism has been recently
given by

J.

Bennett

.
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who argues

that Just as

otherwise arranged.
of the ship could

"the

If i

my observations

of the

house could have been

had acted differently, so
too

have occurred In

for

example,

couW ha™

I

myself the spectacle of the boat
being back-paddled, storn

foremost Into the harbor.
is that, in his

Given a

observations

a different order. If,
for

coxswain of the boat was under
orders from me,

secured

my

''37

example, he

^fferenl event,

a different order.

But the obvious mistake
Bennett

Is

no longer referring

our perceptions of

Furthermore, as

W.

It,

to the

makes

same event.

of course, will be In

A. Suchtlng correctly points

out,

the difference between

my

bringing this about by orders to
the
a different order of perceptions of the parts of
houseJ7 is that in the former case I
can bring about a different order of
perceptions only by
causally influencing the state of
affairs itself, whilst in the
case of the /^houseJ7 i can bring about
the difference by
causally influencing myself alone. ^

coxswain and my bringing about

(3)

Relations between the Second Analogy
and the
Principle of Indeterminacy

Going back now

to our original question,

we may ask how does

contemporary physics, especially the indeterminacy
principle, relate
to

what Kant says about causality

should like to affirm

in the

my agreement with

Second Analogy?
L.

W. Beck,^^

First,

I

that rather than

making Kant's views on causality indefensible, the
indeterminacy principle, on the contrary,

arguments

seems

to require the

Second Analogy

for its

own
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Although Hunne and Kant
disagree as to the origin of
the ooncopt
of causality,
nevertheless they both agree
that event-series

seen as causally related.

However,

if

must be

the modern physicist is
saying

that there are non-causally
related (i.e.

statistically related) event-

,

series (i.e., sub-atomic
event-series) which can be
recognized as

event-series independently of any
causal

laws,«

then a disagreement

of a different kind arises,
since Kant maintains that

events only by using the concept
of cause.
Kant would ask the following
question:
that E2 temporally follows
Ej ?

that his representations

we recognize

As Beck correctly sees,

"How does

the physicist

know

More fundamentally, how does he know

and

are representations of events,

the

if

events in question are not causally
related

To obtain evidence that there

member

is a

of an event-series following

subatomic event

subatomic event

not governed by any causal law (that
is, given E^
not the case that

somehow

we can

which

is a

and which

and some law

is

it is

necessarily predict E^), the physicist must

conrelate these subatomic events with
empirically observable

phenomena, such as flashes
Beck's own example,

let us

of light and clock readings.

say that the flashes of light

Borrowing

and

are

evidence from the unobserved subatomic events and that
we set our
clock at Cj marking time
a

when we see

Fj

,

and we discover that

in

percentage of cases (perhaps even 99% of the time) F^ occurs
when

the clock is at

at time T^.

The point

is this:

In order for the
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Physicist to

know

that

and

other, there had to be a
“Hlor

are events not causally
related to each

dec^ that the states of affairs we call

events in the clock-series
are causally related and
hence Invariably

associated with each other in

a fixed
d
iixea orHor
oraer

and upon empirical fact

,

that the F-series is not
invariably correlated with the
C-series.

That

is

,

the only

realizing the temporal

way we can say

successivene^

E^

and

of the flashes of light

like Kant's representations
of an event series.

can realize

this

successiveness

relation with the C-series

because
not

know

which are

And the only way we

of the F-series is

by means of

its

Without such correlation we could

could not appear before F^

,

and that

if

that could

occur, then that which the F-series
represents would not be events
all but rather

I

cor-

whose temporal determinations we know

of its causal relatedness.
that

are events is by

at

simultaneous states of affairs (as in Kant's
house example). 43

agree, therefore, with Beck that
there are good epistemological grounds
for regarding our knowledge of indeterminacy as parasitic upon
our knowledge of

causal determinacy. Without the causal determinacy
of
middle-sized objects, as asserted in the Second
Analogy,
I do not see how we could
get the evidence we have for noncausal relations among microscopic objects.
Although when

first

presenting his uncertainty principle Heisen-

berg seemed to think that the causal principle
was no longer valid,

Lhy sics and Philosophy he seems
ment:

to

agree with the above argu-
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n the discussion of the
Copenhagen interpretation of guantum
theory u has been emphasized
that we use the c°asLarcor
experimental equipment and more
qenlran
generally in describing that part
of the world which does
not
elong to the object of the
experiment. The use of these
concepts, including space, time,
and causality, is in fact
the condition for observing
atomic events and is, in this
sense of the word, "a priori. "46
'

However Heisenberg goes on

What Kant had

to assert that

not foreseen

was

that these a priori

concepts
can be the conditions for science
and at the same time can
ave only a limited range of applicability
Modern
P ysics has changed Kant's statement
about the possibility
o synthetic judgments a priori from
a metaphysical one into
a practical one. The synthetic
judgments a priori thereby
have the character of a relative truth. 47

/

This brings up our main question
concerning what kind of deter-

miniMlis being maintained by Kant's
Kant

mean by

Critical philosophy.

What does

calling nature, in the Third Antinomy,
"that connection of

appearances determining one another with necessity
according
sal laws"

to univer

and by saying, in the Second Analogy, that

there is an order in our representations in which
the present,
so far as it has come to be, refers us to some
preceding
state as a correlate of the event which is given;
and though
this correlate is, indeed, indeterminate, it
none the less
stands in a determining relation to the event as its consequence, connecting the event in necessary relation with
itself in the time-series?^^

Or, to put

it

another way, how are

which the understanding, through
ity, legislates to

we can answer

experience?

we

its

to

understand the 'objectivity'

use of categories such as causal-

This question must be answered botoro

the question as to whether the quantum mechanics

o(
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Heisenberg has made Kant's
solution to the freedom-determinism
problem irrelevant.
Heisenberg's remarks on Kant are
not fully clear.

However, from

the implications that he
draws, namely that because a
prior cause for
the emission of an a-particle
from a radium atom cannot be
found,

"Kant's arguments for the a priori
character of the law of causality
no

longer apply.

he seems to be interpreting Kant's
determinism as

implying that the modal status of
specific causal laws

by some kind

of a priori necessity.

Given

is

characterized

this Interpretation of Kant,

the indeterminacy principle, as
Heisenberg and Margenau interpret
(in

contradistinction to Einstein and Planck),
would deal a death blow

to Kant's

view of causal determinism, dissolving
the problem with

freedom as stated in the Third Antinomy.

use of the a
IS

it

priori

Heisenberg admits that the

concept of causality in a limited and practical
sense

necessary, but a strong and universal determinism
among events

has been empirically disproven by quantum
mechanics.
I

shall point out now, with the promise to expand
later, what

Paton says in his discussion of the Second Analogy,
which seems to me
quite on target:

what the mind thus imposes upon objects is the universal law of necessary succession or causation.
Particular
causal laws can be known only as a result of experience.
for Kant

Their particularity belongs to the matter of experience, not
to
form. As such it must be due to things-in-themselves and
not to the knowing mind.^^
its
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Kant specifically states that
the law of causality argued
for in the Sec-

ond Analogy

is a

necessary law of our sensibility,
and therefore

a

formal condition of all
perceptions, that the preceding
time necessarily

determines the succeeding
Kant thought this
Ej

and

somehow

The controversial point

.

entails that

is the

if

is

cause

whether

of E

then

are necessarily connected.

As Charles Hartshorne states in
"Freedom Requires Indeterminism

and Universal Causality", almost
everyone agrees that every event has
Its

causes, but "an indeterminist

a certain definition of ’cause',

(as

conceived in this

namely that

conditions, from which only one outcome
in principle or ideally, the

outcome

is

is

it

is a

article) rejects

condition, or set of

possible, or from which,

wholly predictable."^"^

The

question is, granted that this strong sense of
causal necessity properly characterizes the Newtonian-Laplacian
physics, does Kant's view
of causal determinism simply mirror this
classical position, thereby

standing or failing with it?

determinism

is

I

shall argue that

understood properly, in

sense, the quantum mechanics

its

when

Kant's view of

transcendental or critical

of the indeterminist school

does not

invalidate the problem of freedom and determinism that Kant
wrestles

with in his

first

(4)

Critique

.

Kant's Causal Determinism as a

Newtonian-Laplacian determinism
its

in

Demand

of

Reason

physics did of course have

metaphysical counterpart in rationalism, especially in Spinoza and
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Leibniz.

Although Leibniz tried

of Spinoza, nevertheless
both

escape the logical necessitariani
sm

to

saw nature

in terms of a substance

ontology with an established
destiny which flowed out of the
divine

substance.

The unity of nature had

a

cosmic grounding which stamped

the essence of each substance
with strict necessity.

Hume undermined

this

dogmatic determinism by taking away
the

substance ontology upon which

it

limited to a world of impressions.

was based; human knowledge was
However, Hume, under

his

empi-

rical presuppositions, could
offer no objective significance to
the

causal concept since there

is

no impression of

it.

Facing this situa-

tion, Kant revolutionized
metaphysical inquiries by adopting a

new

philosophical methodology which he calls
critical or transcendental:
il QJ^scendental

^

all

knowledge which

is

occupied not so much

with objects as with the mode of our knowledge
of objects in so
this

mode

of

knowledge

this critical approach

is to

be possible a priori.

when speaking

far as

To overlook

of Kant is to overlook Kant

com-

pletely.

Kant

s

inquiry into the concept of causality must be understood

in this critical spirit

necessary

an inquiry which searches

out the concepts

for the objectivity of experience:

therefore easily comprehend the concept of cause, as a
concept necessarily belonging to the mere form of experience, and its possibility as a synthetical union of
I

perceptions in consciousness in general; but

I

do not

at

.
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all

comprehend the possibility

of a thing in general as a
cause denotes a condition
not at all belonging to things,
but to experience. For
°f

experience can be nothing but
objectively valid knowledge
appearances and of their succession.

of

.

Kant's views of natural necessity,
or what can be called his "critical

determinism

focuses not upon particular causal
connections among

,

empirical things,

but rather upon a

way

of thinking without

which

an experience of nature would be
impossible.
Specific empirical laws must be established
for Kant by

way

of

inductive procedures--procedures upon
which Kant never fully elaborates

.

The necessitarian character of these laws

this empirical

manner but

is rather

versal conditions of experience
tion of Kant that

I

am

not established in

is

prescribed "in accordance with uniIt

.

is

trying to develop to

important to the interpreta-

remember

that the categories

of modality, in this case, necessity, are
not objectively synthetic

because they add nothing
predicated.

to the

concept of an object

of

which they are

They are what Kant calls "subjectively synthetic" because

they indicate only the relationship that objects must have to
the knowing mind.

That is, they refer only to

tlie

action of the mind by which

the concept is produced.

Also,

it

must be understood that the principles

restricted to empirical thought--! e
.

.

,

not to mere thoughts

modality are

they are concerned with real (not

logical) possibility, actuality, and necessity.

refer to objects

of

.

In other

words, they

In the Preface to the

second

.

34

edition, Kant explains this
distinction and thereby his
opposition to

rationalism in the following way:
I

can ihink whatever

I please, provided
only that 1 do not contradict myself, that is, provided
ray concept is a possible
for the possibility of the
concept, even
hough I may not be able to answer tor
there being, in the sum
all possibilities, an object
corresponding to it. But something more is required before
I can ascribe to such
a concept
objective reality, that is real possibility;
the former posslbility IS merely logical.

In effect,

tality

them

what Kant

is

saying

is that

I

can think God

.

freedom, immor-

and even leprechauns to be possible, but
this does not assure
of

re^

nation.

We

possibility, since they

may be mere fancies

of the

imagi-

cannot make an object possible by mere thinking;
therefore

possibility is real only

when

actuality and necessity.

related to experience, and so too with

They have no application

to objects

beyond

experience
Furthermore,

\A^the

if

we combine

this limitation to empirical thought

fact that each of the categories of modality, like all the
other

categories, must apply to aji objects of experience, such that every

object of experience

is

possible, and actual, and necessary, then

realize that all the postulates are extensionally identical.

cussion of the table

of categories, Kant

says that necessity

wider than possibility and actuality since

it

is

dis-

no

can be viewed as the

combination of the other two.^^ Also, Kant makes
possibility is no wider than actuality since

In the

we

it

it

quite clear that

must be employed

empirically, and actuality is no wider than possibility since everything
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actual must be possible.
a Is is present,

“

From this

it

follows that

if

one

of the

mod-

then the other two must be
there as well

These points have led commentators
such as Professor Kemp Smith
to criticize Kant

by saying that "one and the
same definition adequately

covers

terms alike"^^-that is, that
the three modals are

all three

indistinguishable.

er^elation
ich

it is

But this is unsound, since the
object has a differ -

to tjiejnij

viewed

is

to the p articular

to understand

Kanfs analysis

seen as determining existence in

modality suggest that to know the possibility
of

c^ happen,

to

know

and to know x's necessity
light

it

seems

to

x's actuality is to

is to

me Cassirer

is

know

my argu-

of causal necessity.

a different

ing to the specific interests of
the understanding.

that X

modal aspect nndPr

This is the important point relevant
to

.

ment concerning how

Each modal

^

way accord-

The schemata

a thing

know

x

is to

that x

^

that x had to happen.

of

know
happen,

In this

exactly correct in saying that Kant's

"critical determinism"

says nothing as to the ground of things; it does not
even refer
directly to empirical things as such. It is
rather a principle
for the formulation of empirical concepts,
an assertion and
a prescription as to how we should grasp
and form our
empirical concepts in order that they may discharge their
task
the task of the "reification" ( Objectivierung) of
phenomena. If our concepts of causality fulfill this de-

mand, it is futile to seek another justification, an allegedly higher dignity for them.°^
I,

of course, admit that there is

much room

for

confusion when

Kant speaks about the status of specific causal laws in their relation

^
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to the general principle
of causality:

Even natural laws, viewed
as principles

of the empirical

rn?ces:uy°?nd1o

suggestion of a
determine
etermination ffrom grounds which
are valid a priori and
The laws of nature, indeed.
one®anfa"u''w°th“
under higher prlnciPies of nnd; r
a
They simply apply the latter to
sieHal
special cases ZfTn the field
of appearance. These prin<=0"tains the conSt/on and as it were the
dition,
exponent, of a rule in general.

T

tte

^‘"''ds under

,

A strong sense of causal necessity
along the lines of Newton-

Laplace could easily be read out of
such

an interpretation would be out of
the
say.

a

passage, but

spirit of

1

think such

what Kant really wants

to

Kant is not saying that the necessity
of the causal principle

somehow sanctions

the reading of specific causal
laws as necessary

as soon as empirical induction has
done

its

work.

Rather, the law of

causality is a necessary principle of the
understanding that governs
our

way

of thinking about natural events

and their relations.

laws are applications of the transcendental
principle

employ the concept

of

cause, since without

it, if

in that they

,

must

the Second Analogy is

correct, there would be no objective experience
at all.
the status of their lawlikeness

Natural

However, as

this is a matter for induction.

to

The

necessity that spills over into specific causal laws from
the transcendental causal principle

is the

an event

due

s

existence

is

necessity to think that the reason

to its being

governed by rule.

That

for
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science can find any such rule
or that there really

Is

such

a rule Is a

completely indeterminate matter.

Such an interpretation seems
quite

In tune with Kant's calling
the

Analogies, as well as the Postulates,
regulative principles, as distinct from constitutive.

The concept of cause

o which a unity of experience

g

may

is

"only a rule accord-

arise from perception.

It

does

not tell us how mere perception
or empirical intuition In
general itself

comes about.
point

1

Gerd Buchdahl comes very close to
capturing the

have been trying

for thoorotical

to

make concerning

Kant's theory of causality

roason when he says

that the 'justificational force' of
the concept of causality is
exhausted in the process of generating the
possibility
of

contingent judgments of experience concerning
a sequence
of states. Any further relevance it
may have, above all for
empirical science regarded as a system of
causal laws,
must be a separate matter.
^^
.

At this point

.

.

someone might grant

that this

may be

the proper

interpretation of the work of the understanding in
the Transcendental

Analytic, but nevertheless argue that
er

somehow Kant smuggles

in a strong-

sense of causal determinism with the Dialectic's concern over
free-

dom which

is

evidenced by a statement like the following:

we could exhaustively investigate all the appearances
men's wills, there would not be found a single human
action which we could not predict with certainty, and recognize as proceeding necessarily from its antecedent condi.

.

.if

of

tions

.

And only because Kant believes

in the ancestral

causal necessity of

.
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events in the spirit of Newton
and Laplace does he see
a problem with
freedom
But,

I

think, this is to misunderstand
what Kant is saying in the

Dialectic about the function
of reason in

ing— a
climax.

its

relation to the understand-

relationship which brings Kant's
"critical determinism" to

We

have discussed the concept

of the understanding
and found that
for generating

not discussed

it

its

of causality as a principle

is a

necessary presupposition

experience of objective contingent
events, but we have
it

with regard to experience in

in relation to nature as an
interconnected

At this point

we

its total unity, that is,

system

of

appearances.

find reason discharging its
function-

Reason concerns itself exclusively with
absolute totality in
the employment of the concepts
of the understanding and
endeavours to carry the synthetic unity,
which is thought
,

in the category, up to the
completely unconditioned
Reason accordingly occupies itself solely
with the employment of understanding, not indeed in so
far as the latter
contains the ground of possible experience
(for the concept of the absolute totality of conditions
is not applicable
in any experience, since no

experience is unconditioned),
but solely in order to prescribe to the
understanding its
direction towards a certain unity of which
it has itself no
concept, and in such a manner as to unite
all the acts of
the understanding in respect of every
object, into an
absolute whole, ' ^

Reason serves

to

complete the work of the understanding by seek-

ing the unconditioned "viewed as consisting
of the entire series in

which

all the

members without exception

are conditioned and only

the totality of them is absolutely unconditioned.

This is essen-

tially the deterministic picture that the antithesis
of the Third

Antinomy
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puts forth.

Although reason doesn't
create any concepts of Us
own,

ft can
extend a concept of the
understanding, such as causality,
beyond its

empirical limitations by freeing

it

Such an extension enables
reason
terms of a synthetic unity.

from

its

schematic employment.

to think the totality of
conditions in

This unconditioned is not a
mere aggregate

of conditions but, rather,
the idea of an ordered system
of nature--a

system conceivable because of
reason's thinking that the functions
the understanding are applicable
to all appearances.

of

Reason, there-

fore, is charged with the task
of unifying the work of the
understanding

by providing a framework within
which the search
systematically and indefinitely continued.

In this

for

causes can be

way reason

regu-

lates the continuing scientific
investigations of the understanding just

as the category of causality regulates
our

way

of thinking about events,

neither prescribing anything concerning
the status of specific empirical laws, except the manner in which
they must be investigated.

describes the relation between the understanding
and reason

in the

solution to the Third Antinomy:
he principle of the causal connection of
appearances is
required in order that we may be able to look for and
to determine the natural conditions of the natural events, that is,
1

to say, their causes in the ^flield of
appearance_J^. If this
principle be admitted, and be not weakened through any
exception, the requirements of the understanding, which in
its empirical employment sees in all happenings
nothing
but nature, and is justified in so doing, are completely
satisfied; and physical explanations may proceed on their

own

lines without interference.^^

Kant
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Kant Is not saying that
science will discover in the
final analysis, or

would discover

if it

had the knowledge,

be necessary in the Newtonian
sense.

all empirical

laws to

Rather, as Buchdahl puts

"science regarded as 'theoretical
reason' can only
'requirements' of the understanding;
and that

it

try

and

it,

'satisfy' the

tries to satisfy these

requirements by subjecting Itself
to the requirement to search
for

causes.

This search can only be "set
as a task"^5__^

successful end

we cannot

anticipate.

Such a search

by the regulative principle of
reason which poses
for the

is

made possible

this "as a problem

understanding, and therefore for the
subject, leading

it

to

undertake and to carry on, in accordance
with the completeness prescribed by the idea, the regress in the
series of conditions of any

given conditioned."^^
Kant refers to this function of reason as
hypothetical in that the
universal extension of the principle of causality

is put

forward as a

kind of explanatory model upon which an
investigation of particular

instances can be systematically carried out.

Reason posits

"a certain

collective unity as the goal of the activities of the
understanding.

which otherwise are concerned solely with distribution unity.
universality of the model can never be proven since
all of the

possible instances that

fall

under

it.

we can

The

never know

Furthermore, to dis-

cover empirically that there are certain instances which do not
accord
with the model does not necessarily invalidate the legitimacy of the
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model; in fact, their very
discovery may have only been
possible through
the use of the model.
The hypothetical use of reason
attempts to give
our knowledge a systematic
unity but a unity which is,
for Kant,

only a projected unity, to be
regarded not as given in itself
but as a problem only. This
unity aids us in disco
"rinra
P inciple for the understanding in
its manifold and special
odes of employment, directing
its attention to cases
which
are not given and thus rendering
it more coherent ^8

Such a

"critical determinism"

which states that

feature of our jsn pwledge of
nature that

we employ

it is

a

necessary

the principle of

causality in our explanation of
events is far different from the
physical

determinism of the Laplaclan

spirit.

In fact,

out of harmony with the critical
spirit in that

beyond

its

Laplacian determinism
it

is

extends knowledge

empirical limitations. "Critical determinism"
charges

science with the task of searching

for

causal laws which will serve as

the ground for the explanation of
events.
a question of scientific
in a like-minded

By so doing

it

focuses upon

methodology which Karl Popper has answered

way:

The belief in causality is metaphysical. It is
nothing but a
typical metaphysical hypostatization of a well
justified
methodological rule the scientist's decision never to
abandon his search for laws .... there could not be an
empirical statement having methodological consequences
which could compel us to abandon the search for laws.
For a statement supposed to be free from metaphysical
elements can have indeterminist conclusions only if these are
falsifiable. But they can be shown to be false only if we
succeed in formulating laws and in deducing predictions
from them which are corroborated
And this means
that we ought to search for laws and predictions. Thus
we
cannot obey an exhortation to abandon this search without

—

,
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repudiating the empirical
character of these hypotheses
This
seif-contradictory to tMnh that a’ny
m°Ilarh“
mpincal
hypothesis could exist which
might
compel us *°
to
®
abandon the search for laws . ^9

Although Kant's "critical
determinism" says something even
stronger

about the causal principle,
namely, that
objective empirical experience
at all,

it

it is

necessary

for our

nevertheless seems to me that

Kant would be In essential
agreement with Popper's statement

read

it

having

if

we

as speaking to reason's extension
of the principle in order

i(j

provide an order of nature.
If

the interpretation of Kant that

the right track,

I

I

have been trying

think there are at least three reasons

to give is

why

on

Kant's solu

tion to the problem of freedom
and determinism in the Transcendental

Dialectic is

still

relevant.

First, the interpretation of

and Heisenberg's uncertainty principle

nessed by the reluctance

of Einstein

is still

open

to

quantum theory
debate as wit-

and Planck to accept any indeter-

minist consequences and, more recently, by
Debroglie

who has con-

verted to a determinist point of view.^^

Secondly,

if

Heisenberg

is correct that his principle implies

indeterminism with regard to some events,

I

extension by reason.

pose

a

In fact, this indeterminism

even seems

causal determinism when interpreted in Kant's critical

scendental sense.

way

find that this in no

invalidates what Kant says about the principle of causality
and

an

its

to

presup-

or tran-

Also, Kant would agree with Heisenberg in seeing the
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impossibility of separating objective
reality from the acts of the
observ-

we

er, since

might describe the Critical philosophy
as seeking the

objectivity of subjectivity.

realized that

Long before quantum mechanics Kant

man should not be seen as

a

mere spectator, but rather

as an actor, and that, because of
this Copernlcan revolution, scientific

explanations had to be reinterpreted In
the Critical spirit and

ontology had to be recast into the framework
of transcendental idealism.

However,

this

view

of his world in no

of

way

man

as taking an essential part in the formation

conflicts with Kant's "critical determinism",
but

rather is the key to its formation.

Furthermore, Kant's determinism says nothing
about the modal
status of particular events; this is an indeterminate
matter.

Rather,

the necessity Kant's determinism imposes is
upon our

knowing

these events.

It

demands

way

of

that the scientific mind approach nature

searching for causal laws, for without such a transcendental
principle
there would be no objective understanding of experience
nor would
there be any systematic unity to scientific work.

somewhat

of a loose

fit

is true to

is

between the necessity imposed upon experience

by the understanding and
it

Although there

its

extension by reason, nevertheless

say for both that the necessity imposed

is not that

I

think

we

must "necessarily find " events that are lawfully related but "the necessity is that
in the

gaps

we
left

enquire for them.

open

in this

search

Furthermore, to locate freedom
is

analogous to the traditional

.
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argument that makes room

for diety at the points

where our natural expla-

nations break down.
Thirdly, even

if

contemporary physics had dissolved
the problem

freedom and determinism

of

(a

position

have been arguing against),

I

Kant's solution to the Third Antinomy
would

because of the insight

it

maps out

It

being-in

this case, the physical and

allows us to see reason's dynamic
at work as

different frameworlts according to
its different purposes

have already seen this dynamic

at

critical determinism "--a position

work

in

which

I

of

1

think

we

We

hope will become even
.

To

tip

my hand

Just a

shall find reason carving up reality into
different levels

being— levels which

serve

.

it

what we have called Kant's

clearer in our exploration of Kant's
solution
bit,

be worth studying

gives to Kant's transcendental
approach to the

different dimensions of man's

ethical dimensions.

still

are marked off by the purposes reason must

CHAPTER

II

AN interpretation OF KANT'S
SOLUTION TO
THE THIRD ANTINOMY

(5)

An Introduction

to the

Problem and a Key

to the Solution

The problem that the Third
Antinomy poses and the question
that
Kant'S solution attempts to
answer is the following:

disjunctive proposition to say
that every effect
world must arise eUher from
nature or from freedom- or
must we not rather say that in
one and the~same event, Tn
erent relations. , both can be
found? That all events
e sensible world stand in
thoroughgoing connection in
accordance with unchangeable laws
of nature is an estabished principle
the Transcendental Analytic,
and allows
no exception Rant's "critical
determinism" 7. The
question, therefore, can only be
whether freedom *is completely excluded by this inviolable
rule, or whether an effect
no wit standing its being thus
determined in accordance with
nature, may not at the same time
be grounded in freedoml
In

—

^

Or, to put

it

another way:

Admitting that in the whole series of
events there is nothing
but natural necessity, is it yet
possible to regard one and
the same event as being in one
aspect merely an effect of
nature and in another aspect an effect
due to freedom; or
IS there between these two kinds
of causality a direct contradiction?
In

unpacking what Kant means by

ferent aspects,"

we

shall,

I

"in different relations"

and "in dif-

think, find the key to Kant’s solution and,

thereby, gain real insight into Kant's understanding
of the purposes
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and power of the mind's
rational activities.
s

we

noted earlier,

reason, in

its

search for the unconditioned,

not only tries to remain
loyal to the functions of the
understanding by

supporting the universality and
necessity of the principle of
causality
for all of nature, but

it

also seeks an unconditioned
causality which

will serve as the ground of
conditioned events.^
led to this transcendental idea
of a free

cause-that

which will serve as the spontaneous
beginning
independently of empirical determinations

ment

of the regulative principle of

concept of causality so that

it is

higher conditions in the series.
far

we may have

Reason

.

is

naturally

is, of a

power

of an event, acting

In the empirical

reason the demand

always possible

to

is to

employ-

extend the

seek higher and

The rule involved states that "however

attained in the series of empirical conditions,

we

should never assume an absolute limit,
but should subordinate every

appearance, as conditioned,

must advance

to another as its condition,

to this condition."^

through this function alone.

and that we

But reason cannot fulfill itself

The unconditioned that will allow reason

to find a satisfactory resting place
cannot be an unlimited totality of

interconnected conditions, but an unconditioned that
serves as the
origin and limits of conditions

.

This is an idea resulting from the

extension of the concept of cause

for the

cal speculation rather than from the

science.

In

both reason

is trying to

purposes of pure cosmologi-

demands imposed by theoretical
unify the work of the understanding.
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since that

is its

only object,^ but in each
case

dimensions to find

preted as claims of pure
to

of the Third

^matism

and empiricism respectively

causes which serve as "foundation
stones
a practical

it

^
.

By referring to free

of morals and religion,"^

interest-an interest

empiricism can find no room.
est in that

Antinomy can be inter-

have advantages over the other.

dogmatism affirms

explores different

this unity.

The thesis and antithesis

Each seems

it

Dogmatism also has

for

which pure

a speculative inter-

grasps an unconditioned from which
the entire chain of

conditions can be derived.

Therefore

"it

finds comfort in such con-

cepts, and at the same time a fixed
point to which the thread by which
It

guides

its

movements can be attached," while, on

the other hand,

pure empiricism finds itself in a "restless
ascent from the conditioned
to the condition,

empiricism has

always with one foot in the

its

own beauty.

It

demands

air.

However pure

that the understanding

work

within its own proper domain, namely, that of
possible experience.

There is no necessity to leave the chain of the natural
order
and to resort to ideas, the objects of which are not
given,
because, as mere thought-entities, they can never be given.
Indeed, the understanding is not permitted to leave its
proper
business, and under the pretence of having brought it to
completion to pass over into the sphere of idealising reason
and of transcendent concepts
a sphere in which it is no
longer necessary for it to observe and investigate in accordance with the laws of nature, but only to think and to invent
in the assurance that it cannot be refuted by the facts
^f

—

'.

nature.
But

.

it

.

is

.1*^

because

of these interpretations of the thesis and anti-

thesis of the Third Antinomy that no solution to

it

has been found.

The

a
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very principles of pure
empiricism makes any meaningful
inquiry beyond
experience impossible, thereby
"betraying the same lack of

modesty"

of

which

it

charges dogmatic rationalism.

“

Dogmatism, finding

experience quite unsatisfying and
untrustworthy, deduces knowledge
of nature from pure concepts
alone, thinking "that
this without having first
investigated in

it

is

possible to do

what way and by what

right

reason has come into possession
of these concepts.
tion to the Third Antinomy
maintains that regarding both of these
posi-

tions "a certain transcendental
illusion has

w here

none

is to

be found. "13

mocked them with

a reality

That is, in attempting to answer the

questions posed by the cosmological
ideas, in this case the absolute

completeness

of the conditions of the origination
of an appearance,

both positions have approached the
question obtectivelv as

if

the

unconditioned which they seek could be given
to them as an object of

knowledge.
to

we

Both forget that the question concerns an
idea of reason

which no object can possibly be given.

And, therefore, "so long as

obstinately persist in assuming that there is an
actual object cor-

responding
solution.

"

1

to the idea, the
4

problem, as thus viewed, allows of no

Rather than either an empirical or

a

dogmatic solution.

Kant puts forward what he calls the Critical solution which
"does not

consider the question objectively, but in relation

to the foundation of

the knowledge upon which the question is based.
of this Critical solution is

what will occupy the rest

An understanding
of this chapter

—

.
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solution which is, in fact,
a dissolution

when

the thesis and antithesis

are viewed within the
framework of the doctrine of
transcendental ideal-

ism

(6)

Some Misunderstandings

Both Strawson and H.

W.

of the Solution

Cassirer argue that, in opting for
the

possibility that both thesis
and antithesis are true, Kant
has not applied
the truly Critical solution
to the Antinomy.

According to Strawson,

Kant should have found the
antithesis true and the thesis false,
since
the thesis is maintaining that
the series of causes can exist
as a

whole while the antithesis

is

simply stating what Kant supposedly

already proved in the Analytic, namely,
that "Every member of the
series which is actually 'met with'
in experience.

have an antecedent cause.

.

.must be taken to

But not only does this fall into the

fallacy of interpreting the thesis
dogmatically,

it

fails to realize that

the antithesis is also trying to answer
a question raised by an idea of

reason, and, therefore,
in the Analytic.

Strawson seems

its interest

goes beyond what was discussed

Rather than employing the true Critical solution,
to interpret both positions objectively,
deciding arbi-

trarily in favor of the antithesis.

The Antinomy

is a

problem raised by

reason which deals only with ideas; therefore such a
problem cannot
be solved by simply referring to principles
ing which deals with objects.

at

work

for the

In fact, reason's very

unify the work of the understanding

—a

understand-

purpose

is to

purpose which can only be

.
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actualized by employing the
ideas of reason regulativelv

.

if

one

adopted Strawson's solution to
the Antinomy, the positive
implications
for

metaphysics that are established in
the Dialectic would be over-

looked

W.

H.

Carrirer thinks that Kant should
have found both thesis and

antithesis false in the Third Antinomy,
Just as he did for the first two.

That

is

,

he should

have sought to show that both parties
in the dispute were
radically mistaken. In the one case
it is assumed that the
series containing all the conditions
of a given phenomenon
terminates in a first member, while, in
the other, it is
assumed that it consists of an infinity of
members. Neither
assumption is tenable, by reason of the fact
that no significant statement can be made about
the totality of a series
'
of conditions

The only reason, according to Cassirer,
that Kant does not carry out
this properly Critical

Antinomies,

is

method

of attack, as he did in the first

because he mistakenly thinks

flict of the Third

Antinomy

"is

two

that the cosmological

con-

one between natural necessity and moral

freedom."

Or, at least, he anticipates that the possibility of moral

freedom

stake in the Antinomy.

is at

This, argues Cassirer,

is

the

reason he constantly confuses in his solution transcendental freedom,

which

is

I

what the thesis

is truly

find this criticism

about, with moral freedom.

by Cassirer two-pronged.

First he finds no

reason why Kant should not have answered the Third Antinomy

same way as he answered

in the

the first two, and, second, he points out the

reason why Kant was misled.

Both of these discussions seem to me

.

to be

wrong.

Concerning Cassirer's second
point, rather than confus-

ing moral with transcendental
freedom, Kant explicitly
distinguishes
the two at the very beginning
of his solution.' ^

And although he does

note that the possibility of
practical freedom does depend
upon tran-

scendental freedom, since practical
freedom

is

asserting a causality

of our will which can act
independently of natural cause to bring
about

spontaneously

a

temporal event, this does not mean,
nor can

any passages that would lead me
flict of the Third

necessity.

Antinomy

is

1

find

to believe, that Kant thinks
the

con-

one between moral freedom and natural

In fact, Kant states in the

transition to the second Critique

.

Canon, which can be seen as

a

that

The question of transcendental freedom
is a matter for speculative knowledge only, and when we
are dealing with the
practical, we can leave it aside as being
an issue with which
we have no concern. Moreover, a quite sufficient
discussion of it is to be found in the antinomy of
pure reason.
The other prong

in Cassirer's attack overlooks the import
of Kant'

distinction between the mathematical and dynamical
ideas^^--a distinction which exemplifies the difference between
a constitutive and

regulative use of reason.

The

first

two Antinomies are concerned with

a mathematical connection of the series of
appearances of

which

no other than a sensible condition is admissible, that is to
say, none that is not itself a part of the series. On the
other hand, in the dynamical series of sensible conditions,
a heterogeneous condition, not itself a part of the series,
purely intelligible and as such outside the series, can
be allowed
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In other

words, in the case of the
mathematical Antinomies,

their very
nature forces them to think
of "a mere Idea of
absolute totality" in
terms of an object that
cannot be given in any experience "23
But
.

in seeking a mathematically
unconditioned unity "no condition
of the

series of appearances can
be found that is not itself
appearance, and
as appearance one of the
members of the series.
Therefore they

must pretend

to operate under a

con stitutive principle of reason,
which

would allow knowledge of an object
beyond

when,

in fact, there is no

such principle.

all

possible experience,

Any principle

of

reason

is

reaiiiative only, serving as a rule
for "the greatest possible
continua-

tion and extension of experience,
allowing no empirical limit to hold

as absolute" but not being able
to
regulates
all

how

tell

us "what the object is. "25

h

"the synthesis must proceed from
the conditioned through

subordinate conditions, up to the
unconditioned.

reach this goal,

for the

in experience. "2 5

absolutely unconditioned

Yet

it

is not to

can never

be met with

Because the dynamical Antinomies allow a non-

sensible condition of appearances in that
they can be interpreted as

seeking an unconditioned which

is

not a part of the series, the regula-

tive principle of reason can be applied
to them

which shows both thesis

and antithesis to be possibly true.
To ward

off

any possible confusion, we should remember that

there is a difference between the constitutive-regulative
distinction of
the principles of the understanding and of the
principles of reason.

.
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Even though both the dynamical
principles of the understanding
and the
dynamical principles of reason are
concerned with regulating an
object's existence rather than
with constituting its magnitude,
the less the former are
constitutive of experience (in that
they render
the concepts objectively
valid) whereas the latter can
never be, "since

no schema of sensibility corresponding
to them can ever be given.
This is obvious

when we remember

that ideas of reason are conceived

by freeing concepts of the
understanding from

all

possible empirical

conditions

(7)

One

An Attempt

to

Expose some Blind Alleys

of the difficulties in understanding
Kant's explanation of the

compatibility between transcendental freedom
and natural necessity
results from the variety of

ways

in

which he expresses himself.

To

concentrate on only one of these ways, as many
critics of Kant have

done,

is to

It

tion that
if

miss the

is of

it

full

understanding of Kant's solution.

course obvious to everyone

who has

dealt with Kant's solu-

cannot be separated from his transcendental idealism,

appearances are things

in

"for

themselves, freedom cannot be upheld.

Nature will then be the complete and sufficient determining cause of

every event. " 29

To interpret the antithesis

of the Third

Antinomy along

the lines of pure empiricism, which holds the "fallacious presupposition of the absolute reality of appearances

,

is to

leave reason in

its
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antinomic conflict.

Using time as a key, we
learn from the Analytic
that only appearances
stand under the condition
of time and only that

which

IS

effect.

temporally determined must
conform to the law of cause
and
Therefore, concerning that
which is intelligible,

noutn^, nothing happens in it; there
can
be
be^r
no chanoe“
change requiring dynamical
determination in time and
therefore no causal dependence
upon appearances. Tnd consequently since natural necessity
is to be met with only in
the sensible world, this
active being must in its actions
be
independent of, and free from all
such necessity.
By attributing transcendental
freedom to that which
porarily conditioned certainly
sity, but

makes

it

is not

tem-

compatible with natural neces-

no one, including Kant, would
consider such a solution, as

stands, satisfactory.

it

Expressing such dissatisfaction A. C.
Ewing

writes:

What IS easier to say than that the seif as
thing-in-itself
noumenon is free, and as phenomenon
determined

or

by natural

causality in all its actions. At first
sight, at any rate, this
solution seems to come perilously
near to being what

Mr

Sidgwick described the solution of the third
antinomy as tending to become, that is, an
explanation by saying that 'we
may also suppose an unknown relation to an
unknown entity,
which is not a phenomenon, which might afford
the required'
explanation if we only knew it.'^^
Besides appearing quite Pickwickian, such

a solution

would paint tran-

scendental freedom in negative terms, and, as Kant
states, "This

freedom ought not.

.

.

of empirical conditions.

to be

conceived only negatively as independence

The faculty of reason, so regarded, would

cease to be a cause of appearances.
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This last statement introduces
another necessary piece to
the

puzzle, namely, a special kind
of causality of which

edge but of which we are
nevertheless "constrained

we have no knowl-

to think," by the

very nature of reason itself,
"as underlying appearances

Such

.

a

causality through freedom serves
as the ground of appearances
which
are its effects.

Remembering that

all

appearances are necessarily

governed by the causal principle of
the understanding and that therefore any other kind of causality
must stand outside this series of

appearances, we are led to the following
situation:
The effects of such an intelligible
cause appear, and accordingly can be determined through
other appearances, but its
causality is not so determined. While
the effects are to be
ound in the series of empirical conditions,
the intelligible
cause, together with its causality, is outside
the series.
Thus the effect may be regarded as free in
respect of its
intelligible cause, and at the same time
in respect of appearances as resulting from them according to the
necessity of

nature.

Freedom and determinism are seen

we

to

be compatible here, since

refer the sufficient cause of an event first
to an intelligible and then

to an empirical cause.

But rather than a solution this seems to be just

a side-stepping of the problem.

In fact,

it

appears to be

a

mere re-

statement of the conflicting claims of the Third Antinomy,
when what
is

needed

is

an explanation of how just such a situation can be

at all

possible, namely, how can one and the same event be both the effect
of a free

nature ?

cause and yet

at the

same time determined

in

accordance with
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But

if

Kant is saying that

and

,

which are

in

phenomenal

sequence and therefore governed by
natural law, may be freely
caused
by noumena Nj and
respectively acting independently
of each other,
doesn't this involve "the rather
awkward conception of a pre-established

harmony between noumena acting
independently?
that Nj and

must somehow be harmonized

if

That is,

they cause E

it

seems

and E
^

to

fit

properly into a deterministic
framework.

criticism another

way,

it

2

Or, to put Ewing's

seems that the natural law by which

E's

are governed reveals a harmony
between the N's that are understood as

co-ordinate with E's.

And

if

this is true, Kant

would be inconsistent

with his own critical thinking which
disallows any such intellectual
intuition into the nature of

noumenal activity.

Such an interpretation
two ways.

doesn

t

As

I

tried to

of Kant's solution is misleading in at
least

develop earlier, Kant's "critical determinism"

depend upon any presupposition

of

noumenal activity but

rather upon a presupposition of our empirical
knowledge.
of the

noumenal nature

of the

them only as following from

cause

of events,

prior sensible

Regardless

we can understand

causes according

to rules.

This intelligible ground does not have to be considered
in
empirical enquiries; it concerns only thought in the pure
understanding; and although the effects of this thought and
action of the pure understanding are to be met with in the
appearances, these appearances must none the less be

capable of complete causal explanation in terms of other
appearances in accordance with natural laws. We have to
take their strictly empirical character as the supreme ground
of explanation, leaving entirely out of account their
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intelligible character (that is,
the transcendental cause
of
heir^empirical character) as being
completely

unknown.

.

Furthermore, Kant in his reply to
Eberhard comments upon his own
version of pre-established harmony
which he finds "between what
follows from our notions of nature
and what follows from our notions
of

freedom.

"

It

must not be seen as a harmony "between
two different

things taken as external to one another"
but rather "between two completely different powers in us having
completely dissimilar principles."'’'’
In this last statement

solving the puzzle.

depend on referring

think

I

we have

run across one of the keys for

Kant's solution to the Third Antinomy
does not
to

two different things

,

but rather on "conceiving

the faculty ,^of causalltyJZ possessed
by an object of the senses" in a

"twofold manner.

"

therefore, that which in the sensible world
must be regarded as appearance has in itself a faculty which
is not an object
of sensible intuition, but through which
it can be the cause of
appearances, the causality of this being can be regarded
from
two points of view.
We should therefore have to form
.
both an empirical and an intelligible concept of the
causality
of the faculty of such a subject, and to regard
both as referring to one and the same effect.
If,

.

Take,

for

.

example, man who as one

of the

ural world stands under the empirical laws, yet

appearances of the nat-

who

same time

at the

'knows himself also through pure apperception" or having

a

transcen-

dental self which must be presupposed as the ground of his empirical
self.

This

much we learned

in the Analytic.

Therefore,

man

"is thus

I
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I

to himself,

on the one hand phenomenon,
and on the other hand.

In

respect of certain faculties
the action of which
cannot be ascribed to
the receptivity of
sensibility, a purely
Intelligible object.

m

focusing upon what Kant
means by these different 'powers'
or 'faculties' In a subject,

which are the activities

of

reason Itself as

It

works

both With empirical concepts
and with transcendental ideas
according
to Its different principles,
the importance of the following
dark but

pregnant statement
In this

is clearly

brought to

light;

way freedom and

nature, in the full sense of these
without any conflict, in the same
ac^tTons
ctions, according as the actions
are referred to their Intel-

ligible or to their sensible
cause.

(8)

Reason's Explaining One Event from
Different Points of View

In order to help us

understand what Kant

would be interesting and helpful
pher of language

Although

I

who

is

saying,

to cast Kant into the

is offering us a

it

a philoso-

revolutionary theory of semantics.

wouldn't want to press this too

odd to see Kant in this role.

think

mold of

far for fear of overlooking the

real metaphysical importance of the
Critical theory,
IS

I

For example, a fruitful

don't think

way

of

it

under-

standing the controversial chapter on schematism
in the Analytic

is to

see Kant as introducing referential rules which
govern the application
of concepts to objects of experience.

Non-referential rules simply

govern the logical grammar of concepts, providing

a theory of syntax.
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but

when

referring to extraiinguistic
entities,

we need,

according to

Kant, both empirical and
transcendental schemata serving as
semantical rules of reference

which will provide

for empirical

categories their proper determinations
in time/^

concepts and

Without such

schemata "There certainly does remain
in the pure concepts
understanding

...

meaning, but

a

it is

purely logical, signifying

only the bare unity of the representations.

The pure concepts can find

no object, and so can acquire no meaning
which might yield
of

of the

a

concept

some object.
Just as the understanding requires rules
of reference to render its

concepts objectively valid, so there
reason's activities since
tive dimensions as

it

it

is

needed

must refer both

a

semantical theory

to theoretical

and to specula-

serves to regulate the understanding.

say that we need rules

for

reason's metalanguage as

unify and explain the language of the understanding

it

for

We

might

strives to

whose objects have

both an empirical and an intelligible character.

A contemporary theory of semantics having interesting parallels
to

what Kant

is

saying in his solution is offered by Rudolf Carnap.

The main problem he

is

attempting to solve

both extensions and intensions

.

is

how

to

make room

for

His answer centers around the claim

that a variable has a dual reference--one to extensions, the other to

intensions.

In fact,

reference that,

when

every sign in the object language has a dual
translated into the metalanguage, can be read in
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either of two

ways.

In his

conclusions Carnap states:

The formulations in terms of 'extension'
and 'intension,'
class' and 'property,' etc.
seem to refer to two kinds of
entities in each type. We have seen,
however, that, in
fact, no such duplication of entities
is presupposed by our
method and that those formulations involve only
a convenient duplication of modes of speech.
,

Carnap introduces the notion

of a "neutral variable"

which can be

read either extensionally or intentionally depending
on how
lated into the metalanguage according to certain
rules.

point of the metalanguage,

we judge which

Essential to this translation

what purpose you are trying

is the

From the sLund-

context the variable

according to certain key signs, and then translate

it

trans-

it is

is in,

accordingly.

basic pragmatic question concerning

to serve in

what context.

Although Kant would emphasize that the activities of mind are
primary to the structure of language, and, in fact, would no doubt
insist that the latter is understandable only in terms of the former,

nevertheless he too argues

for the

abandonment

of the prejudice that an

individual must be interpreted from only one point of view.

In the

Foundations Kant says
.

to

.

.

it is

an indispensable problem of speculative philosophy

show

that its illusion respecting the contradiction rests on
this, that we think of man in a different sense and relation

when we

call him free, and

when we

regard him as subject to
the laws of nature as being part and parcel of nature. It must
therefore show that not only can both these very well coexist, but that both must be thought as necessarily united in
the same subject.
.

.

Whereas Carnap speaks

of a duplication of

modes

of

speech, Kant
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analogously refers to a
duplication In the activities
and powers of reason whose operations upon
an individual depend upon
the context with-

which the individual

in

is

judged to belong.

Kant seems to be asking

us to think of an event
as a kind of "neutral variable"
which waits to
be translated by reason into
its metalanguage
according to different
principles.

If

we

are asking questions about
an event as seen within

the "field of appearances,

"

that is,

if

we

are carrying out purely

descriptive scientific investigations,
then reason will perform

operations by appealing to empirical
laws of nature.

It

Its

will regulate

the work of the understanding
by extending its concepts, such
as causality, in order that the full
picture of "critical determinism"

may be

seen.

So

far, then, as regards this
empirical character there is no
freedom; and yet it is only in the light
of this character that

man can be studied— if,

that is to say, we are simply
and in the manner of anthropology seeking
to
7
institute a physiological investigation
into the motive causes

bservinq

-

,

of his actions

But

if

"we ascent from the empirical object

to the

transcendental" and

ask our questions from this context, then
"we find that
together with ail its causality in the

this subject,

ofJ7 appearance, has in

its

n oumena certain conditions which must be
regarded as purely intelligible.

Man

is

certainly conscious of his empirical nature; "Yet beyond

this character of himself as a subject

ances he must suppose there

to

made up, as

it

is, of

be something else which

mere appear-

is its

ground

—
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namely, his Ego as this may
be constituted

in Itself. "52

realizes the need for such
a grounding is indicated
by

unconditioned that is free from

all

its

empirical conditions.

never fulfilled in the empirical
realm and, therefore, by

seeks out intelligible origins

That reason

search

Reason

for

an

is

very nature,

its

for things.

point of view as
jhat'h'';
that
belongs to the sensible world,
I shall have to
recognize that, gua intelligence
I am subject to
,
the law of
he intelligible world-that
is, to the reason which
co^ains
this law in the Idea of
freedom,

Tbe^na
eing

,

It

seems

to

me

,

the approach Kant takes in his
solution

comes very

close to what some modern
philosophers are doing in their defense
of

compatlbilism as a solution to the problem
of freedom and determinism.

Take,

example, the specific case given by Kant,
namely,

for

...

a

caused

malicious
in society.

lie

by which

a certain

confusion has been
trace the empirical
sources, finding these in

First of all,

...

we

character of the action to its
defective education, bad company,
/~etc.J.
We proceed in this enquiry just as we should in
ascertaining for
a given natural effect the series
of its determining causes.
But although we believe that the agent
is thus determined,
we none the less blame the agent.
Our blame is
based on a law of reason whereby we regard reason
as a cause
that irrespective of all the above-mentioned
empirical condicould hav e determined, and ought to have determined.
~
~ ^
the agent to act otherwise.^
.

.

.

...

At first glance such a statement

the liar have done otherwise

mined by

prior events ?

And

if

seems

utterly confused, for

his act of lying

how would

was empirically deter-

to argue for the compatibility of these

views by saying that he could have done otherwise

if

two

he had chosen to
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do otherwise certainly seems

be at best an evasion.

to

Chisholm the only way that such

According to

a solution could possibly

work

is if

the statement "He could
have chosen to do otherwise"
were true, which
it is

not

not according to determinism ^5
.

make any sense

However,

I

think, Chisholm does

out of the above solution
because he fails to see

that 'could have' statements
can be used in different senses.

Aune

in his article "Abilities,
Modalities and Free Will"^®

insightfully to this very point.

sense of 'could'" whose logic

Even though the
dents,

we

still

There
in

is

what Aune calls "the ability

no way conflicts with determinism.

liar's act of lying

was determined by causal antece-

might refer to his ability to have done
otherwise in the

circumstances, which implies that he could
have done otherwise
had wanted to.

Involved in this statement, Aune argues,

sense of 'could' which entails that the
wise.

speaks

Take the case

liar

of Jones, a robber:

is

if

another

could not have done other-

Even though he might have

had the ability not to steal.
given his actual wants at the time, he could not have
exercised
this ability because it was physically impossible
for him to do
so.
.In Jones's case his state of mind prior to the robbery made it impossible for him to exercise his ability to
walk
away instead; and thus though he may indeed have walked
away had he really wanted to, it seems that, given his resolve
to rob the store, it was impossible for him to try to
walk
away and hence impossible for him actually to walk away.
And if this was impossible, there is a sense, though it is not
the ability sense, in which he could not have walked away.
Perhaps this is the sense of 'could' that agitates the imagi.

.

,

nation of the libertarians.^^

he
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But, as Aune points out.

If

this is the

sense of 'could' which causes

the libertarians to say
that Jones could not have
done otherwise, then
it

has no bearing upon the free
will question, but only
concerns the

conditions, including his actual
wants and resolves, that led up
to

an event's happening. ^8 Important

to

remember

difference between causation and
compulsion.

in this regard is the

To think that an event's

happening was causally determined by
other events does not imply
that

it

was

fated to

happen— a

position from which

I

have tried to

divorce Kant's "critical determinism.
It

seems

to

me

that Aune's position can be seen
as essentially

Kantian--especially when

we

interpret the ability sense of 'could'
that

he speaks of as the ability or power of
reason which

known, save
Again
tion.

it

If

is

"completely un-

in so far as the empirical serves for
its sensible sign."^^

depends upon the framework within which we are
asking our ques-

we

are seeking a purely physical explanation
of an event's com-

ing into being, then

our answer.

we do

not have to leave the realm of the empirical
for

But, even though "all that has happened in the
course of

nature, and in accordance with

have happened,
have happened

we

Such

.

nize that reason

still

s

a

its

empirical grounds must inevitably

might ask the question whether

question

is

it

meaningful only when

ought to

we recog-

causality has a dual reference such that even though

reason may be asserted to have causality in respect to appearances, its action can still be said to be free, even though its
empirical character (as a mode of sense) is completely and

.
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necessarily determined in all its detail. This empirical character is itself determined in the intelligible character (as a
mode of thought.

Davidson

in his article

"Mental Events" captures

this Kantian

line quite well in the following statement:

Two

features of mental events in their relation to the physi-

—

causal dependence and nomological independence
freedom from deterministic lawsJ7“~combine ... to dissolve
what has often seemed a paradox, the efficacy of thought and
purpose in the material world, and their freedom from law.
When we portray events as perceivings, rememberings, decisions and actions, we necessarily locate them amid physical
happenings through the relation of cause and effect; but that
from the
same mode of portrayal insulates mental events.
and
explain
upon
to
called
be
principle
in
that
can
law
strict
free
man's
explain
a
predict physical phenomena .... We
actions ZT^yJ7 accounts of intentional behavior /^hic^ operate in a conceptual framework removed from the direct reach
of physical law by describing both cause and effect, reason
and action, as aspects of a portrait of a human agent.
cal

,

.

Davidson

is referring to

.

events which can be given either a physical

a mental description depending

or

upon how the events are being "por-

trayed"--descriptions which have utterly different meanings and con-

sequences.

Kant,

I

"that since freedom

am arguing,

may stand

paints a similar picture by showing

in relation to a quite different kind of

latter does
conditions from those of natural necessity, the law of the

not affect the former.

That is, even though the

understood as completely determined from

a

liar's lie

can be

physical point of view, he

moral question
nevertheless can be held blameworthy when the

is

asked,

to the agent's intelligible
since, at that moment, "The action is ascribed

character
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John Silber in his article "The
Ethical Significance of Kant's

Mlaion"66 argues
the Third
of

Antinomy

that Kant's double-aspect
theory as a solution to
is

Two Standpoints"

disastrous.

In his section entitled "The

Problem

Silber says.

In order to resolve the Third

Antinomy (and for other reasons
which we need not here consider) Kant
decided, in the first
C ritique to bifurcate reality into the
phenomenal world of
appearances and the noumenal world of
things in themselves.
All events in the phenomenal
order, he said, are necessarily
,

related in terms of the category of
causality and are in principle fully predictable. In the
noumenal order, on the other

hand, free causes can express themselves.
The "Twostandpoints Theory" fails to support the
facts of everyday
life unless one assumes that
a pre-established harmony coordinates the phenomenal and noumenal
worlds. On the presupposition that such a harmony obtains, there
is nothing
incredible about the fact that whenever a
murderer in the
.

noumenal order freely wills to kill
phenomenal order is predetermined

a victim, a

.

.

gun

in the

to go off in his hand.

But while the interworkings of the two
orders seem no longer
incredible, nothing can lend credibility to the

presupposition
Kant, in discussing Leibniz, clearly indicates
his
lack of sympathy for such, ad hoc solutions.

itself.

But to understand Kant's two-standpoint theory in
this

make the wrong kind

of

moves.

In a

sense

it

is to

way

is to

cast Kant into the

role of Cartesian dualist, thereby having two
separate substances and
all of the

I

problems of interaction that go along with such

am arguing

that to understand Kant's solution

demands

a bifurcation.

that

we com-

pletely reshape our thinking about the dynamics of mental activity
and
its

ramifications for the setting up of ontological frameworks.

very real sense there

is a

In a

harmony between the phenomenal and nou-

menal realms, but certainly not one pre-established by God. Rather

it

67

harmony that reason, due

IS a

tial nature, is

unify its

own investigations and
I

of its

own essen-

is

activities.

wouldn't want to press the analogy
too

similarities

Spinoza there

demands

required to establish in order
to make sense out of and

Although

some

to the critical

far,

I

do see

between Spinoza and Kant along these
lines.

For

one infinite system which can be
looked at from dif-

ferent points of view.

We

can consider God

with an infinite number of attributes
or

^ an

^ an

infinite

infinite

substance

system

of

modes.

And concerning the second framework
we can consider any mode either
under the attribute of thought or under
the attribute of extension.
That IS, there

a

is not

one system of minds and one system of bodies

Descartes but one infinite rational system with
different frame-

la

works

of explanation.

problem for Spinoza
verbal.

However,

different

way

I

The Cartesian problem
a solution

some have

would prefer

of interaction is

no real

criticized as being merely

to see Spinoza's solution as simply a

of conceiving rational activity.

By framing one's language

within the appropriate model of explanation the problem
simply does not
arise, and these

as

it

models

of explanation are the business of

reason itself

attempts to investigate and understand the one infinite substan-

tial order

.

The ontological differences between Natura Naturans and

Natura Naturata and between the infinite and external modes of God

under the attributes of extension and thought are legislated by the

essence

of rational activity itself.

It

is this

method which

I

see as

68

having definite analogies to
the Kantian program.
Essential to

my

interpretation of Kant's solution
is the importance

of Kant's understanding of
the regulative principle of
reason.

makes reference

to this regulative principle
but mainly as

Silber

it is

tant to his teleological views
of nature in the third
Critigue

-a

imporposition

Srlber interprets as "an alternative
solution to the Third Antinomy on

the basis of the limitations of
natural causality and the regulative

employment

of finality. "68

i

stand Kant's solution to the Third
Antinomy, the regulative principle
of reason must be seen as of
fundamental importance.

Furthermore,

I

shall argue against the view that
Kant changed his mind in the third

C ritique because
,

I

see what he

is

saying there as being in perfect

agreement with the solution he offers

in the Critique of Pure

Reason

.

I

(9)

Kant

is

The Importance of the Regulative Principle
of Reason to the Solution

attempting to make room for both freedom and natural

necessity by revealing the dynamics of our rational activities
which

may

exist in polar tension but not,

mic conflict.

Conflict arises

when

when employed

properly, in antino-

the principles of reason are not seen

as regulative but as constitutive and, therefore, employed as
objective
principles.

Principles of reason are subjective principles, called

maxims, "which are derived, not from the constitution
from the interest of reason

.

When

of

an object but

the principles of reason are

69

tin^ULj UL

,

Both

critical determinism" and
transcendental freedom are

interests
erests ot
of reason.

And reason attempts to satisfy both
by translating

events, which are otherwise
neutral, into
to different principles.

its

metalanguagee according

This metalanguage of reason might
be sche-

matized in the following way:

N
R

N
Depending upon what context an event
marked out by the interest of reason,
reason into either
seeking

or

a purely empirical

is in, a

context which

actually

is

this event will be translated

which are explanatory models.

If

we

by

are

explanation of an event, then reason never

leaves R^ which operates according to principles which
provide,

for

the understanding, a unified system of nature within
which to work.

^2 P'^ovides the concept of causality with a framework within which

can achieve
is that

that

it

its

greatest possible empirical extension.

R2

,

it

therefore,

idea of reason which is analogous to a schema of sensibility in

serves as "a rule or principle

employment

of the understanding."

for the

systematic unity of

all

71

The difference between R2 and

a

70

sensible schema

is

"that the application of the
concepts of the under-

standing to the schema of reason does
not yield knowledge of the object
Itself (as IS the

schemata)
If

case in the application

of categories to their sensible

"^2
.

reason, on the other hand,

of conditions, then

framework

it

is

seeking an unconditioned ground

operates within the framework of

transparent.

,

As Kant says in the second Critique

has been sufficiently proved in another place
/liamely, the
Critique^/ that

if

freedom

is attributed to

intelligible order of things.

and here again

we must be

reason's own purity.
things,

R^^

attempts to

,

like R^

making

us,

it

remember

"it

first

transfers us into an

Here again reason
careful to

.

is

seeking unity,

that R^ is formed from

Although Kant refers to "an intelligible order of
,

is really

only an idea of reason through which

it

fulfill itself.

We

misapprehend the meaning of this idea if we regard it as
the assertion or even as the assumption of a real thing, to
which we may proceed to ascribe the ground of the systematic order of the world. On the contrary, what this ground
which eludes our concepts may be in its own inherent constitution is left entirely undetermined; the idea is posited
only as being the point of view from which alone that unity,
is so essential to reason and so beneficial to the
understanding, can be further extended. In short, this
transcendental thing is only the schema of the regulative
principle by which reason so far as lies in its power,
extends systematic unity over the whole field of experi -

which

,

ence

.

Kant refers to an "intelligible order of things" and a "phenomenal order
of things"

because "reason cannot think

this systematic unity otherwise

71

than by giving to the ide;i nf
this unity an object.
Object, as thus entertained
by reason

essayed as

...

"

However

„ere idea;

is a

a somethin, that
is real absolutely
and

it

i,j^,

"this
is not

,,, ,3

postulated only problematically."^^

When reason

is

antinomy dissolves.

recognized as regulative
in the above manner
the
In the section of the
first
iirst rrii-irt
Critique entitled "The

me

Regulative Employment o£
the Ideas of Pure
Reason" Kant speaks of difrent thinkers being

'more particularly interested"
in different prin-

ciples of reason according
to which they make
Judgments.

"Each
believes that his Judgment
has been arrived at through
insight into the
object, whereas it really
rests entirely on the
greater or lesser attach-

ment

to

one of the two principles,

"

which are not based on objective

grounds "but solely on the
Interests of reason.
Kant

is not referring to
different thinkers

which can avoid stepping into
antinomic
regulative employment.

m

the Third Antinomy

but simply to reason Itself
pitfalls

once

Such an employment gives

it

it

realizes its

the power to oper-

ate according to different
principles and, therefore, to
see one and the

same event from
are done in the

different points of view.

name

of systematic unity.

employment even Leibniz's "law
beings" has a place.

It is

And

all of

these operations

Within this regulative

of the continuous gradation
of created

true that

observation and insight into the constitution
of nature
could never justify us in the objective
assertion of the law.
On the other hand, the method of looking for
order in
nature in accordance with such a
principle, and the maxim
.

.

.

.

.
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hich prescribes that

we regard such order-leaving
however
undetermined where and how far-as
grounded in nature as such
IS certainly a legitimate
and excellent regulative principle
,

'

In

beyond what experience or
observation can verify; and though
not itself determining anything, yet serves to mark
out the path towards systematic
unity.
To bring out even more clearly
the importance of this regulative
nature of reason, which

determinism" and

its

I

find to be the

key not only

compatibility with transcendental freedom
but also

to his practical and teleological
principles,
ter with a

C ritiques

discussion of
,

one

is

to his "critical

a criticism

I

by Ewing.

shall conclude this chap-

When one

reads all three

confronted with the puzzle of Kant referring to
three

different kinds of causality--mechanical,
practical and teleological,

which he takes

a great deal of time in trying to reconcile.

interprets the third Critique as very
1

much

a Kantian

Parmenides

790 Kant realizes that the mechanical causality he
argued

first Critique is insufficient for a full

Ewing

explanation of

all

.

In

for in the

events.

In

§64 of the third Critique Kant recognizes that in the case of
organisms

we must

bring in the idea of self-creativity and purposiveness,
remi-

niscent of the Greek notion of "soul" and Whitehead's "actual
entity.

"

Kant's mistake, according to Ewing, is his failure to adjust his
account
of

freedom to

fit

this

new found defect

in his

mechanical determinism.

because he makes a mechanical or quasi-mechanical
causality universal among phenomena that he has to separate
the noumenal from the phenomenal so completely, as the
timeless from the temporal. The awkwardness and obscurity
of Kant's solution comes, no doubt, partly from the difficulties of the subject, but also from the fact that, because
It

is
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he supposed the only kind
of nece<?<^itv to

Kc.

^

"

Tra-c^ndentar'*'
Analytic
ALTyUctot
not onT'“
only necessity but also
'natural' (quasl™l''«sally valid among pheonly able to secure freedom

omena and was consequently
nomenrand

But

if

such an interpretation of the
development of Kant's Critical

philosophy were correct, then

make room
Reason

in

it

certainly seems strange that he
would

for a principle of purposive
unity in the first Critique itself

in its search for the greatest
systematic unity

demands

of itself

the postulation of a supreme
being which serves as the unconditioned

ideal or archetype for the complete
determination of all conditioned
79
things.
Kant explains in "The Final Purpose
of the Natural Dialectic
of

Human Reason"

that

This highest formal unity, which rests
solely on concepts
of reason, is the purposive unity
of things
The specula tiye^ interest of reason makes it
necessary to regard all
order in the world as if it had originated
in the purpose of
a supreme reason. Such a principle
opens out to our reason,
as applied in the field of experience,
altogether new views
as to how the things of the world may be
connected according to teleological laws, and so enables
it to arrive at
their greatest systematic unity. 80
.

And to approach nature from

this teleological point of

view in no way

conflicts with the universality of "critical determinism"

when we

perly understand reason's regulative employment.

The assumption of a supreme intelligence, as the one and
only cause of the universe, though in the idea alone, can
therefore always benefit reason and can never injure it.
Thus if, in studying the shape of the earth
we assume
it to be the outcome of wise purposes on the
part of an
.

.

.

pro

74

cue cjuuiuonai unity;

upon which reason insists in

we do

its

not destroy the uni

empirical employment. 81

This idea of purposiveness in
nature is like the idea of transcen-

dental freedom in that they are
both thought by reason out of
o

its

own

purity in order to prescribe the
greatest systematic unity to experience

and thought.

They do not conflict with the Transcendental
Analytic

because they do not claim extension

of our

knowledge beyond experience.

Rather, reason in its systematic thinking
has the power and the responsibility to postulate different

which our understanding

models (frameworks, systems) within

of nature can achieve its greatest possible
unity.

And because each of these models has

its

own unique

point of view

and purpose, one and the same event may be seen
under different descriptions.

Actually, however, "reason has only one single interest,
and

the conflict of its
of, the

maxims

methods whereby

is

only a difference in, and mutual limitation

this interest

endeavors to obtain satisfactions "82

This interest is the intrinsic harmony of reason with itself,
since "pure

reason

is in fact

reason

is

occupied with nothing but

itself.

"

And this "unity of

the unity of system" which "does not serve objectively as a

principle that extends the application of reason to objects, but sub-

jectively as a

maxim

that extends its application to all possible empirical

75

knowledge

of objects. -83

This principle of systematic
unity, which is

the guiding principle of
reason through which all its interests
seek

harmony, can be seen as having
an "undeterminate - objective employment, since, by postulating such
strengthens and extends

new paths which

a unity, albeit only hypothetical,

own empirical employment, "opening

its

it

out

are not within the cognisance
of the understanding.

Rather than the Critique o f Judgment
being at odds with these

ideas of the first Critique,

agreement.
to the Third

In §70 Kant

Antinomy

I

find instead that

it is

in fundamental

exposes an antinomy analogous

of the

Transcendental Dialectic.

in all respects

The thesis

is

the maxim, received by reason from the
understanding, that "All pro-

duction of material things and their forms must
be estimated as possible

on mere mechanical laws" and the antithesis

is

the

maxim

that

some

material products of nature must be estimated in
terms of final causes.®

Now

if

these maxims of reason were interpreted as constitutive
rather

than regulative, conflict would inevitably arise.
stood that "reason
principles,

is

that is,

own systematic

the truth of both.

it is

under-

unable to prove either one or the other of these

once

it

is

understood that these positions are

subjective interests of reason arising from
its

But once

its purity for

the purpose of

unity, then no contradiction arises from maintaining
In fact,

unknown inner basis

it is

"an open question, whether in the

of nature itself the

physico-mechanical and

nexus present in the same things may not cohere in

final

a single principle;

76
it

being only our reason that

is not in a

position to unite them in such a

principle," therefore being compelled
to act from a "subjective ground,

and not according

to an objective principle of the
possibility of things

in their inherent nature.

reason, which provides

The multiplicity of the principles
its

richness and power, at the same time

the mark of its finitude, giving
tial

of

it

a tragic

awareness

of its

is

own essen-

lack of complete unity.

Because Ewing

employment, he

is

is

unmoved by the dynamic

forced to interpret this teleological causality,

introduced by Kant as early as the
third,

of reason's regulative

first

Critique and elaborated in the

"as a substitute for 'natural' causality" rather than as
a supple-

ment to

it.

88

That Ewing fails to feel the force behind Kant's regula-

tive dimension of reason, thereby forcing him to see the
third Critique

as an alternative to the first, is evidenced by this statement:

"If

causality (phenomenal) were regarded as equivalent to mechanism,

Kant would be bound to insist that

it

was quite impossible

for teleologi-

cal principles to be valid of organisms.
But this is to miss completely Kant's critique of judgment; worse
yet,

it

is to

miss Kant's critique of pure reason

critique of judgment falls.

The principle

itself, under

of teleological

which

judgment,

like all subjective principles of pure reason, yields no objective

edge

.

We

his

are right, however, in applying the teleological estimate,

at least problematically, to the investigation of nature; but

knowl-

.
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P'^‘"<=iP‘e= °f observation
to the causality that
looks to ends
while not pretending to explain
it by this means.
Thus it is
an est^ate of the reflective,
not of the determinate, judg-

aMrrifarch^r
research by analogy

an^d

This principle of judgment
is part of our capacity
for rational thought in
its

search

for

systematic unity.

tize experience.

Without judgment we could not systems

As Kant states in his first
introduction to the Critique

SlJlidament, the lawfulness furnished by
this power of the human mind
® theoretical knowledge of
nature nor
a practical principle of
freedom; nonetheless it gives a
principle for judging nature and
investigating it in search
of the general laws of particular
experiences, according to
which we must posit them to bring out
that systematic
connection needful for coherent experience,
and which we
have an a priori ground for assuming.

Such

a principle, like other "Ideas"
of pure reason, adds nothing to

philosophy as a "doctrinal system," but
instead stems out
of ours" to search for

of a

"need

and posit "a systematic kind of connection wher-

ever possible
Therefore, rather than agreeing with Ewing that
Kant should have

revised his thoughts about freedom in light of the
Critique of Judgment
I

find

what he says there perfectly

Antinomy.
that

we

in tune with his solution to the Third

discussing antinomies of pure reason we must realize

In

are not "asking questions in regard to the nature of
things, but

only such questions as arise from the very nature of reason,
and which

concern solely

which

.

at first

its

own

seemed

inner constitution."^^

to

"Thus pure reason,

promise nothing less than the extension of

.
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knowledge beyond

all limits of

experience, contains,

stood, nothing but regulative
principles

,

if

properly under-

principles which are all

governed by what we might call the
supreme principle of reason,

namely, that of systematic unity.
IS a

The requirement to seek

necessary law of reason "since without

it

for this unity

we should have no reason

and without reason no coherent employment
of the understand-

at all,

ing

Kant s theories of causal determinism,
causality through freedom

and teleological causality

all

must be seen as evolving out

necessary law of reason— a law which enables reason
its

own

finite

conditionedness in

unconditioned.

its

of this

to reach

beyond

eternal restless search for the

The possibility of transcendental freedom

is, therefore,

intimately joined to these self-transcending acts of
reason which pre-

vent
In

it

from exhausting itself in totally limited and disunited
concerns.

such acts ideas of reason are born which serve to carve out

home

for Critical

metaphysical inquiries.

a proper

PART

II

FREEDOM AND ACTION

Introduction

C ritique
dom

IS

of Pure

Reason Kant feels he has shown that free-

compatible with the determinism of natural
causality by reveal-

ing the dynamic of reason's regulative
employment.
still

However, freedom

remains a mere possibility, even though the recognition

transcendental Idea
igation of nature.

how categories

of

is

necessary

of

as a

it

completeness of reason's invest-

for the

To solve the riddle of the Critical philosophy, that

mind can be objectively applied

to

noumenal being

is,

in

practical use, the objective reality of the concept of freedom
must be
justified.

This is the chief task of the Critique of Practical Reason

In the foreward to his

of the

out,

2

Many

Commentary

,

Beck remarks on the neglect

^

second Critique by Kantian scholars

.

.

But as John Silber points

the explanation for this apparent neglect is due to Kant himself.
of the essential

concepts of his moral theory are not fully explain-

ed in the second Critique

.

The concept of obligation and the structure

of imperatives are quite extensively

discussed in the Foundations

;

the concept of the good is given important treatment in the first and
third Critiques ;

and most important

for the

purposes of this dissertation.

the concepts of moral freedom and the will are first systematically

.

80

developed

in the Religion

M etaphysics

of

Morals

Wi thin

the Limits of Ree.nn

Therefore, although the second Critique

.

real climax of the Critical philosophy,
of these other

and in the

it

must be understood

is the

in light

works

The justification of freedom turns upon the
question Kant poses
in the Introduction:

the will, or is

An answer

it

"Is pure

reason sufficient

only as empirically conditioned that

to this question focuses

rationality, and sensibility.
volition.

of itself to

it

determine

can do so?

upon the interrelation

of

freedom,

This in turn demands a theory of human

Only then can we understand Kant's identification

of the will

with practical reason,^ and thereby his explanation
of free action.

What Kant attempts

to

do in the Critique of Practical Reason

uncover the principles that are required

is to

for the rationality of action.

This requires an analysis of practical reasoning that relates
concepts

such as intention, desire, volition, and moral responsibility
mental categories of an adequate philosophy of mind.
current philosophical

market

is

to

funda-

Even though the

flooded with talk about action theory,

Wilfrid Sellars has perceptively noted the lack of any such analysis

reasoning.^

of practical

the outline,

if

I

would argue that Kant has

at least provided

not the full picture, for this analysis with his justifica-

tion of the central practical concept of causality through freedom.

Such

a

concept brings out that sense of 'cause' in which

true to say that agents

it is

cause events, but that they are not caused

to

81

do them.

which

is

This points to a sense of 'can' in
"He can do otherwise"
not explainable in terms of
physical laws; rather,

it

is explain-

able only by a set of practical
principles governing purposive activity.

And under such
with freedom

a set of principles this

is not a

sense

mere indeterminism

of causality associated

for Kant;

on the contrary

freedom of will, although it is not the
property of conforming
to laws of nature, is not for this
reason lawless: it must
rather be a causality conforming to
immutable laws, though
of a special kind; for otherwise a
free will would be selfcontradictory.

This special law of causality, which

reason,

is the

is

provided by pure practical

moral law.®

The practical necessity
obligation which

is

of the moral

law points

to the

concept of

expressed in the morally significant statement "He

ou£ht to have done otherwise,

"

The transcendental justification

of

freedom centers around the rational account Kant gives this concept
account many writers on Kant disagree with because
circularity.

In Part

II I

— an

of its apparent

shall try to explain what Kant

means by saying

that "though freedom is certainly the ratio essendi of the moral law,

the latter is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom.

This relationship underscores the reciprocity between freedom and

reason.

The moral law, which

is a

necessary law

prescribed freely by pure practical reason.

of free action, is

A proper analysis of this

relationship will show that Kant finds both freedom and obligation ulti-

mately grounded in reason.

0

block of all empiricists
cfsu“burthe°k
but the key to the most
sublime practical principles
^^rough it, that they must
necessarily
necrsslrUvTrT^'H^'
proceed rationally . ^

.

CHAPTER

I

AN ANALYSIS OF KANT'S RATIONALITY
OF ACTION

(1)

If

we asked

Distinctions and Relations among
Practical Principles

the question

"Why?" about

A" two different answers might be
given:
the means to B" or "Because

I

"Because

ought to do A.

different kinds of practical reasoning.

the statement

"

I

shall do

"I

want B and A

Is

These answers point to

In the second Critique Kant

locates the practical principles underlying
these two different reasons
for

my Intending

to

do A, thereby providing a

full

theory of practical

reasoning

We

might call this an attempt to give the rationality
of action.

Sellars says "The central theme of Kant's
ethical theory is, in our

terminology, the reasonableness of intentions.
if

what sense

or

senses

any, can intentions be said to be reasonable, i.e.
have a claim on

the assent of a rational being
to

In

answer

make

this question

the statement

"I

hypothetically valid.

According to Sellars, Kant

by looking

is trying

for practical principles that will

shall do A" categorically valid, rather than merely

To put this in more Kantian language, the second

Critique is a search for principles which are categorically prescriptive
of actions, being conditioned

by nothing but pure reason

itself.

Such

84

principles must provide the
rational foundation for
synthetic a priori

propositions which will explain
the practical necessity
between "thinking that one ought to

do A" and "willing

normative rational thought and action.

to

do A,

that is

"

In the next

between

few sections

1

shall

lay out some of the machinery
essential to Kant's rationality of
action-

machinery which

is

valuable to an understanding of what

it

means

to

act freely for Kant.

Kant argues that the empiricist

is

unable to provide

rationality of action because he
confuses

cal principles with

la^ or

maxims

for the

or subjective practi-

objective practical principles

In the

.

Foundations Kant identifies a maxim as
a principle

on which the subject acts

A law, on the other
an objective principle valid for every
rational
being; and it is a principle on which he
ought to act— that
is, an imperative ^ ^

hand,

.

is

.

Part of this empiricist confusion stems
from an inadequate analysis of

the concepts of will and desire, although
the deeper problem appears to
lie in the

empiricist theory of concept formation itself.

Essential in understanding Kant's rationality of action
tinction

A

dis-

of practical principles.

practical principle" is a generic term referring to all those
"proposi-

tions
of

between the formal and material aspects

is his

which contain

such principles

namely one

general determination of the will.

is the

mination of the will
ject,

a

of

is

object whose reality is desired.

The matter
If

the deter-

due to the relation this object has to the sub-

expected pleasure, then the principle

is

empirical

.
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However,

to provide for a

complete theory of rational
action. Kant

argues that one must uncover
principles which spring
unconditionally
from the subject himself.
To do thi s one must refer
to the formal

aspect of practical principles.
The form of practical principles
deals only "with the universal
rules of thinking as such
without regard to differences
in

To study this formal aspect

is to

and the laws associated with

it

objects. "14

its

study the logic of practical
reasoning,

are laws of freedom

A study

.

of

empir-

ical practical principles might
be called practical anthropology,
but
this is not sufficient to account
for the rationality of action. 15

only

by considering the form of practical
principles can moral philosophy,
along with

its

concept of freedom, be established.

To act in accordance with principles

is the

mark

of rationality

distinguishing human action from mere
animal behavior.

^

^

,

But to get the

sufficient conditions for rational action
an account of objective practi-

cal principles is necessary.
are principles upon
his

own personal

Subjective practical principles or maxims

which the subject chooses

principles,

if

They express

to act.

you wiJl, his life-style.

H.

J.

Baton

calls them the "principles actually at work
in our action, principles

which are the real ground
principle of action:
it,

having under

it

of our action.

"Whenever

I

come upon

An example
a

wrong,

I

is

Quixote's

shall right

several practical rules, for instance:

"To

punish the enchanters who changed Lady Dulcinea into the form of

a

peasant

girl is to right a

wrong

An objective principle

^
.

is valid for

every rational agent, and
"would

also serve subjectively as a
practical principle for
if

reason had

full control

all rational

over the faculty of desire. "19

formulate the language of Impgratives
prescribing what

beings

Such principles

we ought

to do.

But not all objective practical
principles are practical laws, rather
only

those which command the willing
of certain actions to be our
duty, to

be categorically valid.

We
laws.
of

my

can now see more clearly the relation
between maxims and

Without maxims there would be no action,
but unless the maxim
action is formed out of regard for a law,

tionally moral.

In order that

my

inten-

1

"I

can also will that my

a universal law.

Having put forth

second Cr itique Kant

is not

actions be categorically valid,

ought never to act except in such a way that

maxim should become

my action

this

much machinery, we can say

tries to explain the possibility of

that in the

maxims which

are not empirical practical principles, and to aid
such an effort, he
offers an analysis of imperatives
or categorically.^^

Such

which command either hypothetically

a distinction,

which

is a

distinction of

imperatives, will help us to understand the two different answers
given
to the question

"Why should

"Apodictic Imperatives,

I

do A?" As Beck points out

this is

how Kant

in his article

really distinguishes

between imperatives, namely by the way they command, rather than by
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their structure.

that the

In the Preface to the

modal concepts

second Critique

.

Kant declares

of the problematic, assertoric,
and apodlctic

indicate the proper difference among
imperatives 24
.

A hypothetical imperative is practically
necessary in so far as
IS c onditioned

by an end,

B, to

which the action. A, stated

imperative is judged to be a means.

problematically ,
the end is what

if it

is a

in the

Such imperatives command either

technical imperative or rule of skill where

someone might desire,

or assertorically

.

if it is

pragmatic imperative or counsel of self-love where
the end

everyone naturally desires, e.g. happiness. 25

in the Foundations, their possibility is

it.

what

As Kant states

easy to establish since they

are analytic as far as willing is concerned

also will the action required for

is

a

But both of these

hypothetical imperatives conform to the same analysis.

I

it

:

"If

I

fully will the effect,

"2 5

To understand what Kant means by the analyticity

of willing

related to hypothetical imperatives, let us borrow another example from
the knight-errant Quixote.

Given the hypothetical imperative

wants to disenchant a Lady, then one ought

to follow Death's

"If

one

method

of disenchantment" and the proposition "Quixote desires Lady Dulcinea's

disenchantment,

"

then "Quixote ought to will Death's method of three

thousand self-inflicted stripes on Sancho's 'browny buttocks'" follows
analytically.

What

is

analytic here is the logic of the willing of a

rational being ,27 not the contents willed.
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The content of the hypothetical,
namely that Death's method of
beating poor Sancho

Lady,

is

is certainly not

required for the disenchantment
of Quixote's

known analytically,

desires her disenchantment.
IS actually a

nor is the fact that Quixote

Rather, Kant's analyticity of
conditionals

statement within his theory of the
rationality of action.

Quixote's intention to bring about
Sancho' s beating

is

reasonable rela -

tive to his desire for Dulcinea's
disenchantment and his belief that
for this to

true

come about Death's method

is

causally necessary.

This is

even though the content willed may in fact
be quite unreasonable,

9S no doubt poor Sancho would roadily
agr©6.^^
But in the second introduction to the Critique
of Judgment Kant

makes

it

quite clear that these technically-practical
principles are

mere "corollaries'- to theoretical philosophy, since
the kind
ity

associated with them concerns concepts of nature.

fore not morally-practical.^^

To account

for the

of

causal-

They are there-

second reason

for

my

intention to do A, Kant must explain the possibility of
imperatives

which command apodeictically

,

that is

any end other than the doing of the act
To say

"I

shall do A because

do A because the willing
"because"

of A is

I

,

without being conditioned by
for its

own sake.

ought to do A"

an apodeictic command.

in these statements is different from the

involved in hypothetical imperatives.

say

is to

"

"I

shall

The sense of

sense of "because"

Both refer to practical reasoning

and to a causality of the will, but only the former

is

grounded in a law

m

of freedom.

The sense
is

of obligation associated
with

each of these imperatives

inseparable from a notion of
aood action.

the second Critique

Kant says that the only objects
of a practical reason are
the good or
the evil.

If

the objective practical
principle is merely a means to

some end, then

the good

which

is

willed is the useful .

ing IS g ood for Lady Dulcinea's
disenchantment.

If

the imperative is

prudential, then the good act is that
which brings about

(desWghl).

my well-being

But unlike the sense of good in
these principles of action,

Kant seeks another sense of good

(

das Gute) which

by anything outside the willing of this
good in
skilfully

Sancho's beat-

is not

Itself. 33

conditioned

Unlike the

good and the prudentially good action, the
morally good

action is not based upon satisfying
specific desires of the agent, but
solely "for the sake of the moral law."^"^

To assure this distinction between objective practical
principles,
however, Kant must justify the use of categorical
imperatives.
laws of moral action issue apodeictic commands
if it is

to

be a good will.

These

for the will to follow,

But because these unconditional imperatives

are synthetic a priori practical propositions, their
possibility is

more difficult

to establish than that of conditionals:

Without presupposing a condition taken from some inclination
I connect an action with the will a
priori and therefore necessarily.
Here we have a practical proposition in which the
willing of an action is not derived analytically from some
other willing already presupposed
but is on the contrary connected immediately with the concept of the will of
.

.

.

.

.

.

,

much
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a rational being as

concept

^

something which

is not

contained in this

.

Kant realizes that the possibility of
these imperatives of morality

cannot be established without the concept
of freedom.

But first he

identifies the criterion of lawlikeness
for these imperatives and argues
that the

phenomenon

of moral obligation cannot be explicated

imperatives are merely conditional.

This is the purpose of §§1-7 of the

second Cr itique which goes to the very heart
and to the nature of reason

(2)

if all

of his rationality of action

itself.

Kant's Theory of Rational Desire

Essential to this purpose is a correct analysis of the faculty
of

desire-- the faculty such a being has of causing, through
reality of the objects of these ideas.
in

such an analysis

is

the faculty of desire.

its

ideas, the

The main question to be asked

whether pleasure always serves as the ground
If

of

so, one need only engage in "a critique of con-

cepts borrowed from psychology," making the principles of action purely
empirical.

Kant contends that because an empiricist, like Hume,

answers the above question
for the

in the affirmative, he is unable to account

concept of moral obligation, and therefore unable

to give suf-

ficient conditions for the statement "S acts rationally out of his desire
that p.

"

This mistake centers around the empiricist philosophy of

mind which

fails to include the

normative dimension of thought.

According to the empiricist, concepts are meaningful only

if
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they have their source in
observation and can be analyzed
only in terms
of

impressions.

Upon

this empiricist theory of

formulates principles of justified

Humean schema

meaningfulness

(or rational) belief

,

Hume

and desire.

A

for the principle of
rational belief is the following;

S

believes rationally that whenever
an event of type E occurs an
event of
type El Will occur if and only
if whenever S observes
(has an impression

of)

an E-event, S also observes an 1
e event.

What

this says,

in effect, is that all rational
belief in lawful regularities is

observation of constant conjunctions
among impressions.
this principle,

when

observes an occurrence

S

of

based upon

Following

an E-event, he can

justifiably expect an e 1 -event to follow.

Hume’s rationality

follows this same pattern in claiming
that

all rational

of action

action out of

desire is simply based upon the regularity
of observing a certain state
of affairs (having a certain impression)
and the pursuing of another.

Such

a claim has led

desire which identifies

it

many philosophers

to give

an analysis of

with a recognizable pattern of behavior.

Russell, for example, argues that "an animal's
desire

nothing but a

is

characteristic of a certain series of action" and from
this
difficult to see that the

of

human beings

OQ
.

same explanation

is

Hume would no doubt

"it is

not

applicable to the desires
be quite agreeable to this

account, since in the Treatise he states that men and animals are
rational in exactly the

same way.^^ For Hume, desire,

can be described only by way of reference

to a

like belief.

succession

of internal
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impressions.

Russell simply expands this
phenomenalistic account into

a behavioristic one, but
the spirit is the

same.

That animals are rational in the
same

haps differing in degree,
and

is

is a direct

way

as man, although per-

consequence

of the

above schema

paradigmatic of the whole empiricist
misunderstanding of the

nature of thought-in this case,
thought as

it

relates to action.

Acting

out of desire involves the notion
of trying to realize some purpose

founded upon the pure thought of an
agent.
reduced to either patterns of behavior

Such thought cannot be

or regularity

Rather then being purely descriptive,
thought
a characteristic of

to the

mental activity which

mouse running
In fact,

for its hole

it

is

essentially normative—

would be absurd

whenever the cat

Hume himself seems

among impressions.

is

to attribute

present.

to realize that the concept of obli-

gation, which is essentially normative and
basic to our conceptual

scheme,

is recalcitrant to his

^ghtness
ness,

is

,

way

of establishing meaningful concepts.

along with the factual element of usefulness or
pleasant-

fundamental, according to Hume, to a theory of value, but the

former cannot be observed.

empiricism,

Therefore, as a result of his strict

Hume must announce

this concept.

a

scepticism concerning the use of

Because

This ought or ought not expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd;
and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what
seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be
a deduction from others which are entirely different from it.'^^
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In trying to give sufficient
conditions for acting rationally
out of

desire and in order to account
for moral obligation, Kant
sees the need
to distinguish

between

a lower

and higher faculty of desire (das

Bea ehrunqsveritioq en) by locating
Because an empiricist,

like

Hume, does

he confuses maxims with laws.

desire is hedonistic:

their different causal determinations.

not

make

this distinction,

A statement of the lower faculty

S desires to do A

because

of the pleasure S

expects as a result of doing

above schema

of

of

analogue to the

Hume's rationality

of action.

This lower faculty of desire is based
upon what Kant calls "the

material of the faculty of desire" which is
the desired object pursued
for its

expected pleasure-giving capacities.

founded upon

it

will be empirical

the object sought will actually

,

since

we cannot know

a priori

if

"be associated with pleasure or dis-

pleasure or will be merely indifferent.
jective maxim, since

Any practical principle

Also

it

will be a mere sub -

not necessarily true that all rational beings

it is

will find the object as pleasure-giving."^^

However

this is not to

say

that the presence of a material of desire disqualifies a
principle from

being a law.

In fact, Kant

object of every volition

if

says explicitly that there must be an

there is to be action at all."^^

He simply

disqualifies as laws those principles that guide action because of
their reference to the material of desire.

because

of

such references, then

If

actions were guided
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the

maxim could not be presented as giving universal
law,

because then the expectation of the existence
of the object
would be the determining cause of the choice,
the dependence of the faculty of desire on the existence
of some thing
would have to be made basic to volition, and this
dependence would have to be sought out in empirical
conditions
and therefore could never be a foundation of a
necessary
and universal rule."^^
Kant is seeking a
for

any and

to be

all rational

way

of setting

up practical laws which are valid

beings and which concern what morally ought

done rather than what i^done.

As

we have

noted earlier these

practical laws must also be carefully distinguished from
hypothetical

imperatives, since they, like the empirically subjective practical
principles, are relative to the material of the faculty of desire.
the

Canon

of the first Critigue Kant

even goes so

far as to

In

remove

hypothetical reasoning from the realm of practical reasoning altogether
in his effort to separate empirical and moral laws:

By 'the practical' I mean everything that is possible through
freedom. When, however, the conditions of the exercise of
our free will are empirical, reason can have no other than a
regulative employment in regard to it, and can serve only to
effect unity in its empirical laws. Thus, for instance, in
the precepts of prudence, the whole business of reason consists in uniting all the ends which are prescribed to us by
our desires in the one single end, happiness, and in coordinating the means for attaining it. In this field, therefore, reason can supply none but pragmat ic laws of free
action, for the attainment of those ends which are commended
to us by the senses; it cannot yield us laws that are pure
and determined completely a priori
Laws of this latter type,
pure practical laws, whose end is given through reason
completely a priori and which are prescribed to us not in
an empirically conditioned but in an absolute manner, would
be products of pure reason. Such are the moral laws; and
these alone, therefore, belong to the practical employment
.

,

of reason,

and allow of

a

canon.
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TO establish the possibility of
categorical imperatives,
locate a theory of rational desire

such that the will
In other

words,

is

whose objects

Kartt

must

are a priori determinable

determined by purely formal principles

of thought.

to establish principles of
morality rather than princi-

ples of self-love, Kant must find
a higher faculty of desire
whose

determining ground must be discovered
through "a relation of a conception to an object by concepts and
not the relation of a conception to

the subject by feelings.

Kant notes that there have been attempts
to distinguish between
a lower and higher faculty of desire
on the basis of "whether the con-

ceptions which are associated with pleasure
have their origin in the

senses or in the understanding "52
.

out, the

^s Beck in his Commentary points

otherwise acute men" Kant

is referring to here are the

Wolffians whose reasoning, following Descartes and
Leibniz, stems
from taking clarity as the distinguishing criterion
between sensibility

and the understanding ^5
.

Through the understanding man can gain an

intellectual intuition, and hence knowledge, into the
very essence
of objects.

This differs from the confused representations derived

from sensation, of which the principles founded upon the lower faculty
of desire are the practical paradigms.

As early as his Inaugural Dissertation Kant upholds

a

generic

distinction between the understanding and sensibility and recognizes
the above rationalist distinction as merely one of degree in clarity.

.
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not of kind.54
Of

Upon

this rationalist

view

it Is

meaningless to speak

two kinds Of desire because the
corresponding expected pleasures

determine this faculty in exactly
the same way.
questions to be asked by the man

who

Therefore, the only

is trying to justify his
acting

out of desire is not whether the
related pleasure Is intellectual
or

sensuous, that

kind, but rather

how long-lasting, and how much

satisfying,
It

is of a particular

how

great,

how

is the related pleasure.

should be pointed out that Wolff himself
speaks of the

rational idea of Eerfection

paniment.

5 6

desired for

He

its

of

which pleasure

is the

necessary accom-

rejects hedonism by holding that the
perfection is

own sake and

not for the pleasure

it

gives.

But,

as Silber makes clear, this will not escape
Kant's argument.
idea of perfection

er^

when used

in a practical

e.g. the perfection of a knife

for cutting.

is

sense must refer

determined by

its

The
to a

given

competence

The idea of perfection cannot determine desire unless
cer-

tain ends are given from which perfection is judged,
and according to

Kant

an end, however, as an object which precedes and contains
the ground of determination of the will by a practical rule-that is an end as the material of the will
is
if taken as
the determining ground of the will, only empirical; it could
thus serve for the Epicurean principle in the happiness
theory but never as a pure rational principle of ethics and
duty
,

—

,

For Kant, the higher faculty of desire has a completely different
structure and function from the lower, as does the understanding from
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sensibility.
Either, then, no higher faculty
of desire exists, or else
pure
reason alone must of Itself be practical,
i.e. it must be able
to de^e^rmine the will by the
mere form of the practical
rule

Therefore, a statement of Kant's higher
faculty of desire is the following:

S

desires to do A because A has the form
of lawlikeness.

the principle of Kant's rationality of
action is:
of his desire to

obey the

an event of type
of pure reason.

rule:

S acts rationally out

"Whenever an event

should occur"

and only

if

This says, in effect, that

if

And

if

of type E occurs,

the rule is a

command

man were completely

a

rational, then every rule prescribed by pure
reason would be acted

upon out

of desire,

where desire

ought to be obeyed for

its

is

simply the thinking that the rule

own sake,

that is, simply because

it is

a

practical law.

Contrary to Hume, 61 Kant argues that reason directly influences
action and, therefore, can be the source of a theory of morals.

G. E. M. Anscombe feels there

Hume and

Aristotle which,

I

is a significant

think, has bearing on this explanation of

reason and action in Kant.

For

reason being

in the

inert;

whereas

difference here between

Hume, actions

are done out of passions,

Nicomachean Ethics

Aristotle says

r o

that reason does indeed play a role in action.

ference

is not

as significant as

it

might

first

However, the difappear, since Aristotle

qualifies this by saying that "intellect itself however moves nothing,

but only the intellect which aims at an end and is practical.

I
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relate this to

what Kant refers

to as hypothetical reasoning
resulting in

universal rules of skill (how to find
means to some end)
for

And

.

.

example, how someone who wants
bread should construct
this kind of reasoning

theory.

even Hume admits

to

be important

.as,
a mill. "64
in action

But, according to Kant, such
reasoning cannot issue in practi-

cal laws and, therefore, cannot
provide the rationality of action.
In trying to

develop the categorical validity

essential for the rationality of action,
Kant

is

different conception of the nature of
thought of
is a part.

Thought in

its relation to the setting

of intentions as being

pointing to a completely

which rational desire
up of laws

is self-

legislating, having, therefore, a formal
and normative dimension which
differs from its empirical dimension.

Through his theory

of rational

desire Kant believes he has shown that thought's
essence cannot be

captured in purely descriptive terms.

(3)

A Vindication of Kant's Formalism in Moral Action

The criterion of categorical imperatives originates from this for-

mal dimension

of thought.

Kant states in the Foundations that "the mere

concept of a categorical imperative

.

.

.

provides us with the formula

containing the only proposition that can be a categorical imperative "66
,

namely
will

it

"

Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time

should become a universal law ."^^ where "maxim" and "law"

are variables.

Broad correctly calls this formula a "second-order
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principle- under which first-order
principles or specific imperatives
fall. 68

This formula, which is an expression
of man's pure rationality,

prescribes to the practical thinker a

way

of choosing his

namely, the maxim should be one that
we can will to be

any and

all rational

beings.

is

it

of Its being within a

framework

egocentric intentions

if

for

he decides upon his

unlversalizable, or as Sellars puts

"irreducibly egocentric.

maxim

a

The moral agent acts categorically rational

rather than merely hypothetically
rational, only

intention because

maxims,

it,

because

of intersubjectivity, rather than being

A case of practical reasoning involving
an argument which

is

is

only hypothetically valid.

Quixote's practical reasoning concerning the
disenchantment of Lady

Dulcinea

is

hypothetically but not categorically valid because Quixote

is acting out of his
is true

desire which is determined by a given end.

This

even though the hypothetical imperative authorizes that anybody

would reason

Sancho himself.
Sellars calls

same way given

in the

it,

same conditions

the

.

including

For intentions to have an intersubjective form, as

and

for

arguments involving them to be morally good,

the intentions must not only be located within but must be formulated

because one

is a

maxim "Whenever
valid only
rational

if it

when

is

member
I

community

of a

come upon

a wrong,

of rational beings.

I

formulated in this way.

he, in his

own

Quixote's

shall right it" is categorically

And, Quixote acts morally

singularity, acts as a

member

of this
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community, that

is,

when he

acts from a moral point of view

than from a personal point of view.

These are points

rather

view Kant has

of

explained through his analysis of imperatives.
In a hypothetical imperative the
content of the imperative, that

is, the value of the "A" in "I
shall

of the

do A,"

law of nature expressed as "A

is the

determined by the content

is

means

to B.

"

But in a

categorical imperative the content of the
imperative is determined by
the form of law as such, which is the
criterion or formula for all cate-

gorical imperatives.

This analysis of imperatives is reflected in

Kant's theory of will which also serves to explain
what he takes to be
the moral point of view.

Kant calls a willing which is determined

through hypothetical practical principles heteronomous

,

whereas an

a^utonomous willing is based upon categorical principles grounded
in
pure reason.
it

To act rationally

is to act

autonomously, and from this

follows that to try to escape the moral law

essential rationality.

extensively in
order to

my

make as

I

is to try to

escape one's

shall be dealing with Kant's theory of will

next section.

I

mention this distinction now only

in

clear as possible the criticisms that have been directed

at this essential "formalism" in Kantian ethics, that is, the determina-

tion of the content of a

maxim by

its

form.

The criticisms against Kant's formalism,

way, against

his claim that the moral point of

or, to

view

put this another
is

determined by

the above formula or categorical imperative alone, come from a variety
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of

camps.

way with

However,

I

think all of these critics would
agree in

the following statement by

W.

some

K. Frankena:

There is more to the moral point
of view than being willing
o universalize one's rules;
Kant and his followers fail to
see this fact, although they are
right in thinking such a willingness is part of it/^

Many

existential thinkers have

come down hard on Kant because they

find him neglecting the importance
of the uniqueness of situations-a

uniqueness which Kant's formula appears

to dilute and abstract.

George

Schrader in his article "Autonomy, Heteronomy,
and Moral Imperatives"
criticizes this Kantian position from

point of view.

what he takes

According to Schrader, Kant

to be a Kirkegaardian

is correct in

thinking that

moral rules formulated a priori by reason are needed
in prescribing
duties.

Nevertheless, the determination of our duties, especially

towards others, does not derive from one's pure reason,
being thereby

autonomously grounded, but rather from the concrete reality
other person, being thereby heteronomously grounded.

of the

As Schrader

says:

To see the force of this objection, which has been voiced in
one way or another by a good many critics of Kant, we need
only to consider that our duties to another person presuppose
his existence. If there were no other persons, we would
have no social obligations. It is, thus, the sheer fact of
the other's existence in all its concreteness that constitutes the initial ground of our obligation to him
His
claim upon us derives from his totality as a person confronting us in our world..
Moral duties to others not only
can but must have a heteronomous foundation.
.

I

would

.

like to take issue with the critics of Kant's formalism
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and specifically with Schrader's
interpretation.
bit,

I

To

tip

my hand

suspect that Schrader does not
fully understand the meaning
of

Kant's autonomy-heteronomy
distinction, especially

statements like the following:

when he makes

"Moral responsibility even toward one-

self is not, then, exclusively
a matter of

autonomy— if

the latter be

construed as giving universal meaning
and significance
ical nature.

But first

Kant's formalism which
I

I

just a

I

I

to one's

empir-

shall present another criticism
against

find closely related to Schrader's
and

think has been adequately rebutted by
R.

M. Hare— a

rebuttal

which

which

shall present later.
E. A. Gellner in his article "Ethics
and Logic"74 argues against

what he takes

to be R.

M. Hare's Kantianism by saying

form of universality alone
our duties.

is

that the pure

not a sufficient condition for determining

Reference must be made to material considerations and,

therefore, the agent acts at least partly from inclination.

A moral

valuation based on such considerations is what Gellner calls
an E-type

maxim which has an ineliminable empirical element such
attempt to universalize
irrelevant.

it

would make the reason

Unlike Gellner's U-type maxim,

it is

for

that any

choosing the maxim

incapable of univer-

salization, that is:

maxim cannot be deduced (in the sense in which an
exemplification is deduced from the rule it exemplifies)
from an open rule formulated with the help of only property
words and variables, but, of course, no proper names.
its
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An E-type maxim "corresponds

to our notion of the real
romantic

lover or the convinced believer,
neither of

whom can abandon

conviction of the unique,
appropriateness of the objeticular attitude. "76

doubt

a

1

of his par-

Quixote's Intention to free Lady
Dulcinea

good example

of Gellner's E-type

the

is

no

maxim.

Ultimately, in both a logical and
a factual sense, choices
and decisions are made by concrete,
here-now people and
no
y principles.
The factual sense amounts to thisthat even if the formal principles
were strong enough to
entail valuations, these would
nevertheless only in fact
e m ade thanks to and in the
concrete existenz of individual men, choosing or preferring
to adopt them.^^
.

.

.

'

Such arguments against Kant's formalism
are not new as one can
clearly see by noting such critics as
Trendelenburg, Slmmel, Blanshard,

and Lotze.

But perhaps the most influential critic
has been Sir David

Ross in his commentary on the Foundations
"Kant must be wrong

...

in saying that

and not from a purpose. "78 According

.

There he argues that

we must

act from a principle,

to Ross, Kant defines a moral

action, one done from duty, as having no purpose;
whereas, on the
contrary,

"It

can be maintained that

nation to do a certain act and yet do

These criticisms

of Kant are

it is

it

possible to have

a direct incli-

purely from a sense of duty.

based upon

a

complete misunderstand-

ing of the application of the formula of the categorical
imperative to

specific moral intentions.
the content of a

What he

Beck reminds us that when Kant speaks of

maxim being determined by

its

form.

is establishing
is a principle of categorical
imperatives, a formula, a second-order principle, and not an
imperative for a specific action. The content of the maxim
.

.

.

.
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which is derived from its form
maxims that fit the formula. 80

is the

maxim

to act only on

The content of first-order maxims
depends upon empirical considerations

only

.

However,

if it

M

is

—

this specific intention is categorically
reasonahlp

under the second-order maxim, and a moral
agent acts
if

content because

he chooses this specific maxim with
falls

it

its specific

under the second-order maxim.

This is what

Kant means by the moral agent acting from
a principle, which does not

imply that the action has no purpose.
In his article

Sir

David Ross on Duty and Purpose

directly attacks Ross' interpretation:
is

guided by a maxim

certain circumstances.

the attainment of
ing at all.

"

81

A maxim

is a rule to

,

Beck

do certain things in

These circumstances always have

The unique point Kant

"

"Every action, properly so called,

some purpose; otherwise

agent acts morally

in Kant,

a bearing on

there is no occasion for act-

is trying to

make

is that if the

then the material maxim which incorporates some

purpose must be chosen by the agent because
order

maxim whose content

order

maxim

is

determined by

that the agent has

it fits

its

under a second-

form alone

chosen to guide the choice

—a

second-

of his speci-

fic intentions

Beck, therefore, seems correct in saying
There are thus two maxims even in moral action: (a) the
maxim of an action as a means to certain consequences-this expresses the intention of the act and depends upon
specific conditions known only through experience; and
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(b)

is

With

the

maxim

maxim

of type

(a) should also be
condition of (b) over

82

dut7
this in

that any

mind we must agree with Paton
that

it is

(a)

hard to see

why

Kant "should be charged with
forgetting that moral action has
a matter

as well as a form, an empirical
as well as an a priori element
object as well as a supreme principle.

expects his readers to remember. "88

Kant does not forget.

it

clear,

1

and an

He

think, from the

moral examples given in the Foundations
that only by understanding the
empirical content of one's maxim can one
decide whether

it

is

worthy

of being considered a practical
law.
In

defending Kant against the charge

pose, a final point should be made.

of disjoining duty

One must be

and pur

careful not to con-

fuse acting from inclination with acting with
a purpose.

Quixote

acts with an end in view of righting a wrong,
for example, the enchant-

ment of his Lady, but this does not necessarily mean
that he acts out
of inclination.

duty; this end

validity.

Rather,

it

may be

that he takes this purpose to be his

may be sought by Quixote because

When Ross

of its categorical

criticizes Kant for inconsistently speaking of

purposes when developing his theory of "imperfect duties,"®"^ he forgets that "There are thus ends that are also duties.
In a reply to Gellner's article.

Hare notes similar points of faulty

interpretation:
in his criticism of 'Kantianism,' Gellner
to observe the distinction between these

seems to me
two kinds of

to fail

rule.

,
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‘°
.

'"°

'"couiri
uld fit the rigour of pure formality
(be

.

valuation
completely of

Hare goes on to make the important
distinction between second-order
and first-order principles:

The second-order principle analyzes
the concept 'rational
principle' (in that sense of the
expression in which it means
U type maxim') .... A person who accepts
this secondorder principle has not thereby had all
his moral problems
solved for him; he has to do something
further in order to
obtain his first-order maxims, namely,
exercise his autonomous, rational will by 'making laws for himself
which are
of the form prescribed by the
second-order principle, but are
not themselves formal. In simpler language,
the first-order
principles are not deduced from the second -order
principle;
they are framed in accordance with it.^^
Schrader,

imperatives.
ciple does not

I

think, falls subject to this

same confusion

of moral

An autonomously grounded second-order rational prin-

mean

that

we do

not have to take into account the con-

crete existence of persons in order to formulate first-order

maxims

which accord with the second-order principle.

of his point,

In

defense

however, Schrader adds that Kant himself qualifies his theory

autonomy

in holding that

we should

treat others as

of

ends-in-themselves

and this, in the final analysis, depends upon the fact that they demand
respect qua actual subjects.

Therefore, the very formulation of the

categorical imperative is heteronomously grounded
is not a qualification; it is a

of other persons as

.

This, however,

substantiation of his theory.

ends-in-themselves

is

The treating

an objective end prescribed
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by reason itself, not

a subjective

end.

This is so because this end
of

moral action is also the around
of moral law; the categorical
imperative

would not exist

As Paton puts

if it

man

it,

is

were not
such

a

for the

existence of rational agents.

ground "because the categorical

imperative has its origin in his
rational will" and therefore, "his
rational will ought not to be
subordinated to any meaner end but is
itself an end. 89 Thus, to
treat rational agents as
ends-in-themselves
IS to act out of

desire to obey the moral law, that is,
to act autono-

mously, and, hence, can serve as
categorical imperative

Towards Others"

a

restatement of the formula of the

The following statement from "Duties

.

in Kant's Lectures

on Ethics serves as an excellent

reply to Schrader:

Respect
mankind

for the rights of others is rooted in
principle,
is not rich in principles. Providence

and as
has implanted
in our bosoms the instinct of benevolence
to be the source of
actions by which we restore what we have
unrightously procured
.

If

this clarification of Kant's formalism is sound,

we should have

then at least a hint toward solving the problem of
harmonizing the
teleological and deontological themes of his ethics.

"when Kant speaks
end, what he says

...
is in

As Sellars says,

of the happiness of others as a categorical

no way inconsistent with his claim that the

ought of moral principles

is

categorical rather than the hypothetical

ought which pertains to the relation of means to ends."^^
Sellars continues,

"when Kant stresses intentions, he

Also,

is not
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disregarding consequences. 93

Kant is simply saying that to
locate the

rationality of action with respect
to a moral agent,

formal dimension of thought which

agent acts rationally only
IS, only

if

his intention is

if

self-legislating.

chosen because

But to err in this

We

The moral

conforms to the moral

first

err in our

judgment of

not explain the fallability of

explain the possibility of a

categorically necessary Intention which

sums up

it

can always

way does

moral judgment; for this one must

a pure practical reason.

look to the

his intention is categorically
valid, that

law legislated by pure reason.
this data.

is

we must

is

grounded In the concept

of

Sellars, in the following statement,
neatly

this Kantian moral position:

Kant is insisting that the principles in terms
of which the con
cept of a categorically valid intention is to be
explicated are
not empirical principles. They are a priori
and can, in
principle, be known by a 'mere analysis of the
conceptions
of morality.
The fallibility of moral philosophy is not
.

the

fallibility of empirical induction.

However,

this

development

of the categorical validity of intentions

does not completely establish that the moral imperative
than merely logically possible.

how

a

otherwise.
its central

if

any more

This principle of autonomy asserts

moral agent would necessarily act

and how he ought to act

is

if

he were completely rational

he were irrational enough to be inclined

This involves a use of pure practical reason which has as

concept freedom of the will.

the objective reality of freedom can Kant
rationality of action as

it

Therefore, only by showing

make good

his claim for a

relates to the meaning of a moral personality.

109
This rationality of action that Kant
is seeking revolves around the

question of how 2ure reason can be
practical.

And such a question

concerns not only the loaic of practical
reasoning, which deals with
the purely formal structure of thought,
but also the metaphysics of
practical reasoning, which deals with
the determination of objects. 9=

The former concerns the categorical validity

of practical

laws, while

the latter concerns their causal efficacy
within the concrete world.
In both the idea of a free

that

what Kant

is

is

immanent.

In fact,

doing in the second Critique

is

it

might be said

giving the proper

relationship between the logical and metaphysical
foundations of a
practical law, because only then can

be free.

we

truly explain

what

it

means

to

CHAPTER

II

AN INTERPRETATION OF KANT'S
THEORY OF MORAL WILLING

(4)

The Distinction between Wille
and Willkilr

When we developed
action,

we were

at the

of his theory of will,

Kant's theory of desire as

same time providing

m

relates to rational

a background for an analysis

fact, Kant, in several

with the faculty of desire.^

it

passages, identifies

it

The most important of these passages

occurs in the Metaphysics of MoraLs

-

The faculty of desiring in accordance
with concepts is called
the faculty of doing or forebearing
as one likes insofar as the
ground determining it to action is found
in the faculty of
desire itself and not in the object.
Insofar as it is combined
with the consciousness of the capacity
of its action to produce its object it is called
or Choice / Willkiir 7.
The faculty of desire whose internal ground
of determination
and, consequently, even whose likings
are found in the
reason of the subject is called the will /“ier
Wille 7.^
I

shall explore the distinction and interrelation
between the faculties

of

Mile and WHikDr

found in Kant’s theory of will.

Later

I

shall

show

the relationship of these concepts to the concept
of Gesinnunq which

serves to unify the many discreet acts of willing,
thereby establishing
a moral personality.
In his article "Kant's

cal Context

'

Two Conceptions

and also in his Commentary

.

of the Will in Their Politi-

Beck argues that these two

.

Ill

different conceptions of the
will are carried over into
the second
Crltlciue from

two preceding works

.

3

the Critique of Pnre

Kant introduces the concept
of freedom as spontaneity
such that a free
will has the power of
initiating a new causal
series in time. As 1
tried to

develop in the

first

chapter, this is freedom as
a pure tran-

scendental idea
In the

Fo undation s Kant develops the
concept

of

freedom around

the idea of au tonom such
that a will which possesses
x
this property
is

lawgiving, "the property which
the will has of being a law to
itself. "5

According to Beck, the former
conception of will
the latter is that of

mous

W ille

with Sllber

"

I

WUe-

Thus he speaks of

is that of

a "free, i.e.

Wlllkur while

autono-

determining a "free, i.e. spontaneous,
Willkiir

Along

.

find this interpretation of Beck's
unsatisfactory.^

the Metaphysics of Morals Kant
says:

The Will, which relates to nothing but
the law, cannot be

called either free or unfree, for

it

relates not to action, but

immediately to legislation for the maxims of
action
Only will can, therefore, be called free.^
In light of this

passage

it is

wrong

to call Wille either

autonomous

heteronomous because these are predicates that relate
the will
It

is better to call Willkiir either

ing on whether or not

prescribes.

it

Therefore,

autonomous

or

or

to action.

heteronomous depend-

chooses to act in accordance with the law Wille
it is

even misleading to speak

of

Wijj^ deter-

mining Willkiir, since this seems to negate Willkur's
freedom of

^
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self-determination.
in the

Silber correctly explains

Mile

be free -only

to

sense that reason, as judgment and
imagination,

has spontaneity. -9
It

is the

must be granted that

in

is free:

it

pure practical aspect of reason.

many places Kant seems

to associate

the concept of autonomy with
Wille and heteronomy with Willkur r^Q

however, as Beck himself admits, not
until the Metaphysics of Mnr.ic
does Kant reach

two faculties

full clarity

of will.^^

concerning the distinction between these

And even then we must

try to

understand what

Kant should have said in light of his
whole theory of volition and

freedom, rather than what he in fact does say
in particular instances.
This,

I

think, is Silber 's great merit as a Kant
scholar.

Furthermore,

ment

of Wille

we must

continually keep in mind in our develop-

and Willkur that they are abstracted functions

of a

unitary concept of will, just as sensibility,
imagination, and understanding are abstractions derived from an analysis of
empirical thought in the

Critique

.

Therefore, Beck should not find

oven in the Metaphysics

Morals

of

it

so surprising that,

"he does not often succeed in

,

keeping discussion of one of them from interrupting discussion of the
other.
In his

Commentary Beck says

free depending

iawlikeness. 13

way

upon whether

it

that Willkur

chooses

its

Willkur fails to exercise

to the importunities of

sense and

may

or

may

maxims because

its

freedom when

is a will in

not be

of their

"it

name only,

gives

really
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being an aLbitrium brutum "14
.

this interpretation confusing,

i

if

not entirely wrong, especially
in light of what Kant says
in the first
Critique

:

The human will

is certainly

an arbitrium sensitivnm

not

ate Its action. There is in
man a power of self-determination
independently of any coercion through
sensuous impulses. 15

Simply because we might say someone

does not mean that he

is

sible for his actions.

Rather,

practical principles he

gooses

Mile.

is

It

when one

is acting

li^ an animal

not acting freely and, therefore,
not respon-

we mean
to act

he is acting irrationally: the

upon are not laws prescribed by

permitting oneself to be overwhelmed by
what one is

fails in the task of continuously
realizing one's essential

rationality.

In this

less freely.

Even Beck admits that no matter how "depraved

may be,

it still

case Willkilr

is

acting heternomously but nevertheWillkilr

hears the 'heavenly voice' of pure practical reason,
so

that even the most hardened criminal trembles
before its tribunal.

But what Beck fails to realize is that the
hearing of this "voice" alone
is sufficient to constitute

In

Wiilkur's freedom.^

^

speaking of man acting irrationally in the above sense,

I

am

not overlooking the fact that Kant makes room for reason
in the service
of motives

which pure reason does not legislate.

This

much we learned

from the distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives.

However,

I

think the use of such a concept is legitimized by Kant's

defining Wille as "a kind of causality belonging to living beings so

^
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far as they are rational. "1 8

scriptions of
It

is

is in a

Therefore, not to act according
to the pre-

very Important sense to act
irrationally.

important to distinguish for Kant
a rational action, conceived
as

an autonomous action, from
that sense of rationality
used by Kant in
a generic

way.

To

fail to

grasp this distinction

picture of the rationality of
action.

is to

miss Kant's

full

In the Foundations Kant
recognizes

the above distinction within
the will of a rational being:

That IS to say, the relation of
objective laws to a will not
is conceived as one in which
the
Will of a rational being, although
it is determined by principles of reason, does not necessarily
follow these principi6S in virtuG of its own nature.^

good through and through

It

essential for Kant's theory of freedom
that

IS

sense of the irrational which
lity in the

to

man

broad sense.

is to

include this

be understood as a mode of rationa-

Beck seems

autonomy which

in his

worthiness.

is to

it

to

narrow Kant's theory of freedom

make nonsense

out of moral blame-

As Baton says, to understand Kant's theory of
freedom

we must grasp

the sense in which "we must freely allow
ourselves to

be influenced by heteronomous laws."^°
that Willklir is free only

if it

To argue, as Beck does,

follows laws of reason

is to fail to

dis-

tinguish the human will from a holy will,^^ thereby making
the experi-

ence of obligation meaningless.

To say that Willkur did not act

eccordance with laws prescribed by Wille and

blameworthy

is

meaningful only

if

in

is, therefore, morally

Willkur freely chose to disobey

the laws of its rational nature, the laws of freedom.

In fact,

when
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developing Kant's theory

miikur does

of

moral evil. Beck himself recognizes
that

not loose its freedom in disobeying
Wille

.

Beck says

this point that "the subjective
ground of decision (of Willkuri
itself be an act of

freedom" and "evil lies, therefore, not
in

under the conditions of nature to exercise
freedom but
IS freely

adopted and

is in

opposition to the maxim.

.

in a

.

.

at

must

.

.

a failure

maxim

that

of the pure

practical reason.
In "The Ethical Significance of Kant's
Religion " Silber holds

that, in the Foundations

,

Kant's views of freedom and the will are
far

too fragmentary to see heteronomy as a

mode

of freedom.

Not

until the

second Critique does Kant begin to develop the sensuous
nature
in relation to his freedom.

Kant's advance in the second Critique

be seen in his recognition that the will which
gated

is

of

is

man

may

categorically obli-

not the will of a rational being as such but of a rational and
a

sensible being--a human being torn between the demands of his
sensir\

ble and rational natures

.

A

But by making room for a free heteronomous

willing, and thereby moral evil, Kant must face the fact that a moral

agent can
law.

How

sonality?

still

be free, and hence a person, even in rejecting the moral

then can this law be a necessary condition for a moral per-

How

a free will?

is the

Because

categorical validity of intentions connected to
of Kant's uncertainty in handling this problem,

he occasionally in the Critique of Practical Reason reverts to defining

freedom as obedience to the moral law. 25

Kant's insights in the
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second Crmaue concerning the
essential connection between
freedom
and the moral law are not fully
born out until he systematizes
the

dynamics

(5)

of the will through his
Wllle - Wlllkur distinction.

Relations between Transcendental
and Practical Freedom

The relationship between responsibility
and freedom demands

for

Kant a careful distinction between
empirical and psychological freedom

and transcendental freedom.

To be morally responsible

is to

determined, which implies freedom from
external influences.
nizing this
it

many empiricists

try to

to actions issuing from "ideas

account

for a free will

we have produced by

our

be self-

Recog-

by relating

own powers.

However, although
these conceptions do indeed imply
psychological freedom (if
one wishes to use this word for a merely
internal concatenation of ideas of the mind),
nevertheless they also imply
natural necessity, leaving no room for
transcendental freedom, which must be thought of as independent from
everything empirical and hence from nature
generally.
Without transcendental freedom, which is its
proper meaning,
and which is alone a priori practical, no moral law
and no
accountability to it are possible.
.

.

.

.

In the first Critique Kant

that is,
is

says that freedom in

.

.

its practical

sense,

'WHlklir's independence of coercion through sensuous
impulses,"

based upon

this pure transcendental idea of

freedom.^® This practi-

cal freedom

presupposes that although something has not happened, it
ought to have happened, and that its cause, ^as found_7
in the /"field of_7 appearance, is not, therefore, so
determining that it excludes a causality of our will - a
causality which, independently of these natural causes.
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and even contrary to their forces
and Influence, can produce
something that is determined In the
time-order In accordance
with empirical laws, and which
can therefore begin a series
of events endrely of itself
.

This concept of ought cannot be
accounted for through empirical or

psychological freedom where the subject
au tomaton

s plrituale a la

Leibniz.

is impelled

Freedom

better than the freedom of a turnspit,
which

in this

by ideas, an

sense

is

"no

when once would up also

carries out its motions of itself.

Many

interpreters of Kant, for example, the early
Moore,

regard the following passage of the Canon
of the first Critique as

being inconsistent with the above position,
because

appears to

it

claim the independence of practical and transcendental
freedom, thereby, cancelling the former's grounding in the

transcendental freedom

when we

is a matter for

latter:

"The question of

speculative knowledge only, and

are dealing with the practical,

we can leave

it

aside as being

an issue with which we have no concern.
But as Beck points out,

what Kant intended

to

we must

do in the Canon.

interpret this in the context of

A canon

is "the

sum

total of

the a priori principles of the correct employment of certain faculties
of

knowledge,

of conduct,

we

through freedom

mean

and when

"

in the practical

sphere

we deal with laws

are not dealing with the problem of whether causality
is

compatible with natural necessity.

This does not

that practical freedom is independent of transcendental freedom,

but rather that different questions are asked concerning the justification
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of each.

In fact, the

question of their independence
ought not to arise

at all since Kant is saying
that they are really

talking about the

two different ways

same freedom.

By saying that

it is

a practical

purpose, rather than a theoretical

one, which makes us apply the
categories beyond experience
this

of

case the category

of causality through freedom,

case, however, for Kant also points out
that

reason which judges a

priori

for practical purposes.

"it is

has often been

it

thought that Kant completely separates
these realms.

in

,

This is not the

one and the same

by principles, whether

for theoretical or

Pure theoretical and pure practical reason

are not two different faculties, but one
faculty with different interests.
In Part

power
unity
tal

I

I

tried to

show

to pursue them.

among these many

freedom

a fact

that reason has different interests and the

There is, however, essential interrelation and
interests, including practical and transcenden-

which will become even clearer when we come

to

Kant's transcendental deduction of freedom.

An exploration

of the

concept of freedom

to bring this unity of reason to the surface,

is the

because

speaking, only the concept of freedom among

all the

best way,
"it is,

I

think,

properly

ideas of pure

speculative reason, which brings /”knowledgeJ7 such a great extension
in the

supersensuous

.

The concept of freedom

is

important both

to the theoretical and practical purposes of reason, and its category,

namely causality,

is

an extension

of that

same category

of

mind whose

.
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objective reality tvith respect to
objects of experience v,as proved
in
the first Crltiaue.^5

use

is to

Furthermore, to justify freedom in

its practical

give reality to that which for
theoretical reason

is

problematic, and by so doing, "the
practical use of reason

purely
is

thus

connected with the elements of theoretical
reason.
The following passage of the second
Critique carries through the
spirit of the

Canon:

The decision as to whether the causality
of the will is sufficient
to the reality of the objects is left
up to the theoretical principles of reason, involving as it does an
investigation of the
possibility of objects of volition, the intuition
of which is
of no importance in the practical
problem. The only concern
here is with the determination of the will
and with the determining ground of its maxims as a free will, not
with its
results

With what was said above,

it

should now be clear that this in

no way conflicts with Kant’s claim that practical freedom

upon transcendental freedom

or with his saying that

is

grounded

"With the pure

practical faculty of reason, the reality of transcendental freedom
is also

confirmed.

'

Reason has different purposes when employed theoreti-

cally and practically, which in no

eous causal efficacy and
of

way

implies that the will's spontan-

its legislation of

moral laws are independent

each other.
Silber notes that empirical freedom is actually a kind of self-

predetermination and, although freedom and determinism are compatible

according to Kant, freedom and predeterminism never are.

says in the Religion

:

As Kant

.
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what we wish

(wni^^'r °

to understand, and never
shall understand is
to which voluntary
tictions, as events, have
their determining

Srounds in_antecedent time
can be consistent with
edom according to which the act
as well as its oppo.

.

.

,

of itsTaklng

The transcendentally free agent

is

able to formulate his Intentions
with

out being determined by his
inclinations or his

and this holds true even
Transcendental freedom
as the autonomy of

.

expressed through the heteronomy, as
well

WUkUr,

done otherwise, which

inner character,

his Willktir chooses against
his Wille

if

is

own

otherwise the idea that he ought to
have

is the

key concept of practical freedom,

is

meaningless
But, heteronomous willing is not
a positive realization of tran-

scendental freedom.

Silber says in "The Ethical Significance"
that

the individual in adopting a heteronomous
maxim freely
renounces his power as a free being to act
independently
of desires. He freely chooses to
act iust the way he would
act if he had no such freedom at all."^^

This seemingly paradoxical statement embodies,
insight into Kant's theory of

freedom— an

I

think, a fundamental

insight which

I

find appro-

priate to look into at this time because of its
relevance to the distinction and relations
In the
tal

freedom

between transcendental and practical freedom.

Cntique of P ure Reason Kant establishes
is at least not

that

transcenden-

incompatible with nature and that this

freedom should not "be conceived only negatively as Independence
empirical conditions

of

but also positively "as the power of originating
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a series of events.

"

But, in his

Commentary

.

Beck mistakenly

ascribes negative freedom to
this latter concept of
causa noumpnnn
Rather, what Beck should
have said is that Kanfs
positive concept of

transcendental freedom is
provided With no law.

oLPractica nteas^ is

left

empty in the

first Critique

because

it

was

The purpose of the Foundations
and the Critique
to provide such a law,
thereby explaining

what

Kant means in the first
Crltlaue by saying that "reason
sets bounds to
a

freedom which

is in itself

without law.

This law is the moral law which
is legislated by Wille and
exe-

cuted by

Wimir.

WUe

is that purely rational faculty
of will

which

introduces the concept of practical
freedom and gives positive content
to transcendental freedom.

Perhaps what Beck means

is that

from a

practical point of view, transcendental
freedom of the first Critique is

negative.

This Kant would agree with.

Silber, therefore, is not

equivocating on the concept of freedom in
the above passage.

speaking of two different aspects

of

He

is

freedom which are essentially

joined and explained through the Wille Wilikur distinction.

To make

a

variation on Kant's aphorism, Wille without
Willkhr is impotent; Willkur

without Wille
In a

is blind.

heternomous moral willing Willkur disobeys the law

very nature and, thereby, fails to be true to itself.

sustained by the moral law,

does not mean that

it

is

always free in

a rational being

its

of its

Yet, because

execution.

it is

Silber

can freely choose not to be free,

.
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for this is

commands

impossible.

By the very fact that he

of Wille are ever-present,

is a rational

being, the

making freedom not oniy man's

greatest gift, but also his
greatest burden.

Man

cannot escape his

freedom

However, man can freely choose not
of

to fully realize his powers

freedom by trying to escape the law
of his freedom, just as he
can

fail to fully actualize his

powers of rationality by acting irrationally.

Nevertheless, only a rational being can
be regarded as acting irrationally, as

opposed

to nonrationally

Man can no more escape

.

the law of

his freedom than he can escape
his essential rationality by acting
irrationally.

Both heteronomous actions and irrational
uses of mind

are judged according to laws of freedom
and reason.

don

is

—

an expression of rationality

for Kant, as it

heteronomy and the mind's irrationality

What we have

a

a practical point of

^Wahl 7 as

its

it

more than an analogy,

wants.

to

what one has

view, Willkur operates

law and, hence, can neither be indifferent in

choose to do what

is

for Plato,

"For where the moral law dictates there is,

objectively, no room left for free choice

From

was

said seems to be perfectly in line with what
Kant

says in the third .Critique:

to do.

And because free-

Willkur

obligations necessitated by Wille

its

is truly free

.

in light of

choice nor simply
only

if it

executes

Here we are reminded of

Spinoza's and Leibniz's connection between freedom and rational neces-

sity--namely

,

that one is free only

when one

is truly rational.
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irrationality being the mark
of servitude.

But Kant's advance beyond

the rationalists is his
accounting for guilt and culpable
irrationality

by Viewing them as negative
expressions of man's basic freedom
and
rationality.

Furthermore, obligation is for Kant
a practical not a

theoretical necessity.

As Silber says:

Obligation enters as a relation
between the subject and the

when

ubject hhe is tempted to disobey.
A transcendentally free
uman being, if tempted to abnegate his
freedom in the expression of It, IS categorically obligated
to actualize his free
nature. ... He has the freedom
to reject the law but he

cannot escape

its

condemnation and

destruction of his personality.^^

its

punishment in the

This practical necessity, therefore,
in no

freedom of Vnilkur
without losing

its

.

way cancels

out the

Willkur can be rationally determined by
Wille

freedom, because

cept of will from which

we have

we

are dealing with the

same con

abstracted two different faculties.

Beck states this well when he says:
The law is found not by seeking something
outside the Willkur
but by a regression upon the conditions of
its full freed"orTH
conditions that are not actually realized in the
matured man.
Thus, Kant explicitly says, we find Wille by a
regression
upon the conditions of Willkur.

The

Mlie-mUkur

distinction exemplifies the interdependence between

transcendental and practical freedom in that the transcendental
freedom
of Willkur is given positive content

pure practical reason

by the law-giving nature of Wille

,

positive content which the speculative concerns

of the first Critique by its very nature could not provide.

One cannot, however, understand

Kant's discussion of the
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freedom of Willkur unless one realizes that two
different senses

dom

are involved,

milkur as

is

the faculty of free choice, is free even

,

when choosing heteronomously

of free-

.

transcendentally free.

It is

not enough to establish practical freedom.

If

one wants

But, this

to act

morally, then one is not free to act independently of the
moral law,
but must obey the

commands

of Wille

.

Such

a practical

necessity does

not cancel out the free choice of Willkur because Willkiir has
the power
to reject

such commands.

Also, because Wille is not a separate

"thing" from Willkur , but rather the purely rational aspect of Willkur
itself

which allows

things outside

it,

it

to be truly

spontaneous and not determined by

Willkur not only retains

its free

choice, but actually

gains a much deeper sense of freedom.

Because Kant finds the source

of the moral

concept of the rational will itself, rather than
or rational perfection,

obedience to

rather a full expression of freedom.

it is

law to be within the

in experience, or

God,

not restrictive of freedom, but

Through the discovery of the Wille -

Willkiir distinction Kant is able to preserve the formal purity of the

moral law while showing

(6)

its

necessary connection to free action.

Kant's Analysis of Freely Choosing a Moral Personality

The Wille - Willkur distinction
of will only

because

is

carved by Kant from an analysis

of his insight into the essential relation

between

freedom and reason, both of which are grounded in the concept
spontaneity.

of

Kant introduces this concept in the Critique of Pure
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Reason as "the mind's power

which

for theoretical

concept
for in

is

reason

of producing representations
from itself, "53

is

the faculty of understanding.

also the key for practical reason
and

This same

its faculty of will,

analyzing both knowledge and moral
action

we must deal

with

thought that is unconditioned.

mile

is

pure spontaneity itself, whereas
Beck seems to think that

spontaneity only applies to the actions
of Willkiir .^^

Postumum

,

As Kant says in

spontaneity can be predicated of Willkilr

:

Freedom

of choice (Willkilr ) in view of the
choice /"Wahl7
of the lawful and the counter-lawful
is

merely relative
spontaneity and is jibertas phaenomenon
/freedom of
choice in view of_7 the choice of maxims of
actions is
absolute spontaneity and is libertas noumenon .^^
:

Comparative or empirical freedom and phenomenal freedom
coincide;
both must agree with the laws of determinable
phenomena.
is

But Willkilr

unconditionally spontaneous, that is, free from being
conditioned by

inclination, precisely because

mile

.

Without the

latter

it

presupposes the pure spontaneity

we could

of

only speak of the will causing

something to happen in the world of appearances relative to some particular end or desire.

than

its real

This concerns the logical use of reason rather

use by which reason legislates laws^^--a distinction

Kant realizes as early as the Inaugural Dissertation of

1

770.^^

This phenomenal and noumenal freedom of Willkur points to

as both a natural and a moral being.

being, having relative spontaneity,

The Willkur
is

of

the source of

man as

man

a natural

human actions

1
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seen as causally determined events; the WlllkiiV
of man as
being, having absolute spontaneity,

is the

a moral

source of the adoption of

intentions upon which the former action is based.

The actions

performs in the phenomenal world are morally significant

because they are based upon the intentions chosen by
noumenal world.

in the

freedom of Willkur

is of a

whatever

it

the

,

wholly unique nature in that an incentive

to

into his

it

same Willkur

As Kant states this in the Religion

can determine the Willkur
incorporated

this

an action only so

maxim

.

may be, co-exist with

.

.;

far as the individual

only thus can an incentive,

the absolute spontaneity of Willkur

(i.e. freedom).

Because Willkur
tive,

must be able

is a faculty of desire,

Wille

,

if it is

to affect Willkur by arousing desires within

which

is

aroused

which

is

simply "respect for the moral law" and which

because
respect

it is

nature, but

is

called by Kant moral feeling

moral law and thereby

same time lose

In the

for the

moral law

if

That

it.

moralisches Gefuhl
is

known

fail to act out of

be true to

its

own

rational

Kant claims in
at

He would be morally dead.

"The incentive which consists in respect

we have never been

we could never

get

it

)

a priori

one lost this feeling, he would

his claim to humanity.

Religion Kant says:

thing possible,

fail to

(

never totally devoid of moral feeling.

it is

the Metaphysics of Morals that
the

Willkur may

caused by reason.

for the

to be effec-

able to lose, and were such a

again.

62

It is

in this

sense

6

.
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that Silber argues,

’mUe

necessarily determines Wlllkur "S3
.

lies the origin of characteristics

Herein

such as humility, guilt, and self-

respect

The relation this moral feeling has to
Willkur
relation to

M ects

mile. The question

Wlllkur by

I

.

be free?

In

way

of

that arises is,

WiUe> how can

if

is a

key to Willkur's

the moral feeling

acts done out of this feeling

answering this we must again remember that we
are deal-

ing with abstracted faculties of a unitary
concept of will which necessarily leads to distortion.

It

is better to

arising out of the will as a whole, for

action of both Wille and Willkur

Willkur only after
a

it

.

Moral feeling

if it

were not

Silber puts this quite nicely

examination of Wille

originates through the inter-

actualized by

is

has freely chosen to obey the moral law, but such

choice would be impossible
•

it

speak of moral feeling

is

for the

ever-presence of

when he says:

extended, Wille

is

"When

the

seen to be merely the

internal rational conditions of the existence of Willkur

.

Hence, when

Kant says that Wille determines Willkur through moral feeling, he

saying that Willklir determines itself according to

is

its rational nature.

Once the moral feeling has been established as being present
Willkur

,

mined by
at

Willkur
it.

work here.

It

,

is

when viewed phenomenally, can be

in

said to be deter-

important to note the two senses of determination

From the point of view of freedom there

is

determination

by the spontaneity of pure reason itself, independent of any conditions.

.
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However, we can see

WlMf

from another point of view as
conforming

to empirical

iaws of the understanding thereby
determined by prior

conditions.

In the

second Critique Kant says that "the moral
law, as

a formal determining ground of
action through practical pure reason.
.

also a subjective ground of determination.

is

incentive to this action, since
of the subject

it is

the

has an influence on the sensibility

and effects a feeling which promotes the influence

the law on the will.

have respect

it

That is,

But to ask

law

for the

is

what incentive causes Willkur

of

to

improper, because as Silber correctly

states:

asking this guestion, we are looking for the antecedent
conditions from which Willkur's free acceptance of the law
must follow. But if such conditions could be found, then
Willkur would not be free, since freedom involves the
capacity to act independently of such conditions
In

With

this

we come

to a point

where freedom and the absolute

necessity of the laws of rational action meet and reason seeks conditions through

makes clear

which

in the

it

can gain insight into

this meeting.

Concluding Note to the Foundations

.

to

But as Kant

seek con-

ditions for that which is unconditionally necessary is to postpone the
fulfillment of reason.

"Hence reason unrestingly seeks the uncondi-

tionally necessary and sees itself compelled to

any means of making

it

comprehensible.

fi
.

.

."

assume
7

this without

Reason must be

content to comprehend the incomprehensibility of the nature of freedom

with

its

necessary law,

for truly "This is all that

can

fairly be

asked
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of a philosophy
of

which presses forward

in Its principles to the very
limit

human reason. " 68
decision to obey or not to obey the law
of

nature forms the disposition of the
will or Gesinnuna .
is

its rational

This concept

defined in the Religion as "the ultimate
subjective ground of the

adoption of maxims.

Which, after

it is

hfe-style as

it

is

We

might call

it

second order intention

a

freely adopted by Willkur

.

determines a person's

enacted through specific intentional acts.

The choos-

ing of a moral disposition and the
choosing to do specific acts are

separate but related acts of Willkur

The term

'act'

:

can apply in general to that exercise

of

freedom

whereby the supreme maxim (in harmony with the law or contrary to it) is adopted by the Willkur /^the
dispositional act_J^,
but also to the exercise of freedom whereby the actions
themselves (considered materially, i.e. with reference to the
objects of Willkur ) are performed in accordance with that
maxim /"the specific acts_/.^^

Green and Hudson translate

"

aufnehmen " and

"

annehmen

Kant uses to describe the relation of Willkur to Gesinnunq .^^

.

"

verbs

as

"adopt", and Silber in his introduction to the Religion goes along with
this.

such

However, without

a careful

explanation,

a translation is very misleading.

speak of adopting

or

it

seems

Not only does

choosing a disposition, but

it

it

to

me

that

sound odd to

also sounds as

Willkur reaches outside itself to choose something separate from

which would be absolutely counter-Kantian.

To my mind

if

it,

a better render-

ing of Kant's meaning would be "to embrace" or "to establish" or
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perhaps "to make one's own,

"

because

WlMr is

simply choosing to

actualize or accentuate a
particular attitude towards itself.

chooses to recognize

it

itself in a certain

way,

That is,

a recognition

which

establishes a particular moral
disposition which was always
potentially
present as a part of the very nature
of Willkiir itself.

The concept of ^esinnunq
for

gives unity to the moral personality
allowing good and evil to be

it

predicated of
it

essential to Kant's theory of will,

is

would have

mined by

But because

it.

it is

the noumenal actuality of Willkur

to be inferred from the

.

phenomenal specific acts deter-

72
it.

As Kant says in the Religion

:

In order to call a

man evil, it would have to be possible a
infer from several acts done with a
consciousness
of their evil, or from one such act,
as underlying evil
maxim, and further, from this maxim to infer the
presence
in the agent of an underlying common
ground, itself
maxim,

a

of ail particular morally— evil

Hence, although the will
Willkur's relation to Wille

man

is

,

is either

which

maxims.
good

^

or evil,

depending upon

in turn determines the

.

unable to know this on the level of mere observation because

of the inevitable distortion of the dispositional intention
fic

Gesinnung

concrete acts

Not only can the moral agent make mistakes

.

judgment in trying
tions of an agent

by the speci-

s

to serve the moral law, but also empirical

in

observa-

acts can only lead to knowledge of virtus phaenomenon

and legality, not to virtus noumenon and morality.

Gesinnung
aspect of Willkur

is the

.

It

core of the personality, being the enduring

serves to relate the many discrete acts of
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MU^r

providing what Silber calis
"continuity essential to moral
self-

identity.

But the concept of Gesinnung
would be contrary to our

moral experience and inconsistent
with the spontaneity of Wlllkur

MUkur

were unable

demands
before.

that

it

to change, its disposition.

never be predetermined by what

if

The freedom of Willkur
it

was

the

moment

This is another statement of the
burden of freedom; the preser-

vation of one's moral character
siblllty.

is a

continual task and

awesome respon

Furthermore, as long as Wlllkur can hear
the voice of wille

as long as

it

is

responsive to

new man" "through

its

own

a revolution in the

rationality, one "can

become

man's disposition

going

(a

.

a

over to the maxim of holiness of the
disposition).
For man, therefore, who despite a corrupted
heart yet possesses a good will /"Wille 7 there remains hope of
a return
to the good from which he has strayed.
,

Through the concept of freedom in
defining what

it

means

to

its relation to

be a moral person.

action, Kant is

The mark of moral per-

sonality, according to Kant, is to be responsible for one's
actions

judged according to self-legislated laws.^®
tion is the awareness of personality itself.

Our experience
In Silber's

of obliga-

words:

The moral law, according to Kant, reveals the fact and the
meaning of human personality. By telling us what we
Q^ght to do regardless of what our inclinations and desires
may bid us do, the moral law forces us to be aware of
ourselves as agents, rather than as mere creatures of desire.

To recognize our freedom
lity, but

is not

only to recognize our essential rationa-

also to count ourselves as a part of humanity.

Correspondingly
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to fail to realize our full potential
for freedom is to lose

some

of our

right to be a part of this humanity.
In sections (4)-(6)

I

have tried to provide an analysis

of Kant's

theory of will by focusing upon his Wille Willkur distinction.

an analysis

is

Such

important in understanding the causal efficacy
of pure

practical reasoning, that is,

This goes beyond what

how

was said

it is

determinative of concrete action.

in sections (l)-(3)

where

I

tried to

uncover the essential machinery involved in Kant's
rationality

of

action, machinery which included the principle of
autonomy pointing to
a purely formal and normative

dimension

of thought.

Kant's theory of

will actually puts this machinery to work.
In

my analysis

of

Wille - Willkur

I

have agreed with Silber

sgainst Beck in making room for free heteronomous actions without
which
there would be no meaning to moral blameworthiness.

acts freely only
a

mockery

when one's actions

are morally praiseworthy is to

freedom and to overlook the

of

To say that one

full picture of

Willkur

.

make

How-

ever, Beck is certainly right in seeing that without Wille there would be

no freedom at

all,

since Willkur would then have no other laws to choose

to operate under except

heteronomous ones.

have no rational autonomy to actualize.
that Leibniz's ultimate
its

own pure

monad

Wille

is free; it is

rational spontaneity.

That is, Willkur would
is free in the

same sense

conditioned by nothing but

The laws that Wille prescribes are

prescribed necessarily since to prescribe anything else would be to
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make

it

something less than Wllle

consists in

its

own

.

pure practical reason.

Its

freedom

purity.

In section (5)

I

specifically discussed the distinction and inter-

relation between the transcendental and practical
aspects of freedom,

although in fact, when discussing Wille - Willkilr

.

we

are necessarily

referring to and interweaving both of these points
of view.

scendental idea of freedom independent

of practical

The tran-

freedom

problematic and, in a very real sense, negative since

it is

is

purely

lawless.

Practical freedom, on the other hand, without being grounded upon
the

transcendental idea of freedom has no way of being causally efficatious.

In effect,

without a solution to the Third Antinomy the second

Critique could never have been written, unless of course Kant simply

wanted

to recognize an

awareness

of a purely formal 'ought'

could never be objectively justified through action.
first Critique's justification of the

freedom, stronger yet,

its

which

Moreover the

legitimacy of causality through

demonstration of the very need

for the idea

of freedom to give unity to the understanding's investigations of nature,

plays an essential role in the actual deduction of practical freedom in
the second Critique
the focus of

my

.

An investigation

of this

deduction will serve as

final chapter.

Finally, in section

(6)

I

tried to get an

even deeper insight into

the Wille-Willkur distinction and the relation between these two faculties

by focusing upon the very complex activities and unity

of Willkur
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as

it

struggles under both natural and moral
demands and as

as the bearer of both phenomenal and
noumenal freedom.
I

specifically dealt with Kant's important concepts

GefuJli" and "Gesinnung", the former concerning

"

it is

seen

In so doing

moralisches

how

Willkiir springs

into action and the latter concerning its
identity as a moral personality.

However, necessary

cepts

is the fact that

Willkiir

.

to the understanding of both of these con-

spontaneity must be predicated of both Wille and

Room must be made

for both the

freedom

of legislation

and

the freedom of choosing, each being different functions
within a unitary

theory of will.

CHAPTER

III

KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE
MORAL LAW:

LAW FOR THE OBJECTIVE REALITY OF FREEDOM

A

(7)

In Kant's

The Development of Kant's Deduction and a
Clarification of Its Apparent Circularity

development

of the

second Critique

I

think one can find

an analogue to the metaphysical and transcendental deductions
Critique of Pure Reason

.

The metaphysical deduction of the

of the

first

Critique has the task of exposing the essential categories of empirical

knowledge which, in effect,
(l)-(3) for rational action.

is

what we were trying

it,

"there is no

do

in sections

There are, of course, no exact parallels

between the metaphysical deductions
Beck puts

to

of the

ready-made table

two Critiques since, as
of formal distinctions to

serve as a clue to the discovery of the principle of pure practical reason.

Nevertheless, in both deductions the following very general procedure
is

employed:

We

can come to know pure practical laws in the same way we
know pure theoretical principles, by attending to the necessity with which reason prescribes them to us and to the
elimination from them of all empirical conditions, which reason

directs ^
.

In sections (l)-(3)

to carry out just
at the formal

we attempted

to attend to just

such a necessity and

such an elimination, arriving, in the final analysis,

and unconditioned origin

of the moral

law itself.
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However,
Pr actical

just as In the first Cr itique

Reason realizes the need

Kant in the Critique of

,

for a transcendental
deduction of

the principles of pure
practical reason.

Thus

far our analysis of free-

dom and action has been mainly
problematical

in asking thes e questions:

pure reason is practical, then
what must be its principles (Chap-

If

ter

and what must be the nature of the
will that can enact these

I)

principles (Chapter II)?

and

If

the concept of obligation is not
spurious

morality is to be a meaningful dimension
of human experience,

if

then what is the moral law and the
nature of the will which actualizes
it?

In

answering these questions, however, we
have yet to prove the

objective reality of the moral law.

transcendental deduction

is

Just as in the first Critique the

charged with showing that the categories

have a^riori employment as conditions

for

knowledge

of

an object, so

too the transcendental deduction of the
second Critique has the task of

showing that pure reason
as

we

shall see,

is a priori practical.

shows the objective reality

This, at the same time,

of freedom.

From the Critique of Pure Reason we are familiar with how
transcendental deduction proceeds.

It is

tion of right than with a question of fact.^

use the concept
still there is a

concepts.

of

concerned more with

a

a

ques-

Given the fact that men

cause and that they believe themselves duty-bound,

question concerning the justification of the use of these

The general program of the transcendental deduction of the

first Critique

may be summarized

as follows:

Any formal element X

without which experience of empirical objects would be impossible

is

^
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necessary and hence objectively valid
one takes some body of knowledge

remember Kant also provides
of intuition by

sion upon

its

way

a

(in

for

such experience.

That is,

the above case science, but

transcendental deduction for the forms

of mathematics) and then through a critical
regres-

presuppositions proceeds to uncover the concepts and

principles which are necessary for

Although

we might expect

it.

Kant to proceed in the same

way

in

deducing the principle of pure practical reason, we shall find something quite different happening.
to

In fact, it really is

keep the word "deduction" unless

that of the first Critique

.

it is

an equivocation

clearly distinguished from

Kant himself emphatically states that "the

objective reality of the moral law can be proved through no deduction.
It

is not difficult to

understand

why

Kant wants to insist upon the dis-

tinction

between the "deductions"

feels

appropriate to use the word in justifying the moral law:

it

of the

two Critiques

,

even though he

with the deduction, i.e. the justification of the moral law's
objective and universal validity and the discernment of
the possibility of such a synthetic a priori proposition, one
cannot hope to have everything as easy as it was with the
principles of pure theoretical understanding. For the latter
referred to objects of possible experience, i.e., appearances, and it could be proved that they could be known as
objects of experience and, consequently, that all possible
experience must be conformable to these laws ....
Such a procedure, however, I cannot follow in the deduction of the moral law. For it does not concern knowledge
of the properties of objects, which may be given to reason
from some other source; rather it concerns knowledge insofar as it can itself become the ground of the existence of
objects, and in so far as reason by virtue of this same
knowledge, has causality in a rational being.

.
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If

Kant's deduction in the second
Critique paralleled that of the

then

first,

we should expect him

experience,

"

to introduce a notion of "moral

the critical regression from which
would lead to princi-

ples without which such experience
would be unintelligible.

Canon Kant seems
justified in

to

making

come close

this

to

such

In the

procedure in saying:

a

"I

am

assumption /'namely, that pure moral laws are

a prion practicat7 in that

can appeal

I

...

to the moral

judgment

of

every man, in so far as he makes the effort to
think such a law clearly.
But in the Cr itique of Practical Reason Kant
introduces what seems to

be

completely different procedure when he says that

a

.the moral law is given, as an apodictically certain
fact
as it were, of pure reason, a fact of which we are a
priori
conscious, even if it be granted that no exarrmle could be
.

.

.

found in which

it

,

has been followed exactly.^

And again:
The consciousness of this fundamental law may be called
a fact of reason since one cannot ferret it out from antecedent data of reason, such as the consciousness of free,

dom

not antecedently given) and since it forces
a synthetic proposition a priori based on
no pure or empirical intuition
it is.
the sole fact of
pure reason , which by it proclaims itself as originating
°
law (sic volo sic inbeo)
(for this is

itself

,

upon us as

.

,

.

An analysis of this "fact of pure reason" and how
the deduction is,

I

it

functions in

think, the key to understanding Kant's "proof" of

pure reason's being practical and consequently of the objective reality
of freedom.
In the third chapter of the Foundations Kant attempts a deduction

^
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of the moral law

why, according

which Paton interprets as an obvious
to Paton,

we see

face in the second Cr itique

failure. ^

That

the deduction appearing with a

is

new

Paton states the difference as follows:

.

In the Groundwork he seems to
think that the moral law is both
justified and established by an independent
and necessary
presupposition of freedom. In the Critique
on the contrary
It IS our consciousness of
the moral law which leads to the
concept of freedom; and in such consciousness
Kant no longer
finds difficulty. . . . Only on the basis
of the moral law
can we justify the presupposition that the
rational will must
be free; and the moral law is even described
as a principle
for the deduction of freedom.^
.

'

However,
to

I

think such a statement, although essentially
correct, tends

exaggerate the difference, such that a

between the two deductions
the second Critique

,

,

fundamental similarity

the one in the Groundwork and the one in

may be overlooked.

In both the idea of freedom

functions as a necessary part of the deduction of the moral
law:

"freedom

is certainly the ratio

In the first

two chapters

the second Critique ,

whose

we

essendi of the moral law.
of the Foundations, just as in

learn that unlike hypothetical imperatives,

intelligibility rests

on their analyticity, the categorical impera-

tive is a synthetic a priori practical proposition.

legitimate for Kant to ask in chapter three:

imperative possible?",
really be practical?"

§§1-7 of

or, to put

it

"How

Therefore,
is a

it is

categorical

another way, "Can pure reason

In order to avoid misunderstanding, Kant is not

asking how a categorical imperative can have effects in the phenomenal world, that is,

how

it

manifests itself in action.

course, in the second Critique speak of

"

Kant does, of

moralisches Gefuhl" and
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throughout his moral writings attempts to clarify the causal efficacy
of
the will through his Wille - Willkiir distinction as reason dictates; how-

ever , he is always quick to point out that any attempt to explain how

freedom

is

possible, that is, how pure reason shows itself through

effects, would be inconsistent with the Critical spirit:
to explain anything unless

we can

bring

it

"We

are unable

under laws which can have
^

an object given in some possible experience

.

Here, as throughout his Critical philosophy, Kant

is

seeking to

justify synthetic a priori propositions, in this case the categorical

imperative which asserts that every rational being ought to act according to the principle of autonomy.^

As Paton says, "we must take

Kant's main question to be concerned with the relation between a
rational agent as such and the principle of autonomy,
this relation is not analytic, Kant is required to

connection.

It

would be

difficult to improve

show

and because

necessary

their

upon the following state-

ment by Paton concerning Kant's Critical method:
It

seeks to justify

its origin to the

a synthetic a priori proposition

nature of mind as such and in particular

to the activity of

reason itself.

Such

a justification is

Kant calls a 'transcendental deduction'; and
a critique or criticism of reason by itself."^

Such

by tracing

a critique is intended to find

calls a "third term" through

it

what

belongs to

what Kant

in the Foundations

which the necessary connection

ject and predicate of synthetic a priori propositions will be

strated.

And, according to the Foundations

,

in the

of the

sub-

demon-

case of the moral
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law "the £P sitive concept of freedom
furnishes this
.

third term.

This

very place where the deduction of the
Foundations seems mis-

IS the

guided; there

no positive concept of freedom independent
of the moral

is

law and, therefore, morality cannot be deduced
from
of the moral law,

validity.

it.

Independent

freedom remains lawless and hence void of objective

Without the moral law there

tive concept of freedom:

is

even no awareness

of a posi-

"the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of

^

freedom

.

In recognizing this problem with the deduction of
the Foundations
I

am

in

agreement with Paton, and,

with Kant himself.
scholar,
in

such

I

for that matter,

However, as much as

I

I

.

think probably

respect Paton as a Kantian

cannot follow him in seeing the deduction of the Foundations

a radical separation from the deduction of the

second Critique

.

the F oundations Kant is quick to emphasize that freedom must not be

lawless

if it is

to

have any positive meaning and

with the concept of will as

a kind of causality.

well aware that this law of freedom

is the

if it is

to be associated

Furthermore, Kant

is

moral law; in fact, he even

states that "a free will and a will under moral laws are one and the

same.

"

The alleged vicious circularity of which the deduction

of

the second Critique has been accused is, therefore, already present in
1

785

,

although not until the second Critique

is

explaining how to break out of this circularity.

Kant really clear in

Kant

is

able to justify

the objective reality of both freedom and the moral law in one deduction
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because ultimately

their Interdependence is grounded
in the necessary

activities of reason itself of which his
transcendental deduction offers
a critique.

Let

me

put

my debate with Paton

question which, as mentioned earlier,
ing Kant's deduction, namely:

reason
there

'?

seem

In the
to be

aside for the moment and ask a
I

find to be central in understand-

What does Kant mean by

two quotations

in

which

it is

two different meanings: in the

"fact of pure

mentioned above,

first

quotation Kant

refers to the moral law itself as the fact and in the
second he refers to

the consciousness of this law as the fact.

One might,

the latter but not the former; that is, the fact that there

sciousness or consciousness

of

does not appear to be the same

or

is,

it

if

Certainly this prima

Kant's "fact of pure

be made clear.

Perhaps some clarity would result
namely:

moral con-

even to justify the objective reality

facie distinction will have to be overcome
is to

is

seems, accept

duty surely seems to be a fact, but

or the factuality of morality or duty as law itself.

reason"

it

What

if

we asked another question,

kind of fact is Kant referring to in this context?

That

drawing upon a distinction made by Beck,
"Fact of pure reason" may mean a fact known by pure reaits object, modo directo
Or it may mean the fact
that there is pure reason, known by reason reflexively.
These may be distinguished as "fact for pure reason"
and "fact of pure reason".

son as

.

To interpret Kant as saying that the moral law

is a fact

pure reason.

.
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in the

sense that

it

is either

given to or somehow intuited by pure
rea-

son, IS obviously the basis for seeing
Kant as an ethical intuitionist
But this would be inconsistent with the
lessons of the first Critique

which argued that there are no facts known by pure
reason independently
of

sensuous intuition.

Furthermore,

we already know about
itself.

it

would also conflict with what

the moral law, that

Otherwise we could not speak of

for pure practical

it is

a creation of reason

as being a fact either of or

it

reason.

Therefore, the latter interpretation of "fact of pure reason"
is, the factuality of pure

reason itself--is,

I

— that

think, the correct one,

especially when Kant suggests that the "unconditional law"

is

"merely

the self-consciousness of a pure practical reason and thus identical

with the positive concept of freedom.

The moral law

expression of the lawgivingness of reason

itself, of reason's

allowing

it

reason.

Furthermore, under this interpretation,

law

to be the sole fact of pure reason,

a fact for pure reason.

reason only inasmuch as
son, i.e.

,

As Beck puts

it is

it:

known

a priori

we can

"It is a

an

is really

autonomy,

by pure

call the moral

fact for pure

the expression of the fact of pure rea-

of the fact that pure

reason can be practical.

That

is

why

the moral law is the sole fact of pure reason and for pure reason.

be sure, an odd kind of fact, perhaps justifying Kant's calling

It

is, to

it

a "fact, as

But

it

it

were.

"

might be asked, as Kant himself asks, "how

is the
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consciousness of that moral law possible
?

autonomy

a fact?

Kant alludes to the answer in the
very

graph of his Preface:
Its reality

how

That is,

"If

and that of

its

^nd,

it

reason's

para-

first

pure reason is actually practical,

concepts in action. "25

is

will

show

we become

immediately conscious of the moral law,
Kant says, "as soon as we
construct maxims for the will. "26

^

every moral choice reason's

practical nature demonstrates itself in
that to deliberate about what

one morally ought to do

hence

its practicality,

conscious fact.

is to

recognize reason's moral constraint, and

not just as a necessary presupposition but
as a

This does not

mean

that reason must necessarily be

effective, that is, that Willkiir actually follow
the

commands

but rather that reason's normativity is present even
in
In a slightly different context

Beck recognizes

as true in the case of judgmental errors:

its

this

of

Wille

rejection.

same point

"Even though every specific

moral claim that a person acknowledges might be actually invalid
(i.e.

he might always think he ought to approve of

,

he ought to approve of non-a)

,

way, whether an imperative

person believes that

reason

is

it is

in fact,

the adjudication of the conflict

between ^ and non-a evidences the fact
in another

^ when,

of reason. "2^

Or, to put this

is in fact valid or not, if a

valid for him, then the practical nature of

revealed in the very awareness of the imperative force of

the claim upon him.

Our prima facie distinction between the moral law as the fact

of

.
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pure reason and the consciousness
of the moral law as the fact
of pure

reason can now be dismissed.
be conscious

of the prescriptive

which the moral law

of

any being which

for

law

is to

To be conscious of the moral law

is

is the

power

of pure practical reason itself

sole expression.

conscious of

is to

it, for to

The moral law

is a fact

be conscious of the moral

confirm pure reason as practical.

How does

the fact of pure reason play a role in the
deduction,

and what exactly

is

being deduced?

In the following quotation Kant

himself answers part of this question:
Instead of this vainly sought deduction to the moral
principle, however, something entirely different and
unexpected
appears: the moral principle itself serves as a principle of
the deduction of an inscrutable faculty which no experience
can prove but which speculative reason had to assume as
at least possible .... This is the faculty of freedom,
which the moral law, itself needing no justifying grounds,
shows to be not only possible but actual in beings which
acknowledge the law as binding upon them.^^

The fact

man
is

to

of pure reason, established independently of freedom, forces

recognize that he

asked

if

he thinks

it

is free.

would be possible

in order not to serve as a

lying.

Kant gives an example of a man

means

for

of destroying

him to sacrifice his

thing because he

for him:

knows

life

an honorable man by

Kant goes on to say that the man would surely admit that

would be possible

who

"He judges, therefore,

that he can

it

do some-

that he ought, and he recognizes that he is

free--a fact which, without the moral law, would have remained

unknown

to him.

"

The factuality of moral obligation prescribed by
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reason through
its

laws presupposes the necessity of freedom, not
just

its

mere possibility, and provides

than the autonomy of reason itself.
in a rational being

demands

"

it

with a law which

is

nothing less

The fact that reason "has causality

that the moral law

which expresses

it

be "a law of causality through freedom.

The moral law thus defines that which speculative philosophy had to leave undefined. That is, it defines the law for
a causality the concept of which was only negative
in
speculative philosophy, and for the first time it gives
objective reality to this concept.
But,

I

would argue that

ing part of Kant's deduction.

to stop here is to

miss the most interest-

As much as Kant decries any deduction

of the moral law, in apparent contradistinction to

the Foundations

,

second Critique

.

early as §6 to

what he

do in

nevertheless there certainly seems to be one in the

What

show

else would one expect

when Kant promises

as

that "freedom and unconditional practical law

reciprocally imply each other.

"

33

Immediately after proving the objective reality
of the moral law, Kant

passage

tries to

makes

this statement,

which

of

I

freedom by way

take to be a key

in the undeclared deduction of the moral law:

This kind of credential for the moral law, namely, that it is
itself demonstrated to be the principle of the deduction of
freedom as a causality of pure reason, is a sufficient substitute for any a priori justification, since theoretical
reason had to assume at least the possibility of freedom
in order to fill one of its own needs.

What Kant

is

saying

is rather

subtle and draws upon what he has already

established in the first Critique

,

thereby serving to unify the

first

two
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Critiques

.

Kant's solution to the Third Antinomy showed that the con-

cept of freedom had to be used as a regulative Idea of reason

was

to find

any unity as

the unconditioned.

it

moved through conditions

That is, as

reason requires us to think

of

I

show

tried to

thought

in its search for

in Part

freedom as possible.

if

I,

theoretical

Kant says in the

Preface to the Critique of Practical Reason that freedom, although at
this point only a problematic concept, is absolutely indispensable to

the complete use of speculative reason.

And because the moral law provides

which reason
fashion,

it

in its theoretical use had

thereby

independently of

is

its

a positive grounding to that

employ

to

in a regulative

transcendentally deduced and hence accredited

being the fact of pure reason.

This Idea of free-

don which was given independent warrant by the theoretical Critique
serves as the "third term" Kant was searching

when he struggled
It

seems

to

to

me

for in the

Foundations

deduce the moral law.
that Kant

came close

to this idea in the Foundations

because he was certainly aware of and wanted

to avoid the apparent

circularity of the deduction he had given:

we must frankly admit, there is shown a kind of cirwhich, as it seems, there is no way to escape.
from
cle,
In the order of efficient causes we take ourselves to be free
so that we may conceive ourselves to be under moral law
in the order of ends; and we then proceed to think of ourselves as subject to moral laws on the ground that we have
described our will as free. Freedom and the will's enactment of its own laws are indeed both autonomy--and therefore are reciprocal concepts--but precisely for this reason
In this,

,

.
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one of them cannot be used to explain the other
its

ground.

°

And immediately

after saying this, he begins to

viously established in the
standpoints of reason

member

own

of the latter

— the

first Critique

or to furnish

review what he pre-

namely, the need

,

for the

sensible and the intelligible worlds.

"man can never conceive the causality

,

two

As a

of his

will except under the Idea of freedom; for to be independent of

determination by causes in the sensible world (and this

must always attribute to

itself) is to

Having reminded us

is

what reason

be free."^^

goes on to say;

of this Kant then

—

The suspicion which we raised above is now removed namely,
that there might be a hidden circle in our inference from freedon to autonomy and from autonomy to the moral law; that in
effect we had perhaps assumed the Idea of freedom only because of the moral law in order subsequently to infer the
moral law in its turn from freedom.
We see now that
.

.

.

when we

think of ourselves as free, we transfer ourselves
into the intelligible world as members and recognize the
autonomy of the will together with its consequence
morality

—

And again:

"To the Idea of freedom there

concept of autonomy
morality.

It

,

is

inseparably attached the

and to this in turn the universal principle

is this

of

"recognition" and "inseparable attachment" that

Kant did not make clear in the Foundations
at the full-blown insights of the

,

but he

was surely

second Critique's deduction

hinting

in assert-

ing that "categorical imperatives are possible because the Idea of

freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world.
In

"
1

40

speaking of the failure of the deduction in the

F oundations

,

—

—
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Paton says that

we cannot by

inference derive morality from the presupposition of freedom, and still less can we by inference derive
the necessity of presupposing freedom in the positive sense
--from the presupposition that we are members of an intelligible world. Even in Kant's sense of a 'justification', we cannot justify morality by anything other than itself.
This objection by itself is fatal, but in any case we have no
independent insight into
~~ the alleged necessity for presup.

.

.

posing freedom .^

There are two objections in the above passage, both of which Kant

answers in the second Critique
tive

.

Kant agrees that freedom "in the posi-

sense" must be derived from the moral law, from the fact

of pure

reason; however, he does not agree that "we have no independent
insight into the alleged necessity for presupposing freedom."

As Kant

says at the beginning of the deduction:

Beyond objects of experience, i.e., concerning things as
noumena, all positive knowledge was correctly denied to the
speculative reason. This reason, however,was successful
to the extent that it established with certainty the concept
of noumena, i.e.
it established the possibility
indeed
the necessity
of thinking of them
example,
it showed
For
against all objections that the assumption of freedom
negatively considered was entirely compatible with those
principles and limitations of pure theoretical reason. But
it could not give us anything definite to enlarge our knowledge of such objects, but rather it cut off any such prospect

—

,

.

,

,

altogether.

Although

it

doesn't enlarge our knowledge of noumenal objects,

it is

the

moral law which provides positive content to that which theoretical

mere Idea.

Although

am con-

reason was required to employ as

a

vinced that Beck has not seen the

full potentialities of this insight

into interpreting Kant's deduction, he does nevertheless

I

seem

to agree
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with what

I

have been trying to develop:

the concept of freedom

reason--makes

it

— to wit,

that

it is

"The independent warrant of

needed also by theoretical

serve as a systematic credential

for the reality of

pure practical reason.
It is

in this

way

cle of using freedom to

deduce freedom.

that Kant breaks out of the alleged vicious cir-

deduce the moral law and the moral law

He displays

a certain independent warrant for

concept and then shows each to be the foundation

dom

is

deduced from the moral law, which

is

to

each

for the other.

Free-

independently warranted

by being the fact of pure reason, because, through the moral law,
freedom's "transcendent use

is

changed into an immanent use, whereby

reason becomes, in the field of experience, an efficient cause through
ideas.

"

44

And, on the other hand, in the deduction of the moral law

from freedom, which has independent warrant from the needs of reason
in the first Critique

,

the reality of the moral law is proven by its

"giving a positive definition to a causality thought merely negatively,
the possibility of which

was incomprehensible

though this reason was compelled to assume

to speculative

it."'^^

That is, the

factuality of the moral law is accredited precisely because
to resolve the dialectic of theoretical reason

with a positive foundation.

reason

it

serves

by providing freedom

And with this deduction the real unity

the first two Critiques is revealed

—a

out,^^ has been the major source

of

of

unity which, as Martin points

controversy and misunderstanding
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in Kantian scholarship.

With

this transcendental deduction of the

second Critique Kant

honors a promise he made in the Preface, namely, to show that "the
practical use of reason is thus connected with the elements of theoretical reason.

"

tried to

I

show one aspect

of this unity of

reason

in

discussing transcendental and practical freedom and their interdepend-

ence as explained through an examination of Wille - Wilikur
I

only dealt with a hypothetical necessity

But there

— that each without the other

would be incomplete and hence impossible.

Now, however, by estab-

lishing independent warrants for both aspects of freedom

which actually stem from the operations and needs
itself

.

— warrants

of pure

reason

— each can be used to justify the objective reality of the

These two aspects
reason itself in

of

other.

freedom really refer to the different purposes

its theoretical

of

The one con-

and practical functions.

cerned with knowledge and belief, the other with intention and action.

The Idea
its

of

freedom

is

required by theoretical reason such that to deny

regulative use would be to deny unity to reason itself

tried to substantiate in Part I.

—a

point

I

So too, to deny the moral law, freedom's

positive expression, would be to deny the fact of pure practical reason

which

is, to

say the same thing, to deny one's essential rationality

as expressed through Wille

.

Surely then

it

is true that

keystone of the whole architecture of the system

even

of speculative reason.

for

it is

freedom

of pure

"is the

reason and

the expression of pure reason
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itself as

it

seeks to complete

functions.

and action

To

man

An Explanation

of his rationality

of the

Enigma

and to remain silent.

of the Critical

Having established the objective reality
law
all

of causality

and practical

explain the essentiality of freedom in both thought

fail to

is to strip

(8)

itself in both its theoretical

of the

which puts the determining ground

conditions of the world of sense

Philosophy

moral law

— "a

of causality

above

— we must now attempt to clear

up the real enigma of the Critical philosophy, namely, how pure reason
had a right to an extension in
its

speculative use.

the second Critique

Having anticipated this problem
,

a

goes to the very heart

ment

of

it

use which

its practical

problem which, as

I

stated in

is

denied to

it

in

in the Preface to

my

introduction,

of this dissertation, Kant gives a lengthy restate-

following his transcendental deduction:

We

have thought of the will as determinable inasmuch as it
belongs to an intelligible world and of the subject of this
will (man) as belonging to a pure intelligible world, though

man is unknown to us. (How this relation
can be thought and yet be unknowable has been shown in

in this relation

the critique of the pure speculative reason.) We have, I
say, thought of man and his will in this way, but furthermore, we have defined the will with respect to its caus-

law which cannot be counted among
the natural laws of the world of sense; finally we have
thereby widened our knowledge beyond the limits of the
world of sense. But this is a presumption which the
Critique of Pure Reason declared to be void in all speculation. How, then, is the practical use of pure reason
to be reconciled with its theoretical use in respect to
determining the boundaries of their competence
ality

by means

In the

of a

deduction of the concept of causality and other concepts of
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the understanding

,

Kant was able to escape the scepticism of

by way of his transcendental idealism, that

such concepts apply to the appearances

is, only

of our

things-in-themselves as Hume thought.

Hume

only

by realizing that

experience and not to

In that

way he showed

that

causality was necessary to connect such appearances into a meaningful

But

experience which required certain definite temporal relationships.

now

it

seems Kant

is

doing the very thing which his critique of pure

reason forbids, namely, to extend the use
As Kant puts

of these

concepts to noumena.

it:

But how lies it with reference to the application of this category of causality ... to things which are not objects of
possible experience but lie beyond its boundaries? For it
must be remembered that I could deduce the objective reality
of these concepts only with reference to objects of possible
experience
But interestingly enough
effort to clear

it is

up the difficulty.

the deduction Kant refers to in an

In proving the objective reality of the

concept of cause with reference to objects
us that he thereby deduced
"could show

its

cal sources.

"

it

of experience, Kant

as an a priori concept.

reminds

That is, he

possibility from pure understanding without any empiri-

This fact allows the concept of causality to be

"referred to objects in general, whether sensuous or not.

To see

"

only the restrictions that the Critique of Pure Reason places upon

thought and to overlook the real power and freedom that
thought" after banishing empiricism from

it

gives to

its origin"^*^ is to

completely

miss the transcendental thrust that the Critical Copernical Revolution
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gives to the nature of mind.
This thrust can be stated quite simply:

Reason, by

its

very nature,

has the right, the necessity, and the freedom to think
beyond what

can know.

But such a simple statement is heavy-laden with fruitful

consequences
reason

it

for

is a proper

metaphysical thought of which the practical use

and necessary exemplification.

second edition to the

first Critique

But though I cannot know,
say, the representation of

I

.

of

In the Preface to the

Kant says:

can yet think freedom; that

it is

is to
at least not self-contradictory,

provided due account be taken of our critical distinction
between the two modes of representation, the sensible and
the intellectual, and of the resulting limitation of the pure
concepts of understanding and of the principles which flow

from them.^^

Through his transcendental idealism Kant has opened up the doors

reason to
poses.

fulfill its

own nature and function

to actualize its

By limiting knowledge Kant makes room

really reason's ability to transcend its

carve out, with the a priori

for faith^^

which

is

own empirical employment and

certain metaphysical frameworks through which

it

can unify

tions and provide unconditioned grounding for finite

when he speaks

own pur-

concepts which have been granted

seek knowledge through conditions.

for

its

it,

opera-

man who must

This is what Kant is referring to

of the rightful extension of the concepts of the under-

standing into the realm of the intelligible.

The only thing that

is

lacking in extending such concepts

is the

condition for applying these categories, such as causality, to objects.
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This condition, of course, is intuition.

But the lack of such a condi-

tion only rendered the purposes of theoretical knowledge impossible.
"Still, the objective reality of the

used with reference

to

concept remains and can even be

noumena, though

not in the least theoreti-

it is

cally defined, and no knowledge can be effected with

it.

/f*Reason_7 can altogether abstract the concept of cause itself from that application to objects which has theoretical
knowledge as its purpose, since this concept can always be
found a priori in the understanding, independently of any

Thus reason uses this concept only for a practical purpose, transferring the determining ground of the will
to the intelligible order of things, at the same time readily
confessing that it does not understand how the concept of
cause can be a condition of the knowledge of these things.

intuition.

Furthermore, through the transcendental deduction of the principle
of pure practical reason

we have

cept of causality to noumena.

other conditions for applying the con-

Not only was there a need to find

a

positive law for the expression of a causality through freedom whose

Idea theoretical reason had to assume, but also the "objective reality
of a pure will or of a pure practical reason (they being the same) is

given in the moral law a priori, as

concept "of a pure will there

dom.

This

we

is the

were by

it

concept

And in the

a fact.

of causality

with free-

learned from our analysis of Wille - Willkur

.

There-

fore, after identifying the nonempirical origin of the concept of

causality and having justified the moral law's objective reality Kant
is

enabled to say:

Even though

I

have no intuition which would determine
~

f

its

::ausality through freeobjective theoretical reality, it
dom_7 nevertheless has a real application exhibited
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concrsto in intGntions or maximsj that is, its practical
reality can be pointed out. All this is sufficient
to justify
the concept even with reference to noumena.^^

What was

therefore thought to be an enigma turns out to be
a

failure to understand the proper functions of reason
as

ferent attitudes and sets up different frameworks.

It

it

takes on dif-

is the

same under-

standing of reason that allowed Kant to solve the Third Antinomy
which

now allows him

to explain the extension of concepts into the

realm via a practical use.
to

any one of

each

its

specific interests but can

of its postulated

of principles.

As transcendental, reason

move

is not

chained

freely in and out of

metaphysical contexts governed by

And in explaining the concept

noumenal

its

own

freedom in both

of

set

its

theoretical and practical contexts, Kant has not only demonstrated the

mutual support that each context gives the other and thereby the unity
of reason's
it

own operations,

but also the freedom of reason itself as

goes about spontaneously legislating laws

force of this latter point is striking

freedom in both

its theoretical

each framework.

when we come

The

to realize that

and practical use must ultimately be

traced back to the nature of reason in
intelligibility.

for

its

quest

for order, unity

and

CONCLUSION
In this dissertation

Kantian metaphysics.

I

have tackled the problem

of interpreting the

By concentrating on the problem of freedom,

I

have made some discoveries that serve to unify what has previously

been seen by many Kantian scholars as
system.

I

was

a bifurcation within the Critical

led to choose the concept of freedom as the focus of

this dissertation by Kant himself

who proclaims

the whole structure of his metaphysics, and,

it

why

as the "keystone" of
not, since

it is

essentially the freedom of reason that provides the answer to the question

"How

is

reason there

own

metaphysics possible?" Without the spontaneity
is

no way reason can make sense

of or

even begin

of pure

its

reflexive critique with all of the demands and dimensions that such

a critique

must satisfy.

Hence,

a vindication of freedom is

to the very foundation of the Kantian

paramount

metaphysics as well as,

I

think,

the primary avenue to its explanation.
I

have agreed with most Kantian scholars that when dealing with

the Critique of Pure Reason

we

are at the center of the critical system,

although, oddly enough, scholars as diverse as Heidegger, Baton and
Bennett seem to find the beginning and end of that center in the Analytic,

breaking off their commentaries before the Transcendental Dialectic.

This is not to mention the whole stream of positivistic thinkers

who

concentrate on Kant's negative soundings on speculative metaphysics.
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apparently forgetting the same Kant

who speaks

of transcendental Ideas

and a whole realm of meaningful transcendental reflection.

have maintained in this dissertation

What

is that the Critique of Pure

I

Reason

is

the center of Kant's thinking only

is

not only important to understanding the true meaning of Kant, but,

more strongly, quite fundamental
to the

work

if

one realizes that the Dialectic

to providing unity and intelligibility

of the understanding in the Analytic.

Even scholars such as Smith, Cassirer and Strawson who have
given attention to the Dialectic have done so,

much misunderstanding, perhaps

it

seems

to

me, with

primarily due to their underestimating

the importance of Kant's regulative employment of pure reason.

have argued in Part
is the

key

I

of this dissertation, this

to grasping the unity of the

and in the Dialectic.

It

is

essential insight, which to

work

of

employment

of

As

I

reason

reason in the Analytic

also the key to grasping an even more

my mind has been

radically overlooked,

namely, the dependence of the empirical employment
transcendental reflective activity which

is

of

reason upon

its

uncovered by Kant in the

Dialectic.

Although

I

agree that the

thinking, because

it is

first Critique is the center of Kant's

here that Kant demonstrates the distinctions

as well as the interrelations between the transcendental ideality of

appearances and the realm
is

of

noumena wherein the concept

of

freedom

found, nevertheless the real climax of the Critical philosophy does
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not occur until the Critique of Practical Reason

.

Here Kant demonstrates

the objective reality of noumenal freedom which, up to this time,

reason could only think
I

of

and use as an Idea of pure speculation.

As

have argued in the dissertation, this in no way implies that the

transcendental Idea of freedom, whose possibility was proven in the
solution of the Third Antinomy, is not needed as a necessary presupposition of pure reason in order to unify the empirical operations of the

understanding.

In fact,

it is

this very requirement of pure reason

brought out by Kant in the Dialectic of the

first Critique

Kantian scholarship has sadly neglected.

Furthermore, as

argued in Part

II

which
I

I

think

have also

of this dissertation, this requirement serves as the

clue to unraveling the apparent circularity of the transcendental deduction of freedom in the
it

second Critique and,

to

go a giant step further,

allows us to begin to see the unity between the two Critiques them-

selves.

However, the inquiries

of the Critique of Pure

Reason only

provide the prelude for reason's constructing a foundation for the
objective reality of freedom without which the full-blown ontological

significance of noumenal reality and, consequently, the justification
of the

complete activities of pure reason remain incomplete.
In other

Critique

words, having completed

now awaits

to fully explore

its

preparatory task, the first

the work of practical reason in the second Critique

and actualize the exciting possible avenues that

has discovered, one of which

is the

it

idea of a causality through freedom.
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But this, of cours6

sacond Critiqua

,

,

an undorstatomont bocauso

is

and

for that mattar to tha third Critiqua as wall,

than just a task and a challanga;

nass of

its

has givan to tha

it

it

has givan pura raason an awara-

own incomplatanass and providad

sat of concapts and idaas through which

damands and tansions found within

mora

its

it

own

it

with a diraction and a

can bagin
natura.

to fulfill tha

That is, tha prin-

ciples found within the Dialectic free reason to meaningfully explore

dimensions beyond the empirical, namely the moral, the religious, and
the aesthetic

Such

a

view

— dimensions within which reason finds

of the relations

between the Critiques

,

its real dignity.

which

a relation

hope my work in this dissertation has revealed and defended,

I

is

radically different from seeing the Critiques in utter contradistinction

with each other as many Kantian scholars have proclaimed.
I

have attempted to bring to

compose

a unity, a belief

life

In short,

Kant's belief that the first two Critiques

which perhaps finds

its

clearest expression

in the following quotation:

The speculative restriction of pure reason and its practical extension bring it into that relation of equality in
which reason in general can be employed suitable to
its end, and this example proves better than any other that
the path to wisdom if it is to be made sure and not to be
impassable or misleading, must with us men inevitably
pass through science; but it is not till this is completed
that we can be convinced that it leads to this goal.
,

But as

I

have stated in my introduction and elsewhere,

it is

this

"extension" of reason into the practical where the enigma of the Kantian

program

is

found and which has to be resolved before the Kantian
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metaphysics can possibly be seen as sound.

The last chapter

dissertation, and for that matter the entire work of Part

and action, attempts to provide just such

which, to be sure, has been hinted

my explanation
ates in
I

my

of the

enigma

at but

and others have claimed

to

on freedom

a resolution, a resolution

never fully explored.

of the Critical philosophy,

may seem

final section,

11

I

Although

which culmin-

to be inappropriately brief for

be such an essential problem,

turns out to be a truth which, as

of this

it

what

actually

have tried to show, immediately and

clearly falls out of the arguments and results of Kant's demonstration
of the objective reality of freedom and the insights into the activities
of pure

reason that such

a

This is not to say

demonstration reveals.

that the enigma is not a central focal point or springboard into under-

standing the Kantian program, for that this is so
himself.

However,

it is

freedom serves as

have tried

to

recognized by Kant

only after practical freedom

that this riddle can be resolved.
of

is

validated

In fact, the transcendental deduction

resolution.

its final

is fully

To say the same thing,

I

defend what Kant saw as the exciting and climactic dis-

covery of the second Critique

,

which

is "the

grand revelation which

we

obtain through practical reason by means of the moral law, the revelation, namely, of a supersensible world by the realization of the other-

wise transcendent concept

of

freedom."112

A fundamental insight that runs throughout

theory of freedom is

its

my

inquiries into Kant's

reciprocity with the activities of reason and
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the ontological ramifications that such a reciprocity carries with

By vindicating the Idea of freedom in the
its reality in the activities of the

Kant has,

I

first Critique

it.

and by showing

moral subject in the second Critique

.

think, justified and revealed the spontaneity of pure reason

as the source of being.

We

might then say that freedom

is the

funda-

mental concept of being for the Critical philosophy.

One cannot read Kant without being struck by
there are different
of reality
to

my

modes

of being.

the fact that for him

The meaningfulness

goes beyond the reality of appearances.

of the

concept

But, more important

point, as early as the transcendental deduction of the categories

of the first Critique

,

the spontaneous legislative character of reason

was introduced as well as

the implications this had for the being of

a transcendental thinking subject.

tions for

That is, the ontological implica-

noumenal reality are present long before even the Dialectic

the Critique of Pure Reason

of

Not only that, but their connections with

.

a pure spontaneity of reason have already emerged.

However, unless Kant can make sense out

dom and demonstrate

its reality,

of the

any meaningfulness to

concept of freea

mode

of

reality beyond appearances, or, for that matter, the being of appear-

ances
to this

Of course, there

itself is groundless.

program since reason

account of the nature of
be absurd to think

it

its

is

own

is a

certain circularity

attempting to trace and give a critical
activities and principles, and

it

would

could do so without using these very same activities
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and principles.
itself?

What else could be expected

of a critique of

reason by

In fact, the Critical philosophy is a transcendental
deduction

of the principles of reason

by reason

Reason realizes that

itself.

must be free to transcend the empirical limitations
to carve out ontological

it

of the understanding

models and set up principles

for

meaningful

investigation of such models or else face contradictions and incom-

pleteness within

its

own

To say that reason

way implies an
ing.

nature.
is free to originate

unrestricted freedom,

Within each of the contexts

or

if

contexts of meaning in no

that notion even has any

mean-

frameworks that reason carves

out there must be necessary laws which reason must locate and to

which

it

must conform

to

if it is

obey

its

own

rationality.

These neces-

sary laws, however, can only be understood from within that context,

whether
As

ground

be theoretical, moral or teleological.

we

realized in the case of the practical, there really

for free legislation

be sure,
nature.

it

a

is

no

independent of the moral law, which is, to

necessity which reason finds nowhere but within

its

own

This need to legislate other contexts or models for interpreting

events was also evident in the solution to the Third Antinomy where

reason realizes the necessity

for

transcendental or speculative reflec-

tion in order to provide unity to the theoretical activities of the

understanding as

it

works

through the categories.

to

make phenomenal nature

And, furthermore, as

I

intelligible

indicated at the end

"
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of Part

I

of this dissertation, there is no

need

to see the third Critique

as a change in Kant's view of nature, but rather as a consistent
appli-

cation of reason's freedom in setting up yet another context for meaningfully interpreting events.

This, of course, is to be done again with

the guide of necessary principles

— in this

posiveness formed from another demand
logically and aesthetically interpreted.

discovered in this dissertation that

I

of

case the principle
reason as

It is

it

of pur-

both teleo-

is

with the ideas that

I

have

should like to investigate the

third Critique in the future, again using the concept of freedom as a

focal point as

I

think Kant himself suggests,^ being thereby consistent

with his statement in the Preface to the second Critique of seeing free-

don as "The keystone

of the

whole architecture

system

of the

of pure

reason.

Of course, these various frameworks are not determined by reason
The Kantian metaphysics

alone.

dimensional character

of

reason

is not

is

pure idealism.

The multi-

sensitive to and attempts to accomo-

date the multidimensional character of human experience.
attitudes reason takes toward experience, whether

it

The various

be theoretical,

moral or aesthetic, are demands which human experiences will not
allow
ful

it

to overlook.

Such experiences reason seeks

to

make meaning-

according to principles which can only be discovered and justified

by a critique of

its

own

activities.

But of fundamental importance to this dissertation is the fact

.
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that the various dimensions of
ful

human experience cannot be made meaning-

independent of reason's spontaneity in legislating frameworks

of

explanation according to principles which carve out different
modes of
being.

This spontaneity

was

necessary presupposition

a

in the first

Critique with the pure theoretical self-consciousness of the
"I-think,"

even though

its

objective reality as a mode of being was not demon-

strated until the second Critique with the pure practical self-consciousness
of the "I-will".

This is not the discovery of two different rational selves,

but rather one and the same reason discovering and exercising

don within different dimensions
intelligible being

.

And by so doing

— a being which,

,

it

its free-

affirms its

own

unlike the being of appearances,

cannot be known but which must necessarily be presupposed in thought

and which necessarily reveals
scending what

it

itself in action .

can empirically know

This is reason tran-

in order not only to

make sense

out of such knowledge but also to make sense out of those other dimen-

sions of

its

being which reveal themselves through the very act of this

transcendence
This act of transcendence by reason of its
is the true

expression of finitude,

unconditioned which will provide
ideal of pure reason,

it is

for it is

it

unity.

own conditionedness

reason's search for the

And although this

is the

not empty, for, in the realm of the practical,

reason discovers the unconditioned moral law which gives an ontological grounding to what the first Critique presupposed from its very

.
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beginnings, namely, that reason

is

fundamentally free and legislative.

Surely then there can be no doubt that freedom is central for Kant's
Critical thinking, for

it

reason's prescriptions
Although

I

carries with

it

reason's limitations as well as

for the realization of

human

dignity.

have tried in this dissertation to demonstrate the

centrality of freedom for the Kantian metaphysics,

I

realize that

I

have

only hinted at and not fully developed a solution to a Kantian ontology.

The Kantian problems concerning

a theory of

being run as historically

deep as the ancient debate between Plato and

Aristotle.

Realizing that

there are fundamental ontological distinctions the question for Kant, as
it

was

for Plato

and Aristotle, concerns how to relate them.

And just

as Kant sees truth in both empiricism and rationalism in building the
Critical epistemology, the

same holds

true in

coming to terms with

a

Kantian theory of being

Undoubtedly there
tinction

Platonic character in Kant's making the dis-

is a

between the realms

of

phenomena and noumena and yet he does

not want to tear the unity of reality apart into two separate worlds
is quite

This

obvious in his solution to the Third Antinomy and in the intro-

duction to the Third Critique

,

a

work which he claims

unification of all dimensions of being.

leanings, however,

when he speaks

Kant is unintelligible

if

to be the final

Kant links with Aristotlian

of events and

man as having

dimensions of being qua sensible and qua intelligible
for

.

seen as uni vocal.

.

That is, being

Yet Kant's theory of

.
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mind

is

absolutely anti-Aristotlian.

Concepts are not gained totally

through abstraction but rather are found in the
purity of the mind itself.

And even though they are applicable to nature only when
they have been
schematized, the purity of their origin, as

1

tried to bring out in the

final section of this dissertation, justified for Kant
their extension

beyond the realm

of nature.

This grounding for transcendental reflec-

tive thought is a possibility that Aristotle does not have;
and

grounding Kant makes

power
of

to

make meaningful

a

use of in suggesting reason's free legislative
a variety of different

modes

or

dimensions

being

Thus
concept
I

full

it is

of

I

am suggesting as

freedom

key

is the real

believe that this dissertation

that

it

a possibility for further study that the

to unlocking Kant's theory of being.

is the

beginning toward such a study in

has demonstrated the importance of freedom

for Kant's Critical

thought as a whole and has shown how Kant has vindicated

its

scendental use in the Dialectic and transcendentally deduced
objective reality in the second Critique

believe that by doing these things

I

.

tran-

its

But more importantly,

I

have revealed the meaningful

reciprocity between freedom and the activities of pure reason as

engages

in its

own

critique.

Without an insight into

it

this reciprocity,

a Kantian theory of being will remain an enigma, and any Kantian

explanation of the theoretical, moral and teleological dimensions of

man's being will be found unintelligible.
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I

think that the importance of freedom to the unity of Kant's

thought as a whole is clearly stated by Kant himself in the introduction
to the third Critique

and shall, therefore, serve as

a fitting

conclud-

ing statement as to the importance of the work of this dissertation in
its

own

right and as a basis for future study of the Critical philosophy:

Albeit, then, between the realm of the natural concept, as
the sensible, and the realm of the concept of freedom, as
the supersensible, there is a great gulf fixed, so that it is

not possible to pass from the former to the latter (by means
of the theoretical employment of reason), just as if they
were so many separate worlds the first of which is powerless to exercise influence on the second: still the latter is
meant to influence the former that is to say, the concept
of freedom is meant to actualize in the sensible world the
end proposed by its laws; and nature must consequently also
be capable of being regarded in such a way that in the conformity to law of its form it at least harmonizes with the
possibility of the ends to be effectuated in it according to
the law of freedom.
There must, therefore, be a ground of
the unity of the surpersensible /~sic .7* that lies at the
basis of nature, with what the concept of freedom contains
in a practical way, and although the concept of this ground
neither theoretically nor practically attains to a knowledge
of it, and so has no peculiar realm of its own, still it
renders possible the transition from the mode of thought
according to the principles of the one to that according to
the principles of the other.
,

—

—

.
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To simplify references, I have abbreviated the titles of works
by
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which translations and editions I have used.
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York:
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by H. J. Paton. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964
Part
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Other Works on the Theory of Ethics 6th ed. London: Longmans,
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Creed Meredith. Cxford: The Clarendon Press, 1952
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lated by James Haden. Indianapolis and New York:
The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965,
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"Causality and
Modern Physics, " The Monist, vol. 41 no.
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Library, 1950), p. 110.
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have taken this term from W. A. Suchting's illuminating article
"Kant's Second Analogy of Experience," Kant Studien Band 58, Heft 3
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(1967), p. 359
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P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's "Cri tique of Pure Reason " (London: Methuen Co., 1966), p. 138. For a
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Theory of Knowledge (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), p. 155.

35

KrV, B240.
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Strawson, p. 24. Strawson's statement of this thesis goes on to
comprise what might be seen as a qualification to the way I am interpreting Strawson, thereby making this thesis much more acceptably
Kantian. But regardless of how we interpret this qualification, which
is to say the least unclear, there is no question in my mind after seeing how Strawson analyzes Kant's Second Analogy that he bases his
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37
J.

Bennett, p. 222
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1966). There Dryer defends Kant against
what he takes to be misinterpretations of the causal argument
offered by such scholars as
Broad, Ewing and Prichard. Although
it would 1 think take us too
far
astray to examine these positions, 1
should like to point out that not
only IS Dryer's defense of Kant against
these critics quite convincing
but also his interpretation of Kant's
argument seems to agree with the'
one I have presented above. For example. Dryer
says; "Kant is concerned with what must be the case if someone's
observation of a
certain matter A is to enable him to know of the
occurrence of it.
Yet merely observing A after observing a state
in which A did not
present itself would not suffice
Hence Kant argues that the
observer would be enabled to know of the occurence
of A, only if it
would be correct for him to think that the state he observed
in which
A did not present itself was such that it was impossible
for it to
exist without being followed by A
only therefore if it would be correct for him to think that A was caused by something
existing in the
other state." (pp. 431 -432).
.

.

.
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Beck, "The Second Analogy.
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Heisenberg says in Physics and Philosophy that "we have been
convinced by experience that the laws of quantum theory are correct,
and, if they are, we know that a foregoing event as cause for the
emission at a given time cannot be found.
Therefore, Kant's
arguments for the a priori character of the law of causality no longer
.

apply.
41

47
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(pp. 89-90)

Beck "The Second Analogy," p. 201
Ibid.
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p. 202
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43

We also need in the above example a postulate for associating
the F-series with the E-series which also must make use of the Cseries; but I think that which has been said above is sufficient for
establishing the point at issue.
^“^Beck, "The Second Analogy
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Heisenberg, The Physical Principles
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pp. 62ff.

Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy
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Charles Hartshorne, The Logic of Perfection and Other Essays in
Neoclassical Metaphysics (Lasalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing
Company, 1962), pp. 1 62-1 63
I take it this is the sense of cause
Margenau is rejecting when he speaks of "uncaused" events.
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'^My position is much akin to the "critical determinism" Ernst
Cassirer develops and contrasts with the mechanism of Laplace in his
posthumous book Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics
tr. by O. Theodor Benfey (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956).
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^^KrV, B25=A12.
57

Prolegomena
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See Kant's discussion of the Postulates of Empirical Thought,
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Gerd Buchdahl, "The Kantian 'Dynamic
of Reason' with Special
Reference to the Place of Causality in
Kant's System, " Kant Studies
ed. by L. W. Beck (Lasalle, Illinois:
Open CoiTrt Publishing
ompany, 1969), p. 356. This relationship
between the causal principle and specific causal laws was
further elaborated upon by
Buchdahl in a paper "The Conception of
Lawlessness in Kant's Philosophy of Science" presented at the Third
International Kant Congress
at the University of Rochester,
April 2, 1970. There he argued that
any change from Newtonian to post-Newtonian
science would leave
the main body of the first Critique intact,
including its transcendental principles and the necessity they
impose upon our experience
o nature, since these principles do not
prescribe any empirical laws

upon nature.
69

KrV

A550=B578.
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B383

^*^KrV,
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iMd. B445. This is one of two ways to view the unconditioned;
the other way is as a ground of conditions which
itself is not conditioned by any other condition, that is for example,
as a first cause
possessing absolute self-activity (freedom). These two different
ways of viewing the unconditioned leads reason into antinomic con,

flict

with itself.
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The last italics are mine.
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A543=B571; my italics.
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footnote 71
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^KrV, A447=B475.
KrV, A519=B547
The fact that the regulative nature of this principle is overlooked by both thesis and antithesis of the First
and Second
Antinomies is the reason Kant argues that neither position can be true.
.

can say nothing determinate about the whole of experience, e.g. about
the magnitude of the whole of appearances. Rather "I must
limit my
assertions to the rule which determines how experience, in conformity
with its object, is to be obtained and further extended" (A520=B548).
This same insistence upon the regulative employment of reason is
equally important for understanding Kant's solution to the Third Antinomy
where he argues for the possible truth of both thesis and antithesis.
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too finds this to be the reason
ignores the true Critical solution to
the Third Antinomy
(p.

why Kant

213).

-

A533=B561

A534=B562 . There he defines freedom in the
practical sense as "The will’s
independence of coercion through
sensuous impulses" and points out that it,
unlike transcendental freedom, presupposes the notion of ought
.

20

A804=B832
Note well that this in no way undermines
ant s belief that without transcendental
freedom there would be no
practical freedom. He is here simply saying
that once the possibility
of transcendental freedom has been
shown, the requirements of
practical freedom have been satisfied. But
1 shall have more to say
,

.

about this in Part

II

Cassirer underrates the distinction even though he does
mention
does recognize it as being fundamental to Kant's
argument. But regardless of such mention and recognition,
Cassirer
says "I do not propose to worry myself over the intricacies
of the
reasoning Kant brings forward here. Instead, I shall in what
follows
raise a much more general issue, namely, why he offers
so curious
end unsatisfactory a solution of the antinomy between natural
and
non-natural causation. The main reason would seem to be that he
is
unduly preoccupied with the problem of moral freedom"
(pp. 305-306).
I am suggesting that Cassirer
should have undertaken the worry.
But such a statement is quite in keeping with Cassirer's
sceptisism over Kant's understanding of the unconditioned as the
supreme principle of reason (pp. 240-243). Perhaps this is why he
sees little value in any regulative use of reason and hence seems to
avoid any substantive discussions of it (pp. 340-341).
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The development of many of the above ideas came out of discussions with my colleague, Daniel Gordon, at the University
of Massachusetts at Amherst.
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distinction between an intellectual intuition into noumenal activity,
which Kant of course rejects, and transcendental reflection into this
same realm. This failure is witnessed already by his seeming identification of "thing-in-itself " and "noumenon" (see my footnote 32).
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theory of empirical significance in the Analytic, thereby missing the
importance of the dynamic of pure reason in the Dialectic.
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products of the referential rules, which are the principles of the
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understanding, or the rules themselves.
It is clear, however
that in
introducing a concept’s
he is indicating the need for 'such
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Furthermore, in the case of man, this empirical
nothing but a certain causality of his reason."
(A549=
B5 77). Reason is not only to be seen in
an epistemological role but is
also the efficacious cause of man's actions. But
more about this in
the next chapter.
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